

Ouachita Baptist University

## Scholarly Commons @ Ouachita

---

Honors Theses

Carl Goodson Honors Program

---

1968

### The Truman Election: Was 1968 a Repeat?

Cloene Biggs

*Ouachita Baptist University*

Follow this and additional works at: [https://scholarlycommons.obu.edu/honors\\_theses](https://scholarlycommons.obu.edu/honors_theses)



Part of the [American Politics Commons](#), [Political History Commons](#), and the [United States History Commons](#)

---

#### Recommended Citation

Biggs, Cloene, "The Truman Election: Was 1968 a Repeat?" (1968). *Honors Theses*. 673.  
[https://scholarlycommons.obu.edu/honors\\_theses/673](https://scholarlycommons.obu.edu/honors_theses/673)

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Carl Goodson Honors Program at Scholarly Commons @ Ouachita. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ Ouachita. For more information, please contact [mortensona@obu.edu](mailto:mortensona@obu.edu).

THE TRUMAN ELECTION  
WAS 1968 A REPEAT?

---

H 973.9

BIG

*Botanical*

Presented to  
Mr. Guy Nelson  
Associate Professor of History  
Ouachita University

---

In partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for  
Special Studies 492, H491

# 143

---

Submitted by  
Cloene Biggs  
Fall 1968

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

chapter	title	page
1	INTRODUCTION	1-2
11	TRUMAN'S BACKGROUND	3-12
111	HARRY'S RUNNING	13-20
1v	GIVE 'EM HELL, HARRY	21-23
v	GOP PICKS A WINNER	24-29
v1	DEMOCRATS PICK A LOSER	30-32
v11	TRUMAN'S BAG SPRINGS A LEAK	33
v111	WALLACE'S CONVENTION	34-35
1x	STRATEGY	36-41
x	VICTORY FROM THE JAWS OF DEFEAT	42-48
x1	CAMPAIGN 1968	49-54b
x11	REFLECTIONS OF '48 - A FEW DAYS LATE	54c-58d

## ILLUSTRATIONS

TITLE	PAGE
WHO CAN HANDLE STRIKES BEST	9a
DEMOCRATIC DECLINE	9a
TOTAL 1948 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR DEWEY, TRUMAN, WALLACE THURMOND AND OTHERS	44a-44b
THE FORECASTS COMPARED WITH ELECTION RESULTS	45a
STATE-BY-STATE ERRORS IN PREDICTION	45a
"KICK ME" cartoon	48a
TOTAL 1968 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR NIXON, HUMPHREY AND WALLACE	54a-54b
CARTOON	54c
WHERE WALLACE RANKS AMONG THIRD PARTIES	56a
THE POLLS VS. THE VOTERS	58a
1948 ELECTION	58b
MAP OF 1948 VOTE	58c
MAP OF 1968 VOTE PREDICTION MAP OF ACTUAL VOTE	58d

## chapter 1

"Whatever one's appraisal of Harry Truman as President, he commands admiration for his indomitable courage through the election year. On the other hand, what happened to Dewey is a classic example of what the Greeks call hubris, the pride before the fall. Yet, there is no room for anyone to throw scorn or derision. All saw through the glass darkly in 1948. Circumstances contrived a gigantic comedy and pulled all like puppets. One can almost hear Puck in the wings, 'What fools these mortals be.' The experience should be a sobering reminder of human fallibility." 1

As election day in 1948 drew nearer, political pollsters, pros and amateurs united in predicting victory for Thomas E. Dewey. Only underdog candidate President Truman and, as it turned out, the American electorate disagreed with this consensus.<sup>2</sup>

At the end of 1947 Truman was considered certain for renomination by his party, and the Gallup Poll showed that he would easily defeat either of the two leading Republicans--Governor Dewey and Senator Taft. A get-tough policy with Russia had pushed up his popularity--the Marshall Plan, his advocacy of government action to curb high prices, his confrontation with labor leader John L. Lewis which ended in a Truman victory, all had boosted his popularity. The '47 November elections had brought favorable omens, after the devastating defeat in the Congressional elections of '46, with Democrats winning many local elections. On November 7

political commentator David Lawrence said, "The chances are less than even that the Republicans will win in 1948 no matter whom the Republicans select as their candidate."<sup>3</sup>

But within four months universal pessimism had set in. Truman was considered a certain loser, and there was a strong drive to deny him renomination. Never has the political stock of a President fallen with such<sup>4</sup> lightning rapidity.

chapter 11

There is a quality of drama to Truman's life story. He had been lifted from relative obscurity to the Presidency by the unpredictable processes of Vice Presidential selection and the death of FDR.

Harry Truman was born on May 8, 1884 in Lamar, Missouri. His father was a farmer and a mule trader. Harry never got beyond high school, owing to a financial disaster that befell his father. He worked as a timekeeper, a bank clerk and returned to the family farm at age twenty-two. He was fond of playing the piano, reading history, the Masonic Lodge and National Guard drill. World War I dislodged him from his comfortable rut. Captain Truman discovered in France, 1918 that he could command men, and he came out of the war with new found self-confidence.<sup>5</sup>

After the war Truman married Bess Wallace and invested in a haberdashery that was forced to close during the depression in 1922. He then turned to politics under the sponsorship of the powerful Fendergast organization. The Fendergasts' needed a candidate for county judge of Jackson County, Missouri. They chose Truman to run, and he won the general election with ease. He now had a \$3,000-a-year job and a new career. Two years later he was defeated--the only electoral defeat in his career--but made a comeback in 1926 when he was elected presiding judge. He served in this

capacity for eight years and earned a reputation for being a conscientious official and an honest one--a rare distinction in that area.<sup>6</sup>

Truman was just a small cog in the Fendergast machine. He always maintained that Tom Fendergast never asked him to do a dishonest deed, but his reputation suffered from guilt by association--a loyal association with one of the most corrupt political machines in the country. In 1934 the Fendergasts' needed a senatorial candidate. They finally turned to Judge Truman who was eager for the chance, fought hard and won.<sup>7</sup>

In Washington Truman was known as "the Senator from Fendergast." It was a very painful situation for him since no one judged him on his ability but only on his background. He was largely ignored. Even though he had quietly broken with Tom Fendergast, he refused to turn his back on his friends or to appear weak by stabbing the people who helped him. Truman voted straight New Deal and greatly admired FDR, but the White House held him at arm's length because of the Fendergast aroma around him. Truman did not know it, but FDR was out to break Fendergast.<sup>8</sup>

By the time Truman came up for re-election in 1940, Tom Fendergast was in jail. FDR sent a message to Truman that if he did not care to run for re-election, he'd be glad to give him a seat on the Interstate Commerce Commission. Mr. Roosevelt said he didn't think Mr. Truman should



care to run.<sup>9</sup>

Mr. Truman thought he should! However, FDR's offer was a measure of how far the errand boy had come; it was a considerable show of recognition from the man who didn't even want to meet him four years earlier, and was now willing to take the trouble he'd get for giving a good appointment to the notorious henchman of T. J. Pendergast.<sup>10</sup>

The Pendergast machine was in ruins; Truman was on his own. With meager funds and a hastily improvised organization he won the primary over FDR's man by only 7,600 votes. It was the triumph of the underdog and a foretaste of 1948. He ran on his record, as he was always going to run - the record said that Harry was an honest man. It became clear from this election that Harry Truman had been running for Himself for a long time - since way back in 1922 when he ran for county judge.<sup>11</sup>

It was in his second term that Truman made his mark as a senator by chairing the "Truman Committee", an ad-hoc committee established in 1941 to investigate the national defense program. This committee was a congressional conscience and auditor of the entire war production program crusading against bureaucratic waste of all kinds. By the time Truman resigned as chairman in 1944, it had saved the taxpayers over fifteen billion dollars.<sup>12</sup>

The committee gave Truman the sort of reputation which leads to a lifetime Senate seat. But in May, 1944 a Southern revolt against Vice President Henry Wallace, who was regarded as too left-wing, caused the President to accept a

new running mate. Truman emerged as the choice. He was an excellent selection for he had an impeccable New Deal record, he was acceptable to the South and in good standing with labor, was something of a hero as a war investigator and he had no enemies.<sup>13</sup>

Less than three months after Truman took office as Vice President, Roosevelt suffered a cerebral hemorrhage. The death of Roosevelt catapulted Truman into that elite circle of thirty-three men who have held the office of President, But Truman was unprepared; FDR had not groomed any man to be his successor. Truman had to conclude America's participation in World War II and help establish peace. He was confronted with occupation problems in Germany, Austria and Japan and was totally unfamiliar with Roosevelt's secret understandings with Churchill and Stalin. Within the year he was called upon to ride the swift current of irritated public opinion flowing out of America's readjustment to peacetime.<sup>14</sup> As Truman himself said:

"I felt that I had lived five lifetimes in my first five days as President. I was beginning to realize how little the Founding Fathers had been able to anticipate the preparations necessary for a man to become President so suddenly. It is a mighty leap from the Vice President to the Presidency when one is forced to make it without warning. Under the present system a Vice President cannot equip himself to become President merely by virtue of being second in rank."<sup>15</sup>

While the nation mourned FDR's death, Truman enjoyed a honeymoon with Congress as with the country. At one point President Truman had a greater popularity

with the American public than did Roosevelt or Eisenhower. Yet he was more often a minority than a majority President in public opinion polls.<sup>16</sup>

Truman was swept along by the momentum of things started under Roosevelt. Shortly after he took office, an international gathering at San Francisco began to draft the charter for the United Nations. On May 8, 1945 Germany collapsed. Just as he was about to discuss Germany's fate at Potsdam, he was informed that the United States now had a successful atomic bomb. Truman promptly issued a decree for Japan to unconditionally surrender or face utter destruction. A new era in warfare opened when Truman ordered the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. Japan surrendered less than five months after he took office.<sup>17</sup>

Disenchantment, when it came, was gradual and it was both personal and political. As President, Truman seemed hopelessly miscast, lacking the dignity or charm of his able predecessor. His personality delighted some, dismayed others, but the main concern was over the way he faltered and fumbled under the weight of responsibility.

"...the plain people still liked Harry Truman as a plain man, but he was not a President who inspired their high confidence and enthusiastic admiration.... A great many of the U. S. people felt sorry for him." 18

Truman's method for handling the railroad strike in May, 1946 enraged his labor supporters and left many citizens with serious doubts concerning his judgment. After months of deadlocked negotiations, a nationwide railroad strike was called. A crisis atmosphere developed for the

coal mines were also on strike, and the country had recently been harassed by a massive strike wave in steel and other industries.<sup>19</sup> Truman spoke to the leaders of the railroad unions saying:

"If you think I'm going to sit here and let you tie up this whole country, your crazy as hell."

"We've got to go through with it, Mr. President," Whitney said. "Our men are demanding it."

Truman got up from his desk. "All right, I'm going to give you the gun. You've got just 48 hours--until Thursday at this time--to reach a settlement. If you don't I'm going to take over the railroads in the name of the government."<sup>20</sup>

In a dramatic appearance before a joint session of Congress, Truman demanded the right to draft strikers into the army whenever national safety was imperiled. During his speech he was informed that an agreement had been reached, but he stuck to his legislative proposal. This incident was probably Truman's most rash and potentially dangerous acts as President. It did put a shine on Truman's image as a tough, determined, "to-hell-with-where-the-chips-may-fall" fighter for what he believed was right." This eventually aided him in 1948 when labor finally came back to his corner. But for now he left labor cold.<sup>21</sup> \*

As the 1946 congressional elections approached, Truman had been in office nineteen months. He had presided over the final victory in the war, but the mood

\* see illustration page 9a

of exultation and hope had gradually faded. In his major endeavor at home--to hold the line on prices and wages-- he had failed. The cost-of-living index leaped from 76.9 at the end of 1945 to 83.4 a year later and to 102.8 by 1948. Price increases brought wage increases which were preceded by strikes. Ordinary consumers, caught in the price squeeze and plagued by shortages of meat, automobiles, housing and other needs turned their irritation on the most obvious scapegoat--the President and the Democratic administration.<sup>22</sup>

"Among the members of his own party," the New York Times reported late in 1946, "the prevailing attitude toward the President is one of simple despair and futility. Most seem to think he has done the best he could, but that his best simply was not good enough." 23

As the midterm election campaign warmed up, the Republicans, with rare genius, summed up the national mood providing a focus for resentment with "Had enough?"--<sup>24</sup> one of the most devastating campaign slogans of all time. \*\*

November 5--election day. When it was over, the Republicans had taken control of Congress for the first time in sixteen years. The crushing defeat brought more comfort to Harry Truman than despair. It lifted twin<sup>25</sup> burdens from the President's shoulders.

When Truman came to the Presidency he was a moderate conservative, but he had inherited a liberal mandate, a set of liberal advisers and a feeling of obligation to defer to his dead predecessor's wishes. Inescapably, Truman found himself making statements and advocating

\*

WHO CAN HANDLE STRIKES BEST?

	Democrats	Republicans	No Difference
October, 1945	41	31	28
February, 1946	36	36	28
October, 1946	23	46	31

\*\*

DEMOCRATIC DECLINE

-1946-

Congressional Preferences

	Democrat	Republican
February	55	45
March	53	47
July	49	51
October	47	53
November Election	45.7	54.3

policies in which he personally did not wholeheartedly believe. Therefore, his administration talked out of the left side but longed for the right so it was bound to stumble and drag its feet.<sup>26</sup>

But with defeat in 1946, the mandate won by Roosevelt in 1944 was lifted. Truman was free to be his own man-- or to be his own President. He could now go in any direction he wished. Second--the Republicans now had the responsibility of finding solutions for the problems of post-war United States. Truman now had his own scapegoat to use as an excuse when things weren't going well.<sup>27</sup>

Shortly after the election Truman's fortunes began to improve. A new and refreshing figure moved into the intellectual void around the President. Clark Clifford, smart, able, diplomatic young lawyer from St. Louis had been promoted to the post of legal counsel to the President. Clifford did not talk or look like a New Deal liberal, though he was, and he gradually won Truman's full confidence becoming his chief speech writer and administrative coordinator.<sup>28</sup>

Truman took a firm line against a strike called by the United Mine Workers, proposed the policy to aid Turkey and Greece which became known as the "Truman Doctrine"--American support for nations everywhere which were resisting Communist pressure--and launched the Marshall Plan. These new ventures displayed Truman for the first time in full command of the powers of his office. By following his own advisers, Truman was beginning to win back large numbers

of disaffected voters. By July, 1947, Dr. George Gallup released his new poll which found 55 percent of the public now favored the Democrats in a Presidential election--compared to 47 percent who would have voted for a Democratic candidate in December, 1946. Gallup spoke of the Democrats as having executed "a major political feat."<sup>29</sup>

By mid-1947 the Truman administration's policy in domestic affairs was made clear when Truman vetoed the Taft-Hartley Act which imposed significant restrictions on the exercise of labor's power in collective bargaining. This was a major victory for Truman's liberal advisors led by Clark Clifford. Suddenly Truman emerged as the champion of the labor movement little more than a year after he had demanded power to put the railroad strikers into the army. This Taft-Hartley veto was the first major step in closing the gap between the inner convictions and public utterances of Harry Truman. The veto message was ineffective since Congress passed the law over Truman's veto. But this restored standing with the unions made it likely that they would support him in the Presidential election the following year.<sup>30</sup>

It was one of the misconceptions--perhaps a public relations triumph--of the 1948 Democratic campaign that it generally gave the impression of being "an improvised, desperate effort of an embattled President fighting single-handedly against over-whelming odds."<sup>31</sup> There is little doubt about the desperation of the campaign, but it was not improvised. The campaign was carefully planned every step of the way. The general lines of strategy were



drawn as early as autumn of 1947. These were a basic blueprint written by Clifford in a lengthy memorandum on "the politics of 1948." When Clifford began his paper in 1947, Truman was not really the underdog; no one had any reason to predict a Southern revolt and Henry Wallace had not declared his candidacy. However, none of those involved in the project were overly optimistic. The 1946 defeat was still fresh in their memory; the Republicans had many able candidates; the **threat** of Henry Wallace was obvious.<sup>32</sup>

In mid-November Clifford presented Truman with a 43-page document--bold and clear in its analysis of present trends, accurate in predicting the future, and proposing a course of action for Truman to follow for the next twelve months.

It was predicted that Thomas E. Dewey would be the Republican candidate; Henry Wallace would run on a third-party ticket; President Truman could win even with the loss of the big Eastern states if he held the South, West and labor vote. Events confirmed these judgements. Clifford was wrong in one prediction. "As always, the South can be considered safely Democratic, and in formulating national policy, it can be safely ignored." This time the South simply refused to follow standard procedure.<sup>33</sup>

Truman read the document and agreed with Clifford's analysis. The concept of a bold, uncompromising offensive with the State of the Union message on January 7.

chapter iii

Harry Truman's State of the Union message, delivered before Congress at 1:30 P.M. January 7, 1948, was the opening gun of his reelection campaign that was to last for ten months. This speech was to announce the political program on which the President would campaign.<sup>34</sup> Clark Clifford's young assistant George M. Elsey said that the speech:

"...must be controversial as hell, must state the issues of the election, must draw the line sharply between Republicans and Democrats. The Democratic platform will stem from it, and the election will be fought on the issues it presents." 35

The reaction of the Republican dominated Eightieth Congress was "extraordinarily chilly." Seven times Truman paused for applause and there was none. Democrat Lowell Mellett wrote:

"The reception for Harry Truman was markedly like that given the Polar explorers by their immediate audience--a circle of correctly attired penguins. A few penguins on that day flapped their wings." 36

The major thrust of the message dealt with domestic issues. Truman requested a multi-pronged social program including expanded social security, health insurance, Federal aid for education, Federal housing, extended farm supports, conservation of natural resources and higher minimum wages. There was also one novel approach which showed the Truman touch--he proposed that each taxpayer should be able to deduct forty dollars from his tax bill for himself and each dependent. Simple; uncluttered by fancy mathematics; something every voter could understand. 37

The President came out fully clad a New Deal liberal, and those on the left and right knew the reason--on December 29 Henry Wallace had entered the political picture with a third party. Truman's program was designed in part to steal the thunder of Wallace's progressive party.<sup>38</sup>

The Democrats greeted his speech with something less than enthusiasm; the Republicans called it "a labored effort to promise all things to all people;" the press particularly criticized the forth dollar tax credit as "unmitigatedly demagogic...explicable as a transparent political move."<sup>39</sup>

The State of the Union message to Congress designed to keep the President's program in the headlines. Truman was exploiting one of the major benefits of the Presidential office during election year--the power to create publicity just by being the President. The slogan around the White House was "hit'em every Monday," as Truman gave the Congress much unsolicited advice. He issued his economic report; Reorganizational Plan I of 1948; plan for a waterway that would link the St. Lawrence River to the sea; a proposal for curbs on grain used in making ethyl alcohol all in the month of January. Others from February to March concerned: civil rights, extension of wartime controls, highway construction, assistance to Greece and Turkey, International Telecommunication Convention, assistance to China, U. S. participation in the United Nations, housing, extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act. Most if not all of these messages sought to dramatize the gulf between dynamic, aggressive, Democratic

Presidential leadership and a stagnant, partisan, Republican Congress.

By far the most important of these messages was the one on civil rights presented February 2nd. Truman had established a Presidential Committee on Civil Rights in 1946 under the chairmanship of Charles E. Wilson of General Electric. The committee's study, "To Secure These Rights," made a number of drastic recommendations. On the basis of this study Truman made ten recommendations to Congress:

- 1 - enact modern civil rights laws adequate for the needs of the day
- 2 - legal attack against all forms of discrimination
- 3 - anti-lynching legislation
- 4 - end to segregation in interstate commerce
- 5 - establishment of a Fair Employment Practices Commission
- 6 - stronger protection for the right to vote
- 7 - right to safety of person and property
- 8 - self-government for the District of Columbia
- 9 - establishment of a permanent Commission on civil rights
- 10 - elimination of discrimination in federal employment and segregation of the armed forces.

This Presidential paper was remarkable for its scope and audacity. Even FDR had never gone this far to aid Negroes; he being politician enough to realize its fullest implications.

There was an immediate roar of indignation from the "ignorable" South. Representative Sam Hobbs accused the President of a desire "to keep the South a conquered pro-

vince," and Representative Eugene Cox said, "Harlem is wielding more influence with the Administration than the entire white South." Senator John Connally of Texas said that it was a "lynching of the constitution."<sup>42</sup>

The President expected these repercussions and had announced his civil rights stand early in the year to give Southern tamperers a chance to cool off. Instead he added fire to the already simmering pot of Southern revolt. At the Conference of Southern Governors in Wakulla Springs, Florida, the following week, the revolt was given a chance to gather momentum. They eventually adopted a forty-day cooling-off period. But it was becoming obvious that something serious was in the works. Senator Eastland of Mississippi, labeling Truman a "carpetbagger," declared, "All we have to do is to refuse to vote the ticket.... By withholding the electoral votes, the South can defeat in 1948 any Democratic candidate."<sup>43</sup>

In order to placate the dissident Southerners, Truman quietly backed away from initiating action to get his civil rights legislation passed. His two executive orders on federal employment and the problem of the armed forces were not released until after the stormy Democratic Convention. Truman did everything possible, short of going back on his February 2nd speech, to keep the Dixiecrats in the party.<sup>44</sup>

Another serious blow came to the Democrats a few days after the civil rights message when the question concerning the extent of support for Henry Wallace was answered. On

February 17th in a special election for Congress held in the 24th Congressional District of the Bronx, supposedly a stronghold of Democratic boss Ed Flynn, the American-Labor candidate Leo Isaacson, backed by Henry Wallace, trounced his Democratic and Liberal opponents by a two to one margin. This indicated that Wallace's strength could cost the Democrats New York and other Eastern states in the Presidential election. Wallace had campaigned in the district which was 35% Jewish saying, "Truman talks Jewish but acts Arab." Although the United Nations, under pressure by the United States, had passed through a resolution for partition of Palestine on November 29, the United States had then issued an arms embargo on December 5. Jews and Arabs were now fighting with hundreds<sup>45</sup> being killed.

Under this cloud of prevailing doom, the Democratic Party held its annual Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner with the distinguished guest for the evening being President Truman. The atmosphere was grim. Senator Olin Johnson of South Carolina had reserved an entire table right under the eyes of the President, then sent an aide to make sure the table remained vacant. They spent \$1,100 to keep that table vacant refusing to attend on the ground that since no segregation<sup>46</sup> was enforced they might have to dine with Negroes.

The absence of prominent Southerners was very noticeable. There were fund-raising dinner parties throughout the South, as usual, but little if any of the proceeds found their way to the Democratic National Committee. At Little Rock Governor Laney took a vote as to whether the funds should be retained in Arkansas as a protest against the President's civil rights

program. The chairman called the vote a tie and referred the money to the party's state committee. Soon afterward, when Harry Truman's dinner speech was relayed from Washington, about 400 diners (750 present) got to their feet and quietly left the room.<sup>47</sup>

If ever there was an office-seeking politician with the chips stacked against him, it was Harry Truman--do-nothing-right-Truman in those first months of 1948. Late in February he took a break and went on a two week Caribbean cruise. This break and others greatly aided Truman since they broke the oppressive continuity of growing hostilities and gave time for his natural self-confidence and optimism to recuperate. He returned looking Tan, rested and ready to fight. Monday, March 8th, he called Democratic National Committee Chairman Senator McGrath to his office. A little later McGrath, with a hint of a smile, walked into a swarm<sup>48</sup> of reporters in the White House lobby.

"The President," he told them, "has authorized me to say that if nominated by the Democratic National Convention he will accept and run."<sup>49</sup>

By the end of March Truman's popularity had hit rock bottom. He had retreated from his position calling for partitioning Palestine and adopted the idea of the temporary position of trusteeship. To the liberals this was a complete sell-out. Max Lerner voiced this sentiment for many: "One would have to go back to Munich to recall a sell-out as cynical, as bedraggled, as contemptible.... A man had to have a genius for blundering to have done so complete a job of stripping

himself of the support of so many varied groups."50

The Democratic leaders could see their strange conglomeration of support bases being pulled apart. The party was an amalgam of a conservative South, a progressive, organized labor movement, big-city machines, moderates, liberals, idealists, radicals, Jews and now Negroes--all fused together by the political genius of Roosevelt and torn apart by the particularly apt blundering of Truman. The conviction that Truman was a dead duck was due basically to the fixed idea that political analysts had been proclaiming for some time--that the dissolution of the Roosevelt coalition was inevitable. To a large extent the decline in Truman's political strength was this sophisticated political thinking becoming ingrained in the public psychology. Time and again political analysts wrote that only the war enabled Roosevelt to hold his coalition together in 1944--an idea impossible to challenge or substantiate. There is something to the belief that if you say something often enough, loud enough people begin to believe it.

In the dark days of the spring of 1948 Truman was urged to withdraw. The belief in the certainty of Truman's doom led to the most bizarre development of a rather bizarre campaign--the effort to draft General Dwight D. Eisenhower in place of Truman. (It has been reported that Truman offered to withdraw if Eisenhower would consent to run with Truman as the Vice Presidential candidate. Truman denies this, and General Eisenhower simply says that any affirmation on this should come from Truman or not at all.) By the end of March



the rebellion was erupting in all parts of the nation. However, Eisenhower was not interested in receiving the nomination, and the rebellion gradually died. Truman was never worried about being denied renomination. He knew that to a great degree the man sitting in the White House controlled his party's convention through naming the chairman, patronage which gives control of party machinery down to the lowest precinct worker thus enabling the President to corral convention delegates, and the belief that to dump the party's leader, thereby repudiating the record of the party, is very dangerous. Once Truman had decided to run there was little that could be done to prevent renomination.

chapter iv

The central theme of the President's campaign in 1948 was his vendetta with the Republican dominated Eightieth Congress. This was a convenient piece of fiction contrived out of thin air by a master politician. Truman understood that the people have a distrust for their elected legislative body and are ready to blame them collectively for the ills of the time, therefore, he made the Eightieth Congress his scapegoat. He impressed the people with his idea that the President and Vice President are the only two persons elected by the whole country and represent all the people. The members of Congress, on the other hand, are elected by sectional or special interest groups.<sup>53</sup>

The explosion against the Eightieth Congress came suddenly in June. For the first five months of the session there were no signs of any unusual bad feelings between the President and the Congress; only the usual friction on domestic affairs. The President set off on June 3rd in the Presidential Special for a cross-country trip to accept an honorary degree at the University of California. This enabled him to list the trip as "non-political" and to have it paid for by the regular treasury rather than by the impoverished Democratic National Committee. Congress was to adjourn June 19th and Truman was criticized for taking "a self-serving, political vacation at a moment when the whole Government should be on the job in Washington."<sup>54</sup>

Truman stopped for major addresses, containing his personal message to the people, in five key cities and made many off-the-cuff rear-platform speeches. Truman jauntily announced that he was on his way "fur to get me a degree." Having established the non-political pretext for his trip, he got down to his personal message: "There is just one big issue. It is the special interests against the people, and the President being elected by all the people." Of course, the Republican Party in general and the Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress in particular represented the special interests. "You've got the worst Congress in the United States you've ever had. If you want to continue the policies of the Eightieth Congress, it'll be your funeral."<sup>55</sup>

Truman kept blazing away, the crowds were hugh and enthusiastic, local politicians told him that he day struck fire. He had taken the position of the fighting champion of the people against special interests. The first shouts of "Give'em hell, Harry!" were heard on this trip, and this soon became the battle cry of the Democratic campaign. Truman said the cry was originated by some man in Seattle with a big voice. Truman declared, "I told him at that time, and I have been repeating it ever since, that I have never deliberately given anybody hell. I just tell the truth on the opposition--and they think it's hell."<sup>56</sup>

Senator Taft protested bitterly, as did most Republicans, the spectacle of the President heaping hell-fire and brimstone on the Congress at the federal expense. "The

President," said Taft, "is blackguarding the Congress at every whistle station in the country." With this Taft coined the term used to describe Truman's campaign-"whistle-stopping." He also managed to wound the civic pride of every place the President had spoke.<sup>57</sup>

The President was highly satisfied with his trip. As an extemporaneous speaker he inspired the crowds as his prepared speeches could never do. He established the free-swinging style he was to use in later campaign trips. Once Truman came out as his own man after 1946, he gradually, though blundering at times, let his natural political instincts take over. He believed in the people as strongly as he held the Congress, Party leaders and press in contempt. You might say he decided to "tell it like it is!" -this was something the people could understand.

chapter v

As Truman slid downhill, the battle for the Republican nomination seemed to be all important since whomever won would obviously be the next President. The struggle for the nomination is the story of the rise and fall of Harold Stassen. Many Republicans believe that if the vigorous, young Stassen had been nominated, he would have been elected.<sup>58</sup>

The leading candidates were Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio and underdog Harold Stassen. Dewey was the sweetheart of the liberal faction of the Party. He had risen to prominence in the 1930's as a racket-busting district attorney in New York City. In 1942 Dewey was the first Republican in twenty years to win the governorship of New York. He established a reputation as a moderate economically and socially with a talent for efficient management. In foreign affairs he was an advocate of the United Nations. He won the Republican nomination in 1944 without actively campaigning for it. He could not defeat the electorate's reluctance to turn out Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief during wartime, but did make a good showing. He was returned to the governorship of New York in 1946 by an impressive victory.<sup>59</sup>

However, Dewey was not a dramatic or compelling candidate. Many found his manner cold and smug. Time magazine wrote of Dewey that he was "too mechanistically precise to be liked, too watchfully unbending to be confided,

too coldly ambitious to be loved." But Dewey had a rich baritone voice, perfect for radio. He was clean cut, well groomed and combined youthful vigor with a keen sense of political awareness. The liberals felt he was perfect for the mood of the country--a mood which they felt showed tiredness with the brash Democrats and ready for a change for the cool steadiness of Dewey. This was their great miscalculation.<sup>60</sup>

Stubbornly opposed to the Dewey forces was the conservative Old Guard of the G.O.P. Its members were the grass-roots workers who kept the party together between national elections, and their champion in 1948 was Robert Alphonso Taft of Ohio. Taft had emerged as a skillful political tactician and a formidable political figure. He was the actual leader of the Party in the Senate. Taft had come to symbolize thrift, honor, patriotism and other virtues they were clinging to in order to keep their sanity during the two previous decades of bewildering and fearful change.<sup>61</sup>

Taft was a shy, dour-faced man almost totally without personal magnetism.. His comments on controversial issues were usually to bluntly honest and politically ill-considered. For instance, in 1947 when food prices were skyrocketing he advised the American people to "eat less." Nevertheless, he was the most serious threat to Dewey.<sup>62</sup>

The fact that the Republicans had two leading candidates opened the door for the emergence of a compromise darkhorse-- Harold Stassen. After Dewey won the New Hampshire primary in early March, Stassen came to the front. In the first

big primary in Wisconsin on April 6, Stassen pulled off a surprise, overwhelming victory over favorite son General Douglas MacArthur. Stassen then moved his very effective organization into Nebraska where the three leaders campaigned vigorously. Here Stassen won again. In the primary in Pennsylvania where no candidates were entered, Stassen received enough write-in votes to win. Suddenly the Gallup Poll had done a flip-flop, and Stassen pulled ahead of Dewey.<sup>63</sup>

Stassen had captured the imagination of the public. The reasons for his tremendous success are the man himself-- he was young, only forty-one, and appealed to the young. In 1938 he had startled the nation when at thirty-one he was elected governor of Minnesota. After wartime service in the Navy, he returned to the political scene. His enthusiasm, drive and physical appearance radiated strength, purpose and decisiveness. He attracted young lieutenants with dedicated zeal.<sup>64</sup>

Stassen declared his candidacy for the Presidency in 1946 and launched a campaign that was to cover 160,000 miles in forty-two states. As a midwesterner, Stassen appealed to the conservatives; he was an internationalist reflecting the liberal temper of the times. He seemed as bold and forthright as the title of his book Where I Stand. In the age of anxiety when there was a deep distrust of politicians, Stassen came forth as a new, unorthodox, forceful personality who had the self assurance to cope with the problems of the times. His chances looked good, but then came the mistakes.

Stassen's driving ambition caused his first mistake-- pitting himself against Taft in the Ohio primary on May 4th. Taft told Stassen honestly that Stassen could not win in Taft's home state, but Stassen took the advice as a sign of weakness. By the time Stassen saw his mistake it was too late. Taft won the primary, and Stassen lost valuable time from campaigning in Oregon.

Dewey knew the importance of Oregon, where another Stassen triumph would almost assure Stassen the nomination. Dewey was taking no chances this time but campaigned long and hard. Now it was Stassen's turn to panic, and he did make a crucial error. He challenged Dewey to a debate on whether the Communist Party should be outlawed. Dewey eagerly accepted. His courtroom experience had been excellent training for such an encounter, and while the voters around the country listened on their radio Dewey tore Stassen's arguments to bits. Dewey won the primary and greatly enhanced his prestige nationwide.

More than 2,000 delegates and alternates gathered at Philadelphia on June 21st and watched the dawn of a new political age--television had arrived. However, its limited scope caused little change in the 1948 conventions. The major decisions were still made in smoke-filled back rooms, and only the "insiders" felt like it was a high-spirited convention. To all outward appearances the Republicans suffered from boredom within.

Dewey arrived at Philadelphia with 350 votes, gathered in the primaries and behind the scenes. He only needed 200



votes to secure his nomination.

Dewey had a highly efficient organization. While Stassen and Taft were bickering among themselves, Dewey's men were out wheedling, cajoling and promising--or at least seeming to promise--in order to get the uncommitted delegates. One state after another wavered and, fearful of being bypassed by the Dewey bandwagon, panicked and climed aboard. As a result, on the first ballot Dewey had 434 votes, just 114 short of the needed majority. Taft had 224 votes and Stassen 157. To maintain the psychological pressure Dewey's lead would have to grow during the second round; it did, to 515 votes only 33 short of nomination.<sup>69</sup>

Taft placed a desperate call to Stassen saying the only way to stop Dewey was if Stassen released his delegates to Taft. Stassen said he would on the fourth ballot, but by now Taft knew there would be no fourth ballot. Taft, wearily, scribbled a few lines and sent the note to Ohio Senator John Bricker, who had placed Taft's name in nomination. Just before the third ballot began, Bricker read Taft's message to the convention: "Dewey is a great Republican, and he will make a great Republican President."<sup>70</sup>

Within a matter of minutes the other candidates also bowed out, and on the third ballot Dewey became the party's choice. Dewey entered the hall and began his acceptance speech with: "I come to you unfettered by a single obligation or promise to any living person." (The delegates who knew of the intensive pre-balloting bargaining being done by Dewey's lieutenants were stunned. They soon found out

that Dewey meant that, at least on the Vice Presidency, whatever promises his aides might have made or implied would not be binding on him.)<sup>71</sup>

At 4 A. M. Dewey, after having conferred all evening with party leaders, called Earl Warren to his hotel and offered him the Vice Presidency. Warren had turned Dewey down in 1944, but he could not do so again and still retain his standing in the party. After receiving Dewey's promise to invest the Vice Presidency with meaningful responsibility, Warren agreed to run. Thus, the Republicans offered the electorate the governors of the two richest and most populous states. Warren's good-natured warmth nicely complemented Dewey's brisk, chilly manner. The Republican's had come up with a very strong ticket to do battle with a "gone goose."<sup>72</sup>

chapter vi

The stage was set. The Democratic Party was going to commit suicide just so Harry S. Truman could run for President. The convention opened in Philadelphia, on July 12th, and it looked like a massive funeral gathering.

The first night, however, the Democratic Party caught fire, and the man who struck the match was Senator Alban Barkley of Kentucky, convention keynoter. Barkley, long the Democratic leader of the Senate, at seventy was one of the party's staunchest bulwarks and most colorful orators. He spoke for sixty-eight minutes announcing:

"We have assembled here for a great purpose. We are here to give the American people an accounting of our stewardship in the administration of their affairs for sixteen outstanding eventful years, for not one of which we make an apology."

The delegates, suddenly roused from their lethargy, cheered. Barkley later spoke of Dewey's promise to eliminate the cobwebs from the federal government.

"I am not an expert on cobwebs, but if my memory does not betray me, when the Democratic Party took over the government of the United States sixteen years ago, even the spiders were so weak from starvation they could not weave a cobweb in any department of the government." 73

When Barkley finished, a twenty-eight minute demonstration broke out on the floor. Few demonstrations of that duration are without advance planning, but there was nothing synthetic about the affection displayed for Barkley. For one moment he had blotted out the frustrations of 1948 and turned back the clock to the golden era of Roosevelt. His reward was the Vice Presidential nomination.

Truman had wanted to bolster the ticket with a youngish New Dealer, and his first choice had been Justice William O. Douglas. However, Douglas turned him down. This threw the Vice Presidency open, and when Barkley's speech made him the party's hero,<sup>75</sup> Truman had to accept him.

Before the convention closed, Truman received another surprise. He had hoped to minimize the friction between southern and northern wings by having the platform committee adopt a mild plank on civil rights. The committee agreed over protestations of liberals led by Hubert H. Humphrey, the outspoken young mayor of Minneapolis who was running for the Senate, and who came into national prominence at this time. When the platform reached the floor, Humphrey presented a minority report calling for the adoption of a stronger civil-rights plank. Humphrey orated, "I say the time has come to walk out of the shadow of states' rights and into the sunlight of human rights." The vote was a sensational upset with 651 $\frac{1}{2}$  for to 582 $\frac{1}{2}$  against. Thirty-five delegates from Mississippi and Alabama walked out of the convention in protest. In his memoirs, Truman cites an exchange between a newsman and South Carolina's Governor J. Strom Thurmond. "President Truman is only following the platform that Roosevelt advocated," the reporter pointed out. "I agree," Thurmond replied. "But Truman really means it."<sup>77</sup>

Next came the main order of business. The Southerners remaining threw their support to Senator Richard Russell of Georgia. But on the first roll call Truman got 947 $\frac{1}{2}$  and the nomination. Truman began his acceptance speech around 2 A.M.

He reeled off a long list of Democratic achievements and again lashed out at the sins of the Republican Congress. He then noted that the platform adopted by the Republicans called for legislation to remedy the housing shortage, curb inflation and increase social security.<sup>78</sup> The Eightieth Congress had already failed to act on these proposals therefore:

"On the twenty-sixth day of July, which out in Missouri we call 'Turnip Day,' I am going to call Congress back and ask them to pass laws to halt rising prices, to meet the housing crisis--which they are saying they are for in their platform. Now, my friends, if there is any reality behind that Republican platform we ought to see some action out of a short session of the Eightieth Congress. They can do this job in fifteen days if they want to do it. They will still have time to run for office.... What the worst Eightieth Congress does in its special session will be the test.... The American people...will decide the record." 79

Truman was gambling that the Republican leadership would not push through his proposed legislation and take credit for it. But he felt he had no choice. As Clark Clifford, Truman's top political adviser, put it: We've got our backs on our own one-yard line with a minute to play; it had to be razzle-dazzle. Moreover, Truman was really fairly confident that the Republicans would not call his bluff.

Congress lived up to Truman's expectations and did nothing substantial about inflation, the housing shortage, civil rights or any other problems. Less than two weeks later, Congress went home leaving behind a fresh supply of ammunition for Truman.<sup>80</sup>

chapter vii

The "ignorable" Solid South had had enough. On Saturday, July 17th, Democrats from all over the South and California, Indiana and Maryland met in Birmingham, Alabama. The Dixiecrats' one day convention was a rousing affair, but notably absent were the Southern politicians of stature. Therefore, the nominations went to the two prime movers, Governor J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Fielding<sup>81</sup> L. Wright of Mississippi.

Their platform said, "We stand for the segregation of the races and the racial integrity of each race." Thurmond then said,

"We believe that there are not enough hoops in the Army to force the Southern people to admit the Negroes into our theaters, swimming pools, and homes.... If the South should vote for Truman this year, we might as well petition the Government for colonial status...." 82

The Southern revolt was perplexing. The strong civil rights platform was obviously not supported by Truman, and the Southerners must have known this. However, tempers had been roused, and logic was no longer in control. The revolt, however, was serious. It would rupture the Solid South which was a problem Truman had not prepared for. All White House strategy had been built on the assumption that the 117 electoral votes of the Solid South were in the bag.<sup>83</sup> "Now the bag was leaking."

chapter viii

Philadelphia hosted a third political convention beginning Friday, July 23rd--that of Henry Wallace's Progressive Party. In the same hall used by the Democrats and Republicans, the Progressives formally nominated Henry Wallace for President and Democratic Senator Glen Taylor of Idaho for Vice President.

84

Wallace had seemed to be the spiritual heir of Roosevelt, and a real attraction among liberals. His progressive stands were considered sure magnets for votes. He was an unusual sort of politician--a scientist, a peace advocate, an intellectual, an idealist and devout Christian.

85

The Progressive Party of 1948 was unique among major third party movements, for it was clearly dominated by the Communist Party. Most of the members were non-Communist, but many willingly collaborated with Communists because they were too politically unsophisticated to recognize one. This became the largest and most successful electoral effort ever launched by the Communists, because Wallace, though never a Communist himself, allowed himself to be used for their purposes.

86

Wallace broke with Truman over our foreign policy toward Russia. He hoped to influence the Truman administration toward a more cooperative and understanding position in regard to the Soviet Union. Wallace was more readily disposed to question the motives of his own government than to impugn the sincerity of a foreign power. Truman, however, was in

no mood to overlook the expansionist program of Russia, and the conflict resulted.

Early in 1948 Wallace's following appeared to be extensive. After the victory of his candidate, Leo Isaacson, in the Bronx 24th Congressional District election, Truman and his staff recognized him as a threat. Truman began to offset Wallace's appeal by incorporating Wallace's programs into his own. Thus, Truman took action to recoup some of the damage done when he repudiated the Palestine partition. Truman blamed the State Department for his original mistake and recognized Israel on May 14th within minutes after it had become a state. Also, Truman's civil rights message of February 2nd, was motivated by a desire to offset Wallace's appeal to the Negroes.<sup>87</sup>

The Wallace movement turned out to be a fiasco in the end because he could get no real support from labor. He did manage to get on the ballot in forty-four states, but in order to get enough signatures to do this Wallace was forced to peak too soon.<sup>88</sup>



chapter ix

"Nice guys don't win ballgames," Leo Durocher once observed. The same is too often true of the game of politics, and never has this been more substantiated than in the Presidential campaign of 1948.<sup>89</sup>

Republican Thomas Dewey made the "great miscalculation" of his political career when he deliberately chose to wage a "high-level" campaign. His campaign effort was as tidy as a new pin, abundantly financed and organized with meticulous efficiency. The polls, press and political experts told Dewey he could not lose, so he did not campaign to win but to set up the guideposts of his new administration. Dewey's rich commanding baritone exuded so much confidence that he put his audiences to sleep.<sup>90</sup>

Democrat Harry Truman, just as deliberately, chose the low road--a choice of necessity. No one believed he could win. The party treasury was empty, the party organization was in chaos, and the President was on the defensive. So he fought with the heedless, slam-bang ferocity of the underdog who knows there is only one way out--and he set the public's imagination afire.<sup>91</sup>

Late in June Clifford sent a memorandum to Truman saying:

"This election can only be won by bold and daring steps calculated to reverse the powerful trend now running against us. The boldest and most popular step the President could possibly take would be to call a special session of Congress early in August. This would: (1) focus attention on the rotten record of

the Eightieth Congress, which the Republicans and the press will try to make the country forget; (2) force Dewey and Warren to defend the actions of Congress and make them accept Congress as a basic issue; (3) keep the steady glare of publicity on the Neanderthal man of the Republican party, who will embarrass Dewey and Warren; (4) split the Republicans on how to deal with such major issues as housing, inflation, foreign policy, etc., and (5) give President Truman a chance to follow through on the fighting start he made on his western tour.

This course may be hazardous politically, but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that President Truman faces an uphill fight to win the coming election." 92

This led to the special session of Congress which was a farce, but it did put the Republicans on the spot.

The Democratic campaign was geared to attract four distinct groups--labor, the farmer, Negroes and the consumer. Truman had predicted that the liberals and labor leaders would come back into the fold after the convention, and he was right. They really had no place else to go. Gerald W. Johnson expressed this sentiment in the New York Post:

"The great argument for the President had no reference at all to Truman. It is simply this: Take a look at the others. Stacked up against the Archangel Gabriel, Truman doesn't look so good, by stacked up against the array opposing him he begins to look like the Archangel Gabriel. After all, Gabriel is not a candidate." 93

The Americans for Democratic Action, the Liberal Party in New York, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations all now endorsed Truman. His veto of the Taft-Hartley Act and the recognition of Israel had payed off. The rest were leaning between Truman or Wallace. Dewey never make an inroad into the labor or liberal vote.

Truman started his campaign with a speech in Detroit. This was a "labor city," and Truman came out with another vicious attack on the "do-nothing" Eightieth Congress and the Taft-Hartley Act they had passed. Dewey chose to ignore Truman's attack which set the strategy for both men's campaign.<sup>95</sup>

After labor had come back to Truman, he turned his attention to the farmers, who had reasons for grumbling. The basis of the farmer's trouble was the crop surplus produced in 1948. All summer grain prices had been dropping steeply. Truman managed to blame their troubles on his right arm--the Eightieth Congress.

The farmer, ordinarily, could store his surplus grain in government silos until prices rose. Then he could sell at a profit on the open market. The Commodity Credit Corporation loaned the farmer money on the crops stored. But in renewing the C.C.C.'s authorization in 1948, Congress had failed to authorize the building of any additional storage bins. When the 1948 harvests came in, the C.C.C. ran out of storage bins, and the farmers were forced to sell at a low market price.<sup>96</sup>

In his first major farm speech at Dexter, Iowa, on September 18th, Truman said:

"This Republican Congress has already stuck a pitchfork in the farmers' back. They have already done their best to keep price supports from working. ...big business lobbyists and speculators persuaded the Congress not to provide storage bins for you farmers. They tied the hands of the administration. They are preventing us from setting up the storage bins that you will need in order to get the support price for your grain." <sup>97</sup>

The farmers, usually a Republican stronghold, were suddenly thinking Democratic; Dewey did nothing to stop this. But Dewey was at a disadvantage--he had been concentrating on New York politics for so long that he knew very little of the farmers' problems. His advisors were also big city politicians, so there was no one who could tell him the mistake he was making. The farmers could remember nothing Dewey had said precisely because Dewey had said nothing.

Truman's election campaign was mostly two cross-country tours patterned after his "whistlestopping" tour of June. He was at his best making brief, impromptu speeches at whistle stops along the way. Their finances were low, but they managed to turn this to their advantage. On several occasions to dramatize the party's financial plight, Finance Chairman Johnson allowed the network's to cut the President off the air before he had finished his speech. Once, when a network official warned that Truman would be cut off unless the Democrats put up more money. Johnson told him: "Go ahead. That will mean another million votes."

Dewey also traveled the country in a campaign train with his staff of experts and advisors. They even spoke at some of the same places. (But everywhere Truman was attracting bigger audiences than Dewey. Reporters explained this away by saying that the voters were turning out to see President Truman and his family, rather than Democratic candidate Truman.) Dewey's big issue, if there was one,

was unity. "Our future and the peace of the world are staked  
on how united the people of America are," he proclaimed.<sup>100</sup>

In the interest of unity, Dewey even managed to take a tolerant view of Democratic sins. "I will not contend that all our difficulties today have been brought about by the present national administration. Some of these unhappy conditions are the results of circumstances beyond the control of any government." A kindness Truman would never have extended, and a tactic the voters found dull.<sup>101</sup>

The Progressive Party which had begun with hopes of waging a populist crusade that would bring support from farm and labor groups. But by his attacks on Republican reaction, Truman had stolen most of the issues and made them his own. Wallace found himself with only one real issue--peace. But in 1948 what Wallace called peace, many Americans called appeasement. Wallace's pleas for coexistence with the Soviet Union were undermined by the evidence of Russia's aggressive intentions; in February the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade in June. Wallace's refusal to disavow Communist support, and the obviousness of Communists and their sympathizers in the councils of the Progressive Party smeared his whole campaign with a Red brush.<sup>102</sup>

The presence of Henry Wallace was beginning to pay off for Harry Truman. The sentiment of the country was firmly behind Truman's firm anti-Communist stand and against Wallace as the exponent of the Communist line. Had it not been for the ingrained conviction that Truman didn't stand a chance, it would have been evident that the President, by his anti-Communist stand, was gaining ground.<sup>103</sup>



The Dixiecrat States' Rights campaign headed by Governor Strom Thurmond had been virtually assured thirty-eight electoral votes from the four Southern states where he had been made the Democratic Party's official candidate. Thurmond tried to build on this foundation by campaigning for "racial purity" and "states' rights." He was a moderate on the race issue and rejected racial extremists such as Gerald L.K. Smith. He was a believer in the justice of the South's cause and ran a decent campaign. <sup>104</sup>

Thurmond soon found that support was no easy thing to find. Most of the newspapers were against him. Ralph McGill of the Atlantic Constitution wrote, "We will pay through the nose for the Dixiecrats as we still pay for the leadership which took us into the war between the States to 'save us.' Is Harry Truman immortal?" Practical southerners saw no point in hurting Truman to help Dewey, whose racial views were as bad as Truman's and whose party they intensely disturbed. What could they accomplish by throwing their votes away? Thurmond found himself more and more alone. <sup>105</sup>

Truman kept slashing until the end. In one of his final speeches, he expressed that at first he was puzzled by Dewey's refusal to discuss the issues. "But after I had analyzed the situation, I came to the conclusion that the record of the Republican Party is much too bad to talk about." <sup>106</sup>

The afternoon of election day Truman slipped away to Excelsior Springs, Missouri, where he had a Turkish bath and then went to his room. He had a ham sandwich, a glass of milk, <sup>107</sup> listened to some early returns, went to bed and went to sleep.

chapter x

The Chicago Tribune's headline on the morning of November 3, 1948 read: "Dewey Defeats Truman." Then in their nationally syndicated column that day, the Alsop brothers had written: "Events will not wait patiently until Thomas E. Dewey offically replaces Harry S. Truman." However, at 10:30 A.M. eastern time the morning after election day, Dewey formally conceded. He told the press: "I am as much surprposed as you are. I have read your stories. We were all wrong together." Later Dewey was to say that he felt like a man who woke up in a coffin with a lily in his hand and wondered. "If I am alive, what am I doing here? And if I'm dead, why do I have to go to the bathroom?"<sup>108</sup>

On it's front page, the Washington Post invited the President to a banquet attended by "political reporters, radio commentators and columnists.... The main course will consist of breast of old crow en glace (You will eat turkey)." No major publication escaped without embarrassment, and one by one they apologized to ole "Give'em hell" Harry.<sup>109</sup>

The general public, though they elected Harry, were also amazed. They too had read the newspapers and the polls. The big question was, "How could all those experts be so wrong?" Truman had held Dewey to a lower percentage of popular vote (45.1% to Truman's 49.6%) than Dewey had received in 1944 (46.03%) against Roosevelt.<sup>110</sup>

Most political experts are convinced that the Republican victory was thrown away because of over reliance on

the polls. Because of this Dewey's campaign strategy was to give Truman the silent treatment. Dewey and his staff knew the dangers of an outspoken campaign. The poll predictions, giving Dewey a commanding lead, assured him that a "keep silent" strategy would be safest. Dewey's fixed plan of action robbed his "overthought" campaign of the spontaneity, originality and mobility which Truman enjoyed by playing the game by ear. Dewey permitted a Republican Congress which had notable accomplishments to be branded a "do-nothing" Congress; he allowed Truman to brand the Taft-Hartley law as a "slave labor act" after Truman himself had urged that he be allowed to draft striking railroad workers; Dewey let Truman take credit for high prices and high wages and yet blame the Republicans for not controlling inflation; he did not challenge Truman when he called a tax cut, which relieved 7,400,000 from paying taxes, a "rich man's tax bill"; he let Truman blame the Republicans for a grain storage shortage which was the fault of the Administration; he completely skipped the issues of Communists in Government, and the errors made by Truman's men abroad in dealing with Communism. As a result, the Republicans remained apathetic and overconfident; many simply did not bother to vote. Dewey inspired no one; in contrast, Dewey seemed dead while Truman, was not so efficient but very much alive.

For the pollsters, the shock of the election lingered after the disbelief had worn off. Their humiliation taught them a lesson they will never forget--take nothing for granted. In his first post election report Elmo Roper said:



"I could not have been more wrong. The thing that bothers me most is that at this moment I don't know why I was wrong."<sup>112</sup>

Truman had won a plurality of over 2,000,000 votes, but a swing to Dewey of 30,000 votes, appropriately distributed in Illinois, Ohio and California, would have given Dewey the Presidency. Wallace had made a very poor showing getting only 1,157,326 votes. However, he did cause Truman to lose New York, Maryland and Michigan. Thurmond had received 38 electoral votes, 1,176,125 popular votes, from four southern states--Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina. His 39th electoral vote came from a Democrat elector in Tennessee.<sup>113</sup>

Truman's winning coalition of states were very similar to the design made by Clifford in 1947. The President took every Western state but Oregon, seven of the eleven in the South, the four border states of Kentucky, Oklahoma, West Virginia and Missouri, five states in the Midwest--Illinois, Iowa, Ohio, Minnesota and Wisconsin; his only victories in the northeast were Massachusetts and Rhode Island.<sup>114</sup>

The voters who made up the successful coalition came from the same source as had FDR's support. When the popular vote is analyzed, it is found that Truman held most of the South, ran well in the urban North (here Wallace cut into his vote), successfully captured the west, and also had great success in the Midwest farm belt, usually Republican ground. It had been widely assumed that Roosevelt's coalition had been shattered because of the Wallaceites and

TOTAL 1948 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR DEWEY, TRUMAN,  
WALLACE, THURMOND AND OTHERS

State	Total vote	Percentage of total vote				
		Dewey	Truman	Wallace	Thurmond	Others
Alabama	214,980	19.0	--	.7	79.7	.5
Arizona	177,065	43.8	53.8	1.9	--	.5
Arkansas	242,475	21.0	61.8	.3	16.5	.4
California	4,021,538	47.1	47.6	4.7	0	.5
Colorado	515,237	46.5	51.9	1.2	--	.4
Connecticut	883,518	49.5	47.9	1.6	--	1.0
Delaware	139,073	50.0	48.8	.8	--	.4
Florida	577,643	33.6	48.8	2.0	15.5	--
Georgia	418,760	18.3	60.8	.4	20.3	.2
Idaho	214,816	47.3	50.0	2.3	--	.4
Illinois	3,984,046	49.2	50.1	--	--	.7
Indiana	1,656,214	49.6	48.8	.6	--	1.1
Iowa	1,038,264	47.6	50.3	1.2	--	.9
Kansas	788,819	53.6	44.6	.6	--	1.2
Kentucky	822,658	41.5	56.7	.2	1.3	.3
Louisiana	416,326	17.5	32.7	.7	49.1	--
Maine	264,787	56.7	42.3	.7	--	.3
Maryland	596,735	49.4	48.0	1.7	.4	.5
Massachusetts	2,155,347	42.2	53.4	1.8	--	2.6
Michigan	2,109,609	49.2	47.6	2.2	--	1.0
Minnesota	1,212,226	39.9	57.2	2.3	--	.6
Mississippi	192,190	2.6	10.1	.1	87.2	--
Missouri	1,578,628	41.5	58.1	.3	--	.1
Montana	224,278	43.1	53.1	3.3	--	.5
Nebraska	488,939	54.2	45.8	--	--	--
Nevada	62,117	47.3	50.4	2.4	--	--
New Hampshire	231,440	52.4	46.7	.9	0	.1
New Jersey	1,949,555	50.3	45.9	2.2	--	1.6
New Mexico	185,767	43.2	56.8	--	--	--
New York	6,274,527	45.3	44.3	8.1	--	2.3
North Carolina	791,209	32.7	58.0	.5	8.8	--
North Dakota	220,716	52.2	43.4	3.8	.2	.5
Ohio	2,936,071	49.2	49.5	1.3	--	--
Oklahoma	721,599	37.3	62.7	--	--	--
Oregon	524,080	49.8	46.4	2.9	--	1.0
Pennsylvania	3,735,149	50.9	46.9	1.5	--	.7
Rhode Island	326,098	41.4	57.8	.8	--	--
South Carolina	142,571	3.8	24.1	.1	72.0	0
South Dakota	250,105	51.8	47.0	1.1	--	--
Tennessee	550,283	36.9	49.1	.3	13.4	.2

TOTAL 1948 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR DEWEY, TRUMAN,  
WALLACE, THURMOND AND OTHERS (Continued)

State	Total vote	Percentage of total vote				
		Dewey	Truman	Wallace	Thurmond	Others
Texas	1,147,245	24.6	65.4	.3	9.3	.3
Utah	276,305	45.0	54.0	1.0	--	.0
Vermont	123,382	61.5	36.9	1.0	--	.5
Virginia	419,256	41.0	47.9	.5	10.4	.2
Washington	905,059	42.7	52.6	3.5	--	1.2
West Virginia	748,750	42.2	57.3	.4	--	--
Wisconsin	1,276,800	46.3	50.7	2.0	--	1.0
Wyoming	101,425	47.3	51.6	.9	--	.2
United States	48,833,680	45.0	49.4	2.4	2.4	.9

Based on Statistics of the Presidential and Congressional Election of November 2, 1948, compiled from official sources by William Graf under direction of Ralph R. Roberts, Clerk of the House of Representatives (Government Printing Office, 1949).

Taken from: Frederick Mosteller, Herbert Hyman, Philip J. McCarthy, Eli S. Marks, David B. Truman, eds., The Pre-election Polls of 1948, (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1949), p. 316-317.

Dixiecrats. Actually these revolts strengthened Truman as was shown in Sam Lubell's The Future of American Politics. The Dixiecrats siphoned off some votes, but they also solidified support for Truman among certain groups of traditionally Democratic voters and lent credibility to his civil rights programs. Henry Wallace's campaign made Truman invulnerable to the charges of being too "soft" on communism. This strengthened him among Catholic voters. <sup>115</sup>

Still the question, how had all the experts been so wrong? Everybody's mistakes, in the end, were attributed to the polls. One correspondent confessed: "I was too gutless to put stock in my own personal hunch, based on nothing better than tours of the area, chats with businessmen, union men, miners, ranchers, farmers, political leaders." He felt he couldn't pin down his hunch, so he followed the trend shown by the polls. Local political leaders relied heavily on the polls, so when a reporter interviewed a local leader, he often only picked up the information obtained from the polls the leader had read.

In another instance the Staley Milling Company, a Kansas City feed supplier, conducted an informal poll among its customers by having the farmers register their preference by buying sacks of feed with either a picture of a donkey or an elephant on it. In September, after 20,000 farmers in six Midwestern states had been polled, the result was fifty-four percent for Truman to forty-six percent for Dewey. "We read the Gallup and Roper polls that were all for Dewey," a company official explained, "and we decided that our results were too improbable." <sup>116</sup>

458-

THE FORECASTS COMPARED WITH ELECTION RESULTS

Percentage of total presidential vote

---

<u>National vote</u>	Dewey	Truman	Thurmond	Wallace	Total*
	<u>45.1</u>	<u>49.5</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>99.4</u>
Crossley	49.9	44.8	1.6	3.3	99.6
Gallup	49.5	44.5	2.0	4.0	100.0
Roper	52.2	37.1	5.2	4.3	98.8

\*Exclusive of percentages for minor candidates. Gallup percentages calculated on total vote for four principal candidates.

STATE-BY-STATE ERRORS IN PREDICTION

Forecast percentage minus election percentage	Number of state errors in Crossley predictions	Number of state errors in Gallup predictions
From -12.0% to -10.1%	2	4
-10.0% to -8.1%	4	2
-8.0% to -6.1%	5	9
-6.0% to -4.1%	13	12
-4.0% to -2.1%	12	14
-2.0% to -.1%	7	2
0 % to 1.9%	2	1
2.0% to 3.9%	0	0
4.0% to 5.9%	1	0
6.0% to 7.9%	1	0
Total number of states forecast	47	44

Taken from: Frederick Mosteller, Herbert Hyman, Philip J. McCarthy, Eli S. Marks, David B. Truman, eds., The Pre-election Polls of 1948, (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1949), p. 298-299.

The press were also misled by the polls. The reporters were meticulous in reporting crowd turnouts but were unwilling to draw conclusions which differed with the polls. Thus the great crowds which Truman drew the last few weeks of his campaign led almost no one to suspect that he might win. The crowds were attributed to the "entertainment value" of seeing any President and his family.<sup>117</sup>

Eight days after the election, the Social Science Research Council set up a committee to analyze where the pollsters had made their mistakes. The Gallup, Roper and Crossley organizations all cooperated in the investigation. The committee issued its report on December 27, 1948, and according to them the pollsters made many errors.

(1) All three polls had not considered the possibility of a decisive swing to Truman in the last two weeks of the campaign.

(2) All three stopped polling too early. Gallup's final prediction was based on samples taken in mid-October; Crossley's final forecast was based on a combination of state surveys from mid-August, mid-September and mid-October; Roper's final estimation was from data he collected in August from which he predicted Dewey's victory by such a margin that he discontinued periodic surveys.

(3) All three assumed that the final stages of the campaign would have no significant impact on the votes. Roper believed the entire campaign was irrelevant. The absurdity of this assumption was shown when a post-election survey showed that one out of every seven voters claimed to

have made up their minds within the last fourteen days of the campaign; three-quarters of these delayed decisions favored Truman.

(4) The polls contained errors in sampling and interviewing techniques, which resulted in too few interviews with people of grade school education and thus an underestimation of the Democratic vote.

After 1948 the poll takers became a more modest and humble lot; their techniques improved considerably. They gained a renewed awareness of the unpredictability of both leadership in a democracy and of the choices that voters make in the privacy of the voting booth. Take nothing for granted--particularly the American voter.<sup>118</sup>

To further analyze the election of 1948 we must take into consideration the personalities of the two major candidates. Immediately after the Republican convention Dorothy Thompson noted that Dewey's successful nomination "represented the success of political techniques and the managerial revolution.... Yet I had the impression by no means unique to myself that if he had been defeated more people would have been pleased with themselves."<sup>119</sup>

After the election, James Roosevelt, State Chairman of California, said, "Issues didn't matter in 1948. The people didn't want Dewey." Abe Goff, defeated for re-election in Idaho, tells of five friends meeting the day after election, each of whom voted for Truman because they didn't take to Dewey. Also the Democrats played up an example of Dewey's pettiness, telling how Dewey took a plane from LaGuardia



Airport eight miles to Idlewild Airport so that he, like Truman, could arrive in a plane for the dedication ceremonies.

But Harry, in contrast, represented the backbone of America--a common man. He was a Lion, Moose, Elk, member of the American Legion, V.F.W., Order of Alpha, Society for the Preservation of Barbershop Singing and a 33rd degree Mason. He portrayed a picture of an underdog gallantly fighting on against all odds. This kind of appeal rates  
121  
second only to the price of corn in its result.

"There were those--there are those--who say Harry S. Truman is an opportunistic and say it to mean that he would ride anybody's coat-tails to get ahead. This may be; contrary to popular opinion, some politicians are smart enough to be opportunists and not look like the popular opinion of what an opportunist looks like. It may be that Harry S. Truman's great political invention has been to coldly, deliberately, always give the people what they need, and to hell with the special interests because all the interests can give you is money, whereas the people vote. And Harry has never been interested in getting money, except at a ridiculously low wage per pound of effort expended, even when he needed it very badly for personal reasons. It may be that Harry Truman was open to being bought in exchange for power at the polls. In a nation where the government is supposed to be of, by, and for the people, that's where the power comes from. A study of Harry Truman's career leaves one with the conviction (of) how much easier, more permanent, and more popular Harry's way is." 122





TAKEN FROM: ROBERT SHOAN. "1948 ELECTION", AMERICAN HERITAGE, XIX (JUNE, 1968), P. 111.

chapter xi

"One candidate says he ought to be President because his Vice Presidential candidate is better than anybody else's. Another says he ought to be President because he will run over any anarchist who lies down in front of his car. A third--by all odds the runaway favorite--hardly says anything substantial at all."

123

This was campaign '68.

My name is  
Richard Milhous Nixon  
And I hope that you're  
All fixin' to  
Just tiptoe  
Through the issues  
With me.

Don't want to analyze,  
I'd rather generalize  
So please don't criticize.  
Simply close your eyes  
And tiptoe  
Through the issues  
With me.

James Symington

This was the essence of the Republican campaign of 1968. To a nation nervous over the problems of war, civil crime and violence, inflation--Nixon vowed to "sock it to 'em." However, this gave a misleading impression as the tricky slogan masked the true nature of the Nixon game. Nixon set the pace of his campaign with mechanical efficiency using unemotional drive to take America by shrewd calculation. Nixon was in the lead and playing it safe. He avoided a repeat of the debate debacle of 1960; he moved at a leisurely pace instead of in a mad swirl knowing that his exhaustion caused him to make costly mistakes in 1960.

124

Nixon got his base of support in the small Northern towns and among white Protestants. Small town residents

distressed over city conditions looked to Nixon for a quieting change as did the wealthier suburbanites. The GOP base broadened somewhat in the under 35 and the college-educated vote. Some of these moved from the Democratic party in reaction to the Chicago convention.

Nixon's Dewey campaign strategy gathered in enough diverse groups to elect a minority President. Nixon displayed his ability to put a party and a successful campaign together. But we have not yet seen if he has the inner sources of mind and spirit that separates the skilled technician from a memorable leader of men.

On the shores of the Potomac  
By the gently Johnson Bombing  
Stood the might Happy Warrior  
"Crying Hubert," was his name.

It's been many years a fleeting  
Since Hubert started fighting  
Mayor Humphrey's still repeating  
The messages of yore.

While his courage and his foresight  
Enriched his climb to power  
Lyndon Johnson with his own plight  
Made Hubert's chances sour.

So let us not forget Horatio  
Underdog that he be  
As Smiling Hubert runs for President  
Reminding both you and me.

Jerome Bork and Cloene Biggs

With the desperation of the underdog, Humphrey ran his campaign full steam ahead. His basic tactic was to give the Republicans more "hell" than anyone since Harry Truman. He damned Nixon as "Fearless Fosdick" for clinging to the law and order issue and as "Richard the Chickenhearted" for evading debate.

With his party in chaos, his treasury all but empty and prospects looking very bleak, Humphrey refused to give up.

In late September he dubbed himself "the Lonesome Ranger" and he rode himself mercilessly in an effort to let the people know the real Hubert Humphrey. By Humphrey's sheer determination and zeal he managed to bring a momentum to his own drive that seemed impossible after the convention. 127

Humphrey's usually buoyant expression often became clouded with pain and confusion. He could not comprehend why, in view of his record, he was looked upon as a member of a system that had proved unresponsive to the problems of today. He had always been a liberal, but now, because of his loyalty to his President, he was considered a member of the party moderates. Hubert was deeply grateful to Johnson for all the help Johnson had given him in the Senate and later. 128

Humphrey had always been a courageous liberal. As mayor of Minneapolis, at the age of 34, he had cleaned up the police force, reduced crime and aided schools. He had placed his political career on the line in 1948 when, at the Democratic Convention, he forced through a strong civil rights plank. He had crusaded for Medicare 15 years before it became law; proposed a Peace Corps nine months before it was established; strove valiantly for peace as was seen in his struggle for enactment of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. He failed to see how people could not remember all of this-- 129  
the truth is he could not shake the Johnson stigma.

Run them over

I'm the drover

And I will make you free

If you agree with me.

Communist and Anarchist--Listen here!

Wallace will never fear

In front of his car you lie

And there you're gonna die!

Black man is not crazy

He's just a little lazy

Our pure women he will dirty

If ever we give the chance.

Jerome Bork and Cloene Biggs

The band blared out "Dixie," and a knot of people closed in around three silent black demonstrators yelling, "Kill 'em! Kill 'em!" The true believers waved rebel flags and cheered, but the man merely grinned and greeted his crowd. "We not a sectional movement--we national!" he shouted and here in Madison Square Garden he had rarely been more convincing. In very polite language, George Wallace was running a campaign for President of the United States filled with racial prejudice, bigotry and pure hate--hate for anyone different or who dared to disagree. And the stunning fact of this campaign autumn was that Wallace alone among the candidates had really captured the public's imagination.

The domestic scene had been full of unrest and violence for the last few years. From "Communist inspired" student anti-war demonstrations to actual violent racial disturbances and a large number of Americans were either scared or angry, They were looking for a radical change which would take them back to the days when disturbances of this kind were not the rule but the exception. Suspicious, hate-filled, <sup>131</sup> reactionary Americans had finally found a leader.

TOTAL 1968 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR  
NIXON, HUMPHREY AND WALLACE

State	Total vote	Percentage of total vote		
		Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace
Alabama	921,197	14	14	66
Alaska	20,176	43	47	10
Arizona	376,325	35	50	9
Arkansas	258,692	31	28	41
California	6,231,693	46	47	7
Colorado	795,378	42	51	7
Connecticut	1,259,529	50	44	6
Delaware	211,413	42	45	13
Dist Columb	166,069	82	18	--
Florida	1,874,077	30	40	30
Georgia	907,410	26	29	45
Hawaii	178,447	58	41	1
Idaho	267,368	31	56	13
Illinois	3,580,231	45	46	8
Indiana	1,970,052	38	50	12
Iowa	1,087,733	41	53	6
Kansas	765,796	35	55	10
Kentucky	955,277	38	44	18
Louisiana	1,066,065	29	23	48
Maine	360,289	56	43	2
Maryland	1,197,819	43	42	15
Massachusetts	1,878,067	63	32	5
Michigan	2,258,612	49	41	10
Minnesota	1,464,014	54	42	5
Mississippi	620,386	23	14	64
Missouri	1,567,776	45	44	11
Montana	163,751	44	49	7
Nebraska	441,683	33	59	8
Nevada	133,332	40	47	13
New Hampshire	279,345	44	52	4
New Jersey	2,761,718	44	46	9
New Mexico	309,365	40	52	8
New York	6,632,250	50	44	5
North Carolina	1,553,577	29	39	31
North Dakota	190,994	39	56	6
Ohio	3,348,785	43	45	12
Oklahoma	859,065	32	47	20
Oregon	608,965	43	58	7
Pennsylvania	3,946,910	47	45	8
Rhode Island	370,393	65	31	4



TOTAL 1968 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE FOR  
NIXON, HUMPHREY AND WALLACE (Continued)

State	Total vote	Percentage of total vote		
		Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace
South Carolina	637,624	29	39	32
South Dakota	221,009	40	51	9
Tennessee	1,180,371	28	38	34
Texas	2,527,076	42	40	19
Utah	418,773	36	57	6
Vermont	156,736	44	53	3
Virginia	1,330,434	33	43	24
Washington	878,748	48	45	7
West Virginia	716,955	50	41	7
Wisconsin	1,656,679	44	48	8
Wyoming	100,800	36	56	9
United States	63,639,236	43.4	43.7	12.9

\* Results tabulated before all the precincts were counted

Taken from: "Presidential Vote," Arkansas Democrat,  
November 6, 1968.



Reflections  
of  
1948

chapter xii

There are a number of similarities existing in the candidates, issues and circumstances surrounding the Presidential campaigns of 1948 and 1968. I am not sure if they men made the conditions or if the conditions made them.

Richard Nixon ran the same kind of campaign as did Thomas Dewey. Nixon was not so confident as Dewey because pollsters learned their lessons well in 1948, but he still had a comfortable lead and ran his campaign like a man who was winning. Nixon, as did Dewey, avoided making a big issue of the issues and ran a tightly efficient, well-organized, slightly boring campaign. In the position of winner, with men were above muddling, hard-hitting campaigning. Neither did much to excite the public, but played it safe and got plenty of rest. The important difference is the quality of advisors each man had working for him. Dewey's men would have been fine if they had only been campaigning in large urban areas. However, the absence of anyone knowledgeable on the farming situation could very well be what cost Dewey the election.


Nixon, on the other hand, had an excellent staff of dedicated men, and he was covered in all areas vital to national campaigning. The one thing no one could do was give vitality and genuine enthusiasm to the type of campaign Nixon was waging. Nixon was saved by the fact that the voters wanted a change from the Johnson-Humphrey line without

reverting all the way back to Wallace--the Neanderthal man. Nixon was their only choice.

The 1968 counterpart to Thurmond and his Dixiecrat Party was George C. Wallace and his American Independent Party. Thurmond and the Dixiecrats bolted the regular Democratic Party because of the strong civil rights plank in the platform. Thurmond, a moderate on the racial issue, did not campaign out of the South. He only received support from four of the Southern states. The majority of Southerners, politicians and voters alike, were not willing to endanger the South's strong position in Congress just to fight Harry Truman. Besides, Dewey was just as bad as Truman on race, and he was also a Republican. Thurmond waged a decent campaign, but actually caused little excitement after the initial thurst was over, and tempers had time to cool.

Wallace and his American Independent Party were quite another story. George Wallace led his followers out of the Democratic Party in a fight for racial purity and states' rights. He campaigned vigorously and managed to get on the ballot in all fifty states. His message seemed to have a great deal of appeal for those voters who were scared of the Negro revolution and "Communist-inspired" student demonstrations. Wallace waged a fire and brimstone campaign based on fear and hate. He managed to put some excitement in what might have otherwise been an even duller campaign. Wallace received around 13% of the national vote, carrying six Southern states and cutting into the blue-collar and white suburban vote less than expected. But as long as there are people who hate, Wallace will be around again.

WHERE WALLACE RANKS  
AMONG THIRD PARTIES



percentage of popular vote

Taken from: Newsweek, November 11, 1968, p. 36.

Harry Truman and Hubert Humphrey were both forced to wage campaigns as the underdog. They had nothing to lose and everything to gain from a hard-hitting, gut-level campaign. Truman traveled the nation "whistlestopping" and letting the people see him. He used the Eightieth Congress as the whipping post for all the ills of the nation, and managed to build some enthusiasm for his cause. Truman was a genius when it came to understanding the people and their needs. He brought sympathy for himself by allowing his speeches to be cut off for lack of funds. Americans in Truman's time, loved nothing better than a common man unless it was an underdog--Harry was both. No one believed he could possibly win, and it was a lonely campaign. However, Harry had some definite advantages--one being the fact that he was the President. This enabled him to get publicity, free, anytime he wanted it, since anything the President says is news. Truman was probably not drastically behind Dewey for very long, even though the polls showed that he was. In 1948 everyone was convinced early in the year that Truman did not have a chance. The pollsters, newsmen and political experts had all reached a conclusion and then proceeded to gather evidence to support their conclusion. They had predicted so loudly for so long that Truman could not win, so that when evidence began to filter in indicating that the tide had changed, it was ignored.

The pollsters would never again repeat the mistake of 1948. Therefore, in 1968 when it was indicated that Humphrey would lose they were correct. George Gallup stated that

it was possible for him to pull an upset comparable to Harry Truman's. Nixon had peaked too soon and had run out of "half-issues," a great many people were tired of him. Dr. Gallup said, "Humphrey 'probably' would have won if the election had been a few days later."

Humphrey had to contend with a much stronger third party than did Truman, but mainly Humphrey had to contend with discontent. The advanced news media has given the American people a chance to see the intricacies of their political system at work. Seeing the fiasco at the Democratic Convention this year probably hurt Humphrey badly especially the younger more idealistic voters.

Humphrey made a strong push toward the end. He never gave up. The stigma of the Johnson administration was a handicap he could not overcome. Perhaps the big difference in the result of the two elections is that Truman was already President--his own man, and Humphrey was not; and seemed unable to convince the voters that he ever could be the "captain " of the team.

THE POLLSTERS VS. THE VOTERS  
1968

	Actual Vote	Gallup election eve	Gallup Oct. 27	Harris election eve	Harris Oct. 18
NIXON	43.7%	42%	44%	40%	40%
HUMPHREY	43.3%	40%	36%	43%	35%
WALLACE	13.0%	14%	15%	13%	18%
OTHERS OR UNDECIDED		4%	5%	4%	7%

Taken from: Newsweek, November 11, 1968, p. 35.  
U.S. News & World Report, November 4, 1968,  
p. 41.



1948 ELECTION

-Party Strength-

Voters Calling Themselves	Per Cent	Estimated No.
Democrats	45	22,000,000
Republicans	35	17,000,000
Independents	19	9,500,000
Other Party	1	500,000


-Actual Voting-

	Per Cent	Votes Cast
Truman	49.9	24,179,625
Dewey	45.3	21,991,290
States' Rights	2.4	1,176,154
Progressive	2.4	1,157,326

Taken from: John M. Fenton, In Your Opinion..., (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 63.




### VOTERS PUT NIXON ON THE MAP



TAKEN FROM: NEWSWEEK, Nov. 11, 1968

### AS EXPERTS SEE IT, Nov. 4



TAKEN FROM: U.S. News + World Report, Nov. 4, 1968

-FOOTNOTES-

1 Jules Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959), p. VII.

2 Irwin Ross, The Loneliest Campaign, (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1968), p. 1-2.

3 Abels, op. cit., p. 1-2. John M. Fenton, In Your Opinion..., (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 45.

4 Abels, Ibid., p. 2. Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 195.

5 Ross, op. cit., p. 11.

6 Frank Mason, Truman and the Pendergasts, (Evanston: Reveny Books, 1963), p. 24-25, 44-70, 80-91.

7 Ross, op. cit., p. 12. Mason, op. cit., p. 103-124.

8 Mason, Ibid., p. 126-128.

9 Mason, Ibid., p. 148.

10 Mason, Ibid., p. 149.

11 Mason, Ibid., p. 152-153. Ross, op. cit., p. 12.

12 Phillips, op. cit., p. 33-37.

13 Phillips, Ibid., p. 37-47.

14 Fenton, op. cit., p. 44. Charles A. Beard, The Presidents in American History, (New York: Julian Messner, Inc., 1961), p. 138.

15 Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II of Memoirs, 2 vols., (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), p. 53.

- 16 Fenton, op. cit., p. 45.
- 17 Beard, op. cit., p. 138.
- 18 "After One Year," Time, XLVI (April 15, 1946),  
p. 19.
- 19 Ross, op. cit., p. 14.
- 20 Phillips, op. cit., p. 114-115.
- 21 Phillips, Ibid., p. 115-118. Ross, op. cit.,  
p. 14. Robert S. Allen and William V. Shannon, The Truman  
Merry-Go-Round, (New York: The Vanguard Press, Inc.,  
1950), p. 19.
- 22 Phillips, Ibid., p. 126-127. Ross, Ibid.,  
p. 16. Allen, Ibid., p. 25.
- 23 Phillips, Ibid., p. 127.
- 24 Phillips, Ibid., p. 127. Allen, op. cit., p. 25.
- 25 Phillips, Ibid., p. 127. Allen, Ibid., p. 25.
- 26 Allen, Ibid., p. 23.
- 27 Allen, Ibid., p. 26. Peter R. Levin, Seven by  
Chance: The Accidental Presidents, (New York: Farrar,  
Strauss and Company, 1948), p. 346.
- 28 Allen, Ibid., p. 26. Levin, Ibid., p. 340.
- 29 Levin, Ibid., p. 350. Ross, op. cit., p. 17-18.
- 30 Allen, op. cit., p. 26-28. Arthur S. Link,  
American Epoch, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1965),  
p. 675-676.
- 31 Ross, op. cit., p. 21.
- 32 Ross, Ibid., p. 21.
- 33 Ross, Ibid., p. 22-23.
- 34 Ross, Ibid., p. 55.
- 35 Ross, Ibid., p. 55-56.
- 36 Abels, op. cit., p. 3.
- 37 Abels, Ibid., p. 3-4. Phillips, op. cit., p. 199-  
200.

- 38 Abels, Ibid., p. 4.
- 39 Ross, op. cit., p. 59. Abels, Ibid., p. 4.
- 40 Phillips, op. cit., p. 200. Abels, Ibid., p. 10.
- 41 Ross, op. cit., p. 61.
- 42 Abels, op. cit., p. 10.
- 43 Abels, Ibid., p. 10-11.
- 44 Ross, op. cit., p. 64-65.
- 45 Abels, op. cit., p. 11-12.
- 46 Abels, Ibid., p. 12-13. Robert Shogan, "1948 Election," American Heritage, XIX (June, 1968), p. 24-25.
- 47 Ross, op. cit., p. 62-63.
- 48 Phillips, op. cit., p. 201.
- 49 Phillips, Ibid., p. 201.
- 50 Abels, op. cit., p. 18-19.
- 51 Abels, Ibid., p. 20.
- 52 Abels, Ibid., p. 26-29. Shogan, op. cit., p. 30-31.  
Ross, op. cit., 72-73.
- 53 Abels, Ibid., p. 38.
- 54 Abels, Ibid., p. 39.
- 55 Shogan, op. cit., p. 30.
- 56 Shogan, Ibid., p. 30. Abels, op. cit., p. 44-45.
- 57 Shogan, Ibid., p. 30.
- 58 Abels, op. cit., p. 50. Ross, op. cit., p. 91-94.
- 59 Shogan, op. cit., p. 30-31.
- 60 Phillips, op. cit., p. 217. Bruce L. Folkner, Dirty Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1966), p. 39.
- 61 Folkner, Ibid., p. 39. Shogan, op. cit., p. 27.



- 62 Phillips, op. cit., p. 217. Shogan, Ibid., p. 27.
- 63 Abels, op. cit., p. 51-52.
- 64 Shogan, op. cit., p. 27. Abels, Ibid., p. 52.
- 65 Shogan, Ibid., p. 27-28. Abels, Ibid., p. 52.
- 66 Abels, Ibid., p. 55.
- 67 Shogan, op. cit., p. 28.
- 68 Shogan, Ibid., p. 28. Abels, op. cit., p. 62.
- 69 Shogan, Ibid., p. 28.
- 70 Shogan, Ibid., p. 29. Ross, op. cit., p. 106-107.
- 71 Shogan, Ibid., p. 29.
- 72 Shogan, Ibid., p. 29.
- 73 Shogan, Ibid., p. 29. Ross, op. cit., p. 116-117.
- 74 Ross, Ibid., p. 118-119.
- 75 Shogan, op. cit., p. 29.
- 76 Abels, op. cit., p. 91.
- 77 Shogan, op. cit., p. 104.
- 78 Abels, op. cit., p. 129. Ross, op. cit., p. 94.
- 79 Shogan, op. cit., p. 104. Abels, Ibid., p. 95.
- 80 Shogan, Ibid., p. 104.
- 81 Phillips, op. cit., p. 223.
- 82 Ross, op. cit., p. 131. Abels, op. cit., p. 97-98.
- 83 Abels, Ibid., p. 99. Phillips, op. cit., p. 224.
- 84 Ross, op. cit., p. 142.
- 85 Abels, op. cit., p. 103-105.
- 86 Ross, op. cit., p. 143.

- 87 Abels, op. cit., p. 35.
- 88 Abels, Ibid., p. 210.
- 89 Phillips, op. cit., p. 228.
- 90 Phillips, Ibid., p. 225.
- 91 Abels, op. cit., p. 164-165. Phillips, Ibid.,  
p. 225.
- 92 Phillips, Ibid., p. 226.
- 93 Abels, op. cit., p. 166.
- 94 Abels, Ibid., p. 166-168.
- 95 Phillips, op. cit., p. 232-233.
- 96 Shogan, op. cit., p. 105.
- 97 Phillips, op. cit., p. 236.
- 98 Abels, op. cit., p. 180. Phillips, Ibid., p. 243.
- 99 Shogan, op. cit., p. 106.
- 100 Shogan, Ibid., p. 108.
- 101 Shogan, Ibid., p. 108.
- 102 Shogan, Ibid., p. 109.
- 103 Abels, op. cit., p. 32-35.
- 104 Abels, Ibid., p. 109.
- 105 Shogan, op. cit., p. 213-217, 219-220.
- 106 Shogan, Ibid., p. 109.
- 107 Shogan, Ibid., p. 109-110.
- 108 Shogan, Ibid., p. 110.
- 109 Shogan, Ibid., p. 110-111.
- 110 Shogan, Ibid., p. 110. Phillips, op. cit., p. 247.
- 111 Abels, op. cit., p. 302. Shogan, Ibid., p. 106.



- 112 Ross, op. cit., p. 245-246.
- 113 Ross, Ibid., p. 247-248. Shogan, op. cit., p. 110.
- 114 Ross, Ibid., p. 248.
- 115 Ross, Ibid., p. 252-253.
- 116 Ross, Ibid., p. 248-250. Shogan, op. cit., p. 107.
- 117 Ross, Ibid., p. 249.
- 118 Ross, Ibid., p. 250-252, 271.
- 119 Ables, op. cit., p. 71, 295.
- 120 Abels, Ibid., p. 295.
- 121 Ables, Ibid., p. 295-296.
- 122 Mason, op. cit., p. 153.
- 123 "1968's Voting Pattern," Newsweek, XVII (October 21, 1968), p. 30.
- 124 "The Real Dick Nixon Stands Up," Newsweek, XIX (November 4, 1968), p. 28-29.
- 125 Newsweek, Ibid., p. 29. Newsweek, op. cit., (October 21, 1968), p. 30.
- 126 "The Fighter," Newsweek, XX (November 11, 1968), p. 33-34.
- 127 Newsweek, Ibid., p. 33.
- 128 "The Man Who Would Recapture Youth," Time, X (September 6, 1968), p. 15.
- 129 Time, Ibid., p. 15. Newsweek, op. cit., (November 4, 1968), p. 27.
- 130 Newsweek, Ibid., p. 35.
- 131 Newsweek, Ibid., p. 35.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### -BOOKS-

- Abels, Jules. Out of the Jaws of Victory. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959.
- Allen, Robert S. and William V. Shannon. The Truman Merry-Go-Round. New York: The Vanguard Press, Inc., 1950.
- Beard, Charles A. The Presidents in American History. New York: Julian Messner, Inc., 1961.
- Felkner, Bruce L. Dirty Politics. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1966.
- Fenton, John M. In Your Opinion.... Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960.
- Levin, Peter R. Seven by Chance: The Accidental Presidents. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Company, 1948.
- Link, Arthur S. American Epoch. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1965.
- Mason, Frank. Truman and the Pendergasts. Evanston: Regency Books, 1963.
- Mosteller, Frederick, Herbert Hyman, Philip J. McCarthy, Eli S. Marks, David B. Truman. The Pre-election Polls of 1948. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1949.
- Phillips, Cabell. The Truman Presidency. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966.
- Ross, Irwin, The Loneliest Campaign. New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1968.
- Truman, Harry S. Years of Trial and Hope. Vol. II of Memoirs. 2 vols. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955.

#### PERIODICALS

- "Presidential Vote," Arkansas Democrat, (November 6, 1968).
- "1968's Voting Pattern," Newsweek, XVII (October 21, 1968).
- "The Real Dick Nixon Stands Up," Newsweek, XIX (November 4, 1968).
- "The Fighter," Newsweek, XX (November 11, 1968).
- "The Man Who Could Recapture Youth," Time, X (September 6, 1968).
- "The Pollsters Vs. The Voters," U.S. News and World Report, XIX (November 4, 1968).
- "Voters Put Nixon On The Map," U.S. News And World Report, XIX (November 4, 1968).