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The Democratization of South America

Janet Crawford

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THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF SOUTH AMERICA

by

Janet Crawford

Honors Program
Spring, 1985

APPROVED:

Dr. H. Bass

Dr. M. Thomson

Mr. D. Anderson

In traditional and popular political analysis South American nations have never been seen as particularly democratic. Yet recently there has been a developing trend toward more moderate political systems on the continent. Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia and Peru all have relatively democratic systems, and reforms are being promised even in such repressive regimes as Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. This trend is due not to external influences or forces, but to internal upheaval and change. It is perhaps inevitable that change come to South America as the nations become economically and politically developed, throwing off the traditions of the past. South American nations have had a unique past, which makes it difficult, if not irrelevant, to analyze and categorize her nations solely using traditional western definitions and methods. However, by tempering traditional comparative politics methodology with South American concepts and traditions, it is possible to arrive at some conclusions as to just how democratic South American political systems really are.

There are two different aspects in analyzing and comparing political systems. The first involves theory and abstract ideas. In discussing democracy, it is necessary first of all to define it, to set forth its main characteristics, and to differentiate democracy from other political systems. Defining terms and understanding the concepts used in

analyzing democracy is a prerequisite to any further study.

The second aspect involves applying these ideas, characteristics and concepts which have been defined as democracy to specific and concrete political systems, and evaluating how close or how far a country may be from these ideas. By combining these two steps theories are tested by practical experiences. Both steps are complementary. Therefore, before dealing with democracy in South America, a brief summary of the major developments in democratic theory will be given. Then a short historical overview of South America itself will be presented. Finally, the last part of this paper will be an analysis of certain variables and statistics taken from South American nations to test some of the democratic theories and try to discover which factors affect levels of democracy and to what degree, if any.

Webster's defines democracy as "government by the people, directly or through representatives."¹ Taken at face value, most would agree with this definition and not question it. However, the Soviet Union claims to be ruled by the masses, and most would not consider it a democratic regime. So it is necessary to study the concept of democracy a little more closely and find a more exact, practical definition.

The first democracy labeled as such was, of course, in the Greek city-states. In this setting Aristotle, the philosopher and political theorist, was one of the first to explore this phenomenon called democracy and compare it

to other systems. Aristotle's classification scheme for governments which resulted is still studied today. He asked two questions about political systems: who rules, and who benefits from the rule. His answers were first, either one, the few, or the many rule, and second, either the masses or the ruler benefit. Using these criteria Aristotle set up a six-type categorization scheme. Democracy was defined as a system in which the many ruled and the rulers benefitted.²

This categorization system is still valid today. It is easily understood and widely accepted. Yet its very simplicity begins to cause problems when political analysts apply it to modern systems. The divisions are not exact enough. For example, at what point do the few become the many? Still more difficult to ascertain is who benefits from the rule. At times the ruler might benefit, while at others the ruled clearly gain. The scientific era calls for more exact, precise distinctions and also more complex definitions.

Seymour Martin Lipset was one of the first to supply a new theory of democracy. He stated:

. . . in dealing with democracy, one must be able to point to a set of conditions that have actually existed in a number of countries, and say: democracy has emerged out of these conditions, and has become stabilized because of certain supporting institutional values, as well as because of its own internal self-maintaining processes.³

Lipset was one of the first to set democratic theory on a more practical, verifiable and usable road.

In essence Lipset lists two conditions which must occur in a democracy: (1) There must be a set of political leaders in office with one or more legitimate opposition groups trying to enter office, and (2) there must exist a political formula, or set of beliefs that legitimizes the system and institutions.⁴ Lipset used these two conditions to categorize nations as either more or less democratic.

This major innovation in categorizing nations as to degree of democratization, rather than as democratic or non-democratic (like Aristotle had done) was not new to Lipset. In 1956 Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall published a paper proposing the idea of a spectrum or continuum, with the ideal, model democracy on one end and its opposite on the other.⁵ This idea was later expanded by G.A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell in the later 1960s. They in effect constructed a continuum with more democratic systems toward one end and more authoritarian systems on the other.⁶ This allows greater freedom in classifying systems and is more accurate than the older systems. It was a major breakthrough in political analysis.

Lipset went even farther in his research by looking for other factors which might affect the level or degree of democracy in a political system. He found that economic wealth, higher levels of industrialization, and the resulting higher income levels were directly related to a higher degree of democracy. Another related condition was a higher

level of education in society. He wrote: "Education presumably broadens man's outlook, enables him to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains him from adhering to extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity to make rational choices."⁷ Later theorists expanded this concept, specifically Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Gnudder, who felt communications and an informed citizenry were major prerequisites for democracy.⁸

Lipset also covers two other factors in categorizing governments. A democratic government must be effective, and it must satisfy the needs and desires of society, while fulfilling the functions which most of society feels it should. On a more abstract level, a government must be legitimate; it must "engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society."⁹ These two conditions are a lot harder to verify and document, yet are just as important, or more important, to democracy, according to Lipset.

Using Lipset's research as a foundation on which to build, later theorists tried to be even more precise in evaluating political systems. Phillips Cutright, for example, tried to establish a system to evaluate how much more or less democratic one system was than another. Cutright assigned points to various types of legislative and executive situations by year over a period of twenty-two years. Any deviation from a democratic legislature or executive would

be reflected in the point system. The more points a nation received, the more democratic it was.¹⁰ This also allowed democracy to be viewed by time periods in the nation-state's historical development. Deane Neubauer took this same idea and attempted to improve it, using more modern and scientific statistics and evaluation techniques.¹¹

In summary, by comparing all of these different classification schemes proposed by political theorists, it can be seen that political systems are evaluated using many different criteria. For Lipset the presence of a political belief structure legitimizing the government institutions and an opposition group were the most important characteristics of the government. Phillips Cutright analyzed legislative and executive situations.¹² Deane Neubauer considered electoral competition and electoral equality to be the key to the evaluation of democracy.¹³ Robert Dahl studied the presence of political opposition and political competition.¹⁴ Ranney and Kendall studied the effect of the masses on the political system and came up with four minimum characteristics for democracy: popular sovereignty, political equality, popular consultation, and majority rule.¹⁵

The second step in analyzing political systems, application, tests the validity of these theories. A theory is valid only so long as it holds up in practice. In many cases it is necessary to adapt the theory to fit a specific case because of its unique circumstances. In political

theory this is often the case. For example, how could a developing nation with a low GNP, and a long tradition of military rule return peacefully and spontaneously to a near-democratic civilian rule with no major conflicts? Perú did just that in 1980. This seems to run counter to some of the democratic theories mentioned above, such as Lipset's insistence on the necessity for a fairly high level of economic development for democracy to remain stable. The answer lies in a study of the nation's historical background, which has affected the political, social, and economic environment. Therefore, before starting to rank South American nations according to their degree of democracy, or attempting to rank them, a summary of the forces which shaped modern South America is needed.

South America is a unique historical and geographical entity. Composed of twelve nation-states and one territory (French Guiana) it is at once a unified but diverse group. South American nations have a similar historical background, resulting in many of them facing the same problems today. Yet each is unique and has developed in its own way. In treating South American nation-states politically, it is possible to rely on the similarities as a basis for comparison, but it is necessary to be aware of the differences, and take them into account in the analysis.

The similar economic, social and political characteristics of these nations are a result of their common heritage as Spanish and Portuguese colonies. Spain and Portugal in

the sixteenth century still maintained a semi-feudal society, even though the rest of Europe was moving away from feudalism. This semi-feudalism was imported into the New World and imposed on the Indians and imported slaves.¹⁶

This feudalism had a great effect on the type of society established. Socially the colonists inherited a two-class system, with a ruling elite versus a large peasant class. A middle class of medium-sized farmers and merchants never developed, although as time went on and modernization occurred, the system became a little more complex with the advent of a laboring class and the growth of a small middle class in some countries. But the basic division remained, and still remains today, between the haves and the have-nots, especially as these new groups are manipulated by the elite.¹⁷ The independence wars of the early nineteenth century changed the daily life of the masses very little, if at all.¹⁸ The rule just changed from one elite group to another.

This idea of elite rule permeates all aspects of South American culture, including the economy. All power emanates from the elite; they know what is best for the masses. Therefore, even though most South American nations could be called capitalist, it is with their own brand of capitalism. One scholar has called it state capitalism.¹⁹ Most South American nation-states can be classified in general as transitional states, moving from underdeveloped to developing status. Industrialization and modernization are occurring fairly

rapidly. But many are still in essence one-resource economies, and with the vagaries of weather and the world market are very unstable.²⁰ This instability, combined with the social upheavals caused by industrialization causes the government to step in and keep a tight control over the economic factors in most South American nation-states.

The role that these elitist, authoritarian traditions remaining from the colonial era play in modern South American politics cannot be overemphasized. These ideas, linked with the hierarchical society and corporatist system create a unique political culture for South American nations.²¹ Yet they also cause a lot of problems. There has been a conflict between this inherited tradition and modern imported political values. The case of Brazil is a good example of this conflict.

Brazil during the colonial era was ruled by an emperor, and patterned the governmental system after Great Britain's. In the independence era after 1889 a republic was formed based on the U.S. model. Economic upheaval in the 1930s ruined the republic and a military dictatorship was established using Mussolini's corporate state as a model. After World War II a brief era of the republic was reinstated, which fell again in 1964.²² This very brief summary of the Brazilian experience can be translated with very minor changes to most other South American nation-states. The borrowed political systems might be excellent in principle, and successful in

the land of origin, but not harmonize at all with the new, unfamiliar and different environment.²³ The new institutions ignored the political and cultural realities of South America.²⁴

This reality included the prevalence of political violence, and a large role for the military. Armed forces in South America can be viewed as a political rather than a military institution. Their main function has been in domestic politics and not as a defense against external aggression or even to preserve internal order to a large degree.²⁵

Samuel P. Huntington attempted to explain the reason for the dominant position the military holds in most South American states. Huntington stated that the reason most interest groups, including the army, gain control of the government is because the civil political institutions are so weak. Something has to fill the power vacuum, and the army usually has the men and power to do so.²⁶ Huntington also establishes a relationship between modernization and the role of the military. The more advanced a society is, the more conservative and reactionary will be the military; the more backward a society is, the more progressive the role of its military.²⁷

Morris Janowitz also tried to explain the prominent role of the military in the political system. His formula for preventing coups d'etat was to maintain consistent civilian control, and for the civilian government to be aware of the military needs.²⁸ Janowitz also found in his

studies that the likelihood of military intervention was reduced the more structured and specialized the armed forces were internally.²⁹

The South American experience seems to confirm these theories. The military gained its prestigious position largely by default. After the independence wars all of the Spanish were removed from government posts. But they were the only ones who had any governmental experience. In the resulting power vacuum the military stepped in, as they were already mobilized as a result of the wars. They were unprepared to rule, and were inexperienced, but they were available to provide order for a while. And once established, they were nearly impossible to remove from power.³⁰

Due to South America's unique circumstances, this tradition of violence may not be all negative. During revolutions and periods of near anarchy a form of equality emerges. Without some form of revolution or a crisis period, most South American nations would simply form the traditional hierarchy and ruling elite. However, periods of upheaval and violence act as sort of a levelling force on society.³¹ As one observer noted, legitimacy is a good question, but government efficiency is perhaps much more relevant to solving the day to day problems of the peasant or laborer.³² This is just one of the many areas in which South America cannot be compared to other systems. A nation may have one of the broadest effective political participation records, or a very

high degree of responsiveness to the populace, all as a result of the military stepping in to moderate an excessively intense political conflict.³³

Another significant group in South America today, though perhaps not as influential as the military any more, is the Catholic Church. One of the three main leaders in the pre-independence corporatist society, the Church remained in alliance with the new ruling elite after the wars were over.³⁴ The Church has remained allied with this conservative elite through all of the resulting upheaval and violence. The Catholic Church was a church of the wealthy, so when a revolution started, it was naturally one of the first things suppressed.³⁵ However, currently the Catholic Church is going through a major change itself. The conservative element is still strong but is being challenged by a new reform movement. Many of the younger clergy are disassociating themselves from the traditional oligarchic posture of the Church and becoming involved in "reformist-social revolutionary actions."³⁶

This dichotomy in the Catholic Church is merely a reflection of the split in South American society as a whole. The constant tension between the liberal, democratic ideals and the old traditional values has created a situation in which countries swinglike pendulums back and forth between socialist and conservative governments.³⁷

A final area in which South American nations show their uniqueness is in the field of political participation. In

traditional democratic theory, political participation is measured according to such electoral phenomena as voting and party membership. In South American nations where only one candidate may be up for office, or there is the choice of only one party, or where elections are held but invalidated the next week through a military coup, political participation takes on a different, broader aspect. People do vote, and in fairly high numbers. But in many cases the real participation takes place on other levels. These involve contacting public officials individually and communal activism.³⁸ These are more effective than people realize. As one person wrote: "To judge these factors, relationships, activities, and goals as not 'meaningful' by U.S. or some other standard is thus most inappropriate; rather, they must be judged contextually."³⁹

The above theories and viewpoints are those by which nation-states are traditionally judged as to degree of democratization. For certain nation-states and areas of the world these criteria work very well. But when applied to the South American nation-states its validity begins to break down. The final part of this paper tests these hypotheses by analyzing certain statistics from South American nations and observing if there is a statistical basis for democracy as traditional theorists maintain or not. What will be tested in this section is the hypotheses put forward by Seymour Lipset first and then expanded by later theorists, that democracy is the result of a certain set of circumstances in a nation-state,

including wealth, socioeconomic status, education, etc.

There are two sets of data used in this analysis. The first set is a list of thirteen variables taken from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, compiled by Yale University in three editions, 1964, 1972, and 1983. All three years were reviewed, but all analysis was done from the third edition's statistics. Another source used for some of the variables was the 1985 World Almanac. This data became the dependent variables, the first thirteen variables listed in Appendix A.

The second set of data, the independent variables, is a list of evaluative judgments on the position of six different interest groups in each nation-state of South America, and the type of economy. These judgments were made by the writer based on reading and studying done on each nation-state. These are the last seven variables listed in Appendix A.

The first analysis done on the data were frequencies tables, with statistics on all the dependent variables. These can be found in Figures 1 through 12. Several of the country names have been filled in to give the reader some idea of where individual nations fit into the scale.

The first figure graphs the countries according to total population. Most of the nations are clustered at one end fairly close together, with Brazil being the only exception. This reflects the homogeneity of South American nations.

Figure 2 shows the rank order of nations according to population density. There is a wide variety in this variable

ranging from two persons per square kilometer in Suriname to thirty-three in Ecuador. There is a group that are fairly similar in the center, around the median, however.

The percentage of voter turnout in elections is a significant variable in analyzing political systems. The statistics in this table are from 1972, instead of 1983 like the rest due to the large number of missing cases in the 1983 data. Surprisingly the voter turnout is fairly high in all South American nations. The only significantly different percent is for Colombia, with all the others in the upper percentages.

Figure 4 and the number of irregular transfers of power since 1948 divides the South American nation-states into two groups, those with fairly stable governments and those with unstable regimes. Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela and Uruguay all had four or less irregular transfers of power in this time period. The remaining five (with two missing cases) had six or more. The number of regular power transfers in Figure 5 does not show the same division.

The GNP totals in Figure 6 again show Brazil as the outlier, with one-half the nation-states on the same low level. Argentina, Venezuela and Colombia are better off than most of the nations, but still do not approach Brazil's massive income. The GNP per capita in Figure 7, however, shows a different picture, with Venezuela rising to the top of the scale, and Brazil dropping close to the median.

Figures 8 and 9 give the percent of the labor force in agriculture and industry. Both show a fairly even distribution, with no major gaps or breaks between groups. Figure 10 showing adult literacy is the same, as is Figure 11. Figure 12 portrays trade as percent total GNP. In comparing these nation-states with the groupings in Figure 4 it can be seen that the less stable nation-states do not necessarily have a greater dependence on foreign trade. So economy is not as great a factor as was previously thought.

Figures 13 through 16 examine the independent variables in this same way. Again, there are no striking departures from the norm, as in the first set of data. It is interesting to note that the military always has some effect on the government, in every South American nation-state, whether as an interest group, a dominant interest group, or as government controller. Another interesting observation is that only two nation-states have a so-called market economy, with no significant government intervention. The others are either mixed regulation with some government control or command economies with total government control. In general, these figures show no important relationships between any of the variables, both dependent and independent.

To establish this theory for certain each of the independent variables was run against the dependent variables in an Anova, or analysis of variance, to see if there was a statistical relation between the two. The results are found in Tables 1 through 6. In these tables Group 1 is the mean

in those nations where the independent variable is an interest group, Group 2 is a dominant interest group, Group 3 has government control, and Group 4 are those in which the group has no effect on the government. The F Ratio compares the groups to the total mean. The F Probability is the most important statistic. An F Probability of .10 or less means there is a significant statistical relation between the independent and dependent variables. These are starred on the tables.

The most significant aspect of these tables is the fact that there is no significant relationship between the majority of the variables. However, even with no statistically significant figures some general tendencies can be drawn out. In Table 1, showing the effect of the military on the dependents, under Group 1, in those nations showing the military as an interest group, there is a downward trend in the GNP, and the percent of labor force in agriculture. There is also a higher percentage of foreign trade. This leads to the conclusion that in those countries where the military is least active there is more dependence on foreign trade, a lower GNP, and the country is less rural. This directly contradicts most theorists who state a country is better off with no direct or indirect military intervention. Huntington's thesis of a backward country having a more progressive military is not supported by this data, either.

The next tables also contain no statistically significant variable relationships, but they do show a distinct homogeneity of data, however. Table 4 shows a relationship between students as an interest group and the literacy rate. The GNP is considerably higher, also, although the GNP per capita declined.

Table 5 shows a significant relationship between labor and the number of regular transfers of power. Where labor has no effect on the government, in Group 4, there is significantly smaller numbers of regular transfers of executive power. GNP is also considerably lower. This would seem to indicate that even in regimes without much electoral activity or popular representation, as in most South American nations, labor groups have a stabilizing effect on the government. A suppression of interest groups also leads to a decline in peaceful regular changes in executive power.

The effect of the business independent variable on the dependents, Table 6, shows the most relationship. Those nation states with in effect an oligarchical rule of an elite business group generally have fewer regular transfers of executive power. Those states where the business group is merely an interest group can be seen to have a higher GNP and GNP per capita, and are more urbanized and industrialized.

The final Anova table, showing the relationship between the type of economy and the dependents also produced no statistically significant relation. Some interesting tendencies that can be seen, however, are the lower GNP in group 3, with a command economy. Market economy nations tend to have

more regular transfers of power and more elections. This does seem to support the theories that a capitalist or semi-capitalist economy is necessary or at least useful to have for a democracy. However, these are only tendencies showing up in the table, with no statistically significant relationship shown or proven.



With only a few statistically significant relations emerging from the relationships of the dependent and independent variables, it is safe to conclude that there really is no relationship at all. The Anova tables and frequencies charts did not support the idea that Lipset set forth, and which later theorists developed, that there is a certain set of conditions that must be present for democracy to exist. This does not apply to the South American nation-states. A more valid argument than the East-West division that the world powers have made, and which they try to impose on everyone, is a North-South division. The cultural factors of the "Southern" nation-states are much more significant than a set of theoretical conditions in determining the "democraticness" of the South American nation-states. Within twenty years the East-West division of the world today will be forgotten as the North-South relations becomes the dominant political rally.

22-APR-85 DATA ON SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS
 16:04:36 FREQUENCIES VARIABLES AND STATISTICS: DEPENDENTS

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA

POP TOTAL POPULATION: IN THOUSANDS

COUNT MIDPOINT ONE SYMBOL EQUALS APPROXIMATELY .10 OCCURRENCES




MEAN 21589.063 MEDIAN 10148.500 STD DEV 35965.805
 MINIMUM 363.000 MAXIMUM 131305.000

VALID CASES 12 MISSING CASES 0

FIGURE 2

22-APR-85 DATA ON SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS
 16:04:37 FREQUENCIES VARIABLES AND STATISTICS: DEPENDENTS


FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA
 POPDENS POPULATION DENSITY PER SQ KM



MEAN	14.167	MEDIAN	14.500	STD DEV	9.054
MINIMUM	2.000	MAXIMUM	33.000		
VALID CASES	12	MISSING CASES	0		


22-APR-85 DATA ON SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS
 16:06:13 SPECIAL 1972 FREQUENCY TABLE

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA
 VOTER % VOTER TURNOUT IN ELECTIONS



MEAN	78.727	MEDIAN	80.000	STD DEV	16.523
MINIMUM	37.000	MAXIMUM	99.000		
VALID CASES	11	MISSING CASES	1		
		Suriname			

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA
 IRREGT # OF IRREG TRANSFERS OF POWER SINCE 1948




MEAN	4.600	MEDIAN	5.000	STD DEV	2.119
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	8.000		

VALID CASES	10	MISSING CASES	2
		GUYANA	
		SURINAME	

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA
 REGT # OF REG TRANSFERS OF POWER SINCE 1948

5.



MEAN	11.818	MEDIAN	12.000	STD DEV	4.400
MINIMUM	4.000	MAXIMUM	19.000		
VALID CASES	11	MISSING CASES	1		
		SURINAME			

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA

GNP TOTAL GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT


COUNT MIDPOINT

ONE SYMBOL EQUALS APPROXIMATELY .20 OCCURRENCES

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

4730
13281
21832
30353
38934
47435
56036
64537
73138
81639
90240
98741
107342
115843
124444
132945
141546
150047
158648
167149
175750

***** BOLIVIA
 ***** CHILE PERU
 ***** COLOMBIA
 ***** VENEZUELA
 ***** ARGENTINA



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MEDIAN 9420.000
 MAXIMUM 180020.000

STD DEV 50512.227



VALID CASES 12

MISSING CASES 0

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA

GNPPC TOTAL GNP PER CAPITA

COUNT MIDPOINT ONE SYMBOL EQUALS APPROXIMATELY .10 OCCURRENCES




MEAN 1362.500 MEDIAN 1210.000 STD DEV 736.023
 MINIMUM 510.000 MAXIMUM 2850.000

VALID CASES 12 MISSING CASES 0

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA
 AGRIPER % LABOR FORCE IN AGRICULTURE

COUNT MIDPOINT ONE SYMBOL EQUALS APPROXIMATELY .10 OCCURRENCES




MEAN 30.417 MEDIAN 31.000 STD DEV 13.554
 MINIMUM 9.000 MAXIMUM 50.000

VALID CASES 12 MISSING CASES 0

2-APR-85 DATA ON SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS
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
FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA

NDPER % LABOR FORCE IN INDUSTRY



MEAN	28.167	MEDIAN	27.000	STD DEV	9.944
MINIMUM	15.000	MAXIMUM	45.000		
VALID CASES	12	MISSING CASES	0		

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA
 LITERATE % ADULT LITERACY (15 YRS & OVER)




MEAN	82.667	MEDIAN	83.000	STD DEV	8.117
MINIMUM	68.000	MAXIMUM	94.000		

VALID CASES 12 MISSING CASES 0

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA

ELECTION # ELECTIONS SINCE 1948

11



MEAN	10.091	MEDIAN	11.000	STD DEV	3.885
MINIMUM	5.000	MAXIMUM	18.000		
VALID CASES	11	MISSING CASES	1		
		SURINAME			

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA

TRADE AS % TOTAL GNP



MEAN	55.167	MEDIAN	25.000	STD DEV	84.282
MINIMUM	13.000	MAXIMUM	311.000		

VALID CASES	12	MISSING CASES	0
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FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA

MILITARY

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
INTERESTGROUP	1	4	33.3	33.3	33.3
DOMINANT INT. GP.	2	3	25.0	25.0	58.3
GOVT. CONTROL	3	5	41.7	41.7	100.0
NO EFFECT					
	TOTAL	12	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	2.083	MEDIAN	2.000	STD DEV	.900
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		
VALID CASES	12	MISSING CASES	0		

CHURCH

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
INTERESTGROUP	1	4	33.3	33.3	33.3
DOMINANT INT. GP.	2	3	25.0	25.0	58.3
NO EFFECT	4	5	41.7	41.7	100.0
	TOTAL	12	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	2.500	MEDIAN	2.000	STD DEV	1.382
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	12	MISSING CASES	0		

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA

PARTY

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
INTERESTGROUP	1	2	16.7	16.7	16.7
DOMINANT INT. GP.	2	3	25.0	25.0	41.7
GOVT. CONTROL	3	4	33.3	33.3	75.0
NO EFFECT	4	3	25.0	25.0	100.0
	TOTAL	12	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	2.667	MEDIAN	3.000	STD DEV	1.073
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	12	MISSING CASES	0		

 STUDENTS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
INTERESTGROUP	1	2	16.7	16.7	16.7
DOMINANT INT. GP.	2	3	25.0	25.0	41.7
NO EFFECT	4	7	58.3	58.3	100.0
	TOTAL	12	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	3.000	MEDIAN	4.000	STD DEV	1.279
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	12	MISSING CASES	0		

22-APR-85 DATA ON SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS
 16:04:51 FREQUENCIES VARIABLES AND STATISTICS: INDEPENDENTS

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA
 LABOR

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
INTERESTGROUP	1	3	25.0	25.0	25.0
DOMINANT INT. GP.	2	4	33.3	33.3	58.3
NO EFFECT	4	5	41.7	41.7	100.0
	TOTAL	12	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	2.583	MEDIAN	2.000	STD DEV	1.311
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	12	MISSING CASES	0		

BUSINESS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
INTERESTGROUP	1	2	16.7	16.7	16.7
DOMINANT INT. GP.	2	4	33.3	33.3	50.0
NO EFFECT	4	6	50.0	50.0	100.0
	TOTAL	12	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	2.333	MEDIAN	3.000	STD DEV	1.267
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	12	MISSING CASES	0		

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA
 ECONOMY

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
MARKET	1	2	16.7	20.0	20.0
MIXED REGULATION	2	4	33.3	40.0	60.0
COMMAND ECONOMY	3	4	33.3	40.0	100.0
	0	2	16.7	MISSING	
	TOTAL	12	100.0	100.0	
MEAN	2.200	MEDIAN	2.000	STD DEV	.739
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		
VALID CASES	10	MISSING CASES	2		
		CHILE			
		SURINAME			

TABLE 1
MILITARY BY DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Anova Results

DEPENDENTS	TOTAL MEAN	GROUP 1	GROUP 2	GROUP 3	F RATIO	F PROB
Total Nations		4	3	4		
POPDENS	9.7636	11.6000	6.8333	10.1250	.7899	.4863
VOTER	78.7273	73.5000	83.3333	80.5000	.2916	.7547
IRREGT	4.2000	3.6667	6.0000	3.2500	2.8502	.1243
REGT	11.1818	11.2500	12.0000	10.5000	.1097	.8975
GNP	5907.7273	3522.2500	7362.0000	7202.5000	.2923	.7542
GNPPC	419.0909	421.5000	433.6667	405.7500	.0094	.9907
AGRIPER	45.3636	38.2500	43.6667	43.7500	.0964	.9092
INDPER	16.7273	14.5000	20.3333	16.2500	1.0112	.4060
LITERATE	71.3636	74.5000	61.3333	75.7500	.6437	.5505
ELECTIONS	9.8182	10.7500	8.6667	9.7500	.2368	.7945
TRADE	34.2828	51.0000	29.0000	21.2500	1.6934	.2436

TABLE 2
CHURCH BY DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Anova Results

DEPENDENTS	TOTAL MEAN	GROUP 1	GROUP 2	GROUP 4	F RATIO	F PROB
Total Nations		4	3	4		
POPDENS	9.7636	10.1500	10.7333	8.6500	.1440	.8681
VOTER	78.7273	77.7500	68.3333	87.5000	1.2142	.3463
IRREGT	4.2000	4.2500	3.3333	5.0000	.5340	.6083
REGT	11.1818	11.7500	8.3333	12.7500	1.2879	.3274
GNP	5907.7273	7840.7500	3462.6667	5808.5000	.2671	.7722
GNPPC	419.0909	382.2500	355.0000	504.0000	.3451	.7182
AGRIPER	45.3636	52.7500	50.3333	34.2500	2.1841	.1750
INDPER	16.7273	14.0000	15.3333	20.5000	1.8170	.2236
LITERATE	71.3636	60.0000	72.3333	82.0000	1.9013	.2111
ELECTION	9.8182	9.5000	13.0000	7.7500	2.2338	.1695
TRADE	34.1818	33.0000	23.6667	43.2500	.4710	.6406

TABLE 3

PARTY BY DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Anova Results

DEPENDENTS	TOTAL MEAN	GROUP 1	GROUP 2	GROUP 3	GROUP 4	F RATIO	F PROB
Total Nations		2	2	4	3		
POPDENS	9.7636	11.8000	11.4500	9.1250	8.1333	.2529	.8570
VOTER	78.7273	86.5000	83.0000	74.7500	76.0000	.2279	.8741
IRREGT	4.2000	4.0000	5.5000	4.3333	3.3333	.4465	.7288
REGT	11.1818	14.5000	8.0000	11.7500	10.3333	1.0677	.4219
GNP	5907.7273	2916.0000	769.5000	7549.2500	9139.0000	.6372	.6146
GNPPC	419.0909	470.0000	217.0000	560.0000	332.0000	1.1096	.4072
AGRIPER	45.3636	39.0000	62.0000	38.2500	48.0000	1.4623	.3048
INDPER	16.7273	18.0000	11.0000	18.0000	18.0000	.8662	.5021
LITERATE	71.3636	75.5000	67.5000	80.5000	59.0000	.9253	.6790
ELECTION	9.8182	6.0000	11.5000	10.7500	10.0000	.9403	.4707
TRADE	34.1818	27.5000	26.5000	47.7500	25.6667	.5249	.6790

TABLE 4
STUDENTS BY DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Anova Results

DEPENDENTS	TOTAL MEAN	GROUP 1	GROUP 2	GROUP 4	F RATIO	F PROB
Total Nations		2	3	6		
POPDENS	9.7636	7.3000	10.3333	10.3000	.2623	.7757
VOTER	78.7273	87.5000	75.3333	77.5000	.3119	.7405
IRREGT	4.2000	4.5000	4.6667	3.8000	.1908	.8305
REGT	11.1818	7.5000	12.0000	12.0000	1.1782	.3561
GNP	5907.7273	4067.5000	7890.3333	5529.8333	.1534	.8603
GNPPC	419.0909	550.0000	215.6667	477.1667	1.7518	.2339
AGRIPER	45.3636	49.5000	57.6667	37.8333	2.3707	.1554
INDPER	16.7273	11.5000	14.3333	19.6667	2.8680	.2151
LITERATE	71.3636	74.0000	53.3333	79.5000	3.4018	.0853 *
ELECTIONS	9.8182	8.5000	10.3333	10.0000	.1384	.8728
TRADE	34.1818	38.5000	26.3333	36.6667	.1709	.8459

* Statistically significant value

TABLE 5
LABOR BY DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Anova Results

DEPENDENTS	TOTAL MEAN	GROUP 1	GROUP 2	GROUP 4	F RATIO	F PROB
Total Nations		3	4	4		
POPDEMS	9.7636	14.0333	9.2250	7.1000	2.1469	.1793
VOTER	78.7273	76.6667	68.2500	90.7500	2.4233	.1504
IRREGT	4.2000	3.6667	4.7500	4.0000	.2598	.7783
REGT	11.1818	14.3333	12.5000	7.5000	6.6563	.0199 *
GNP	5907.7273	8207.0000	7651.0000	2440.0000	.6769	.5351
GNPPC	419.0909	352.0000	524.5000	364.0000	.5428	.6011
AGRIPER	45.3636	47.6667	42.5000	46.5000	.0992	.9067
INDPER	16.7273	14.6667	18.0000	17.0000	.2821	.7614
LITERATE	71.2626	72.6667	67.0000	74.7500	.1760	.8418
ELECTIONS	9.8182	10.0000	11.2500	8.2500	.6281	.5580
TRADE	34.1818	21.0000	31.7500	46.5000	.8909	.4474

* Statistically significant value

TABLE 6

BUSINESS BY DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Anova Results

DEPENDENTS	TOTAL MEAN	GROUP 1	GROUP 2	GROUP 3	F RATIO	F PROB
		2	4	5		
Total Nations						
POPDENS	9.7636	11.2500	13.2750	6.3600	3.4489	.0832 *
VOTER	78.7273	77.5000	69.5000	86.6000	1.2587	.3348
IRREGT	4.2000	5.0000	3.5000	4.5000	.4500	.6549
REGT	11.1818	16.0000	12.5000	8.2000	8.1871	.0116 *
GNP	5907.7273	9397.5000	8965.2500	2073.0000	1.3817	.3052
GNPPC	419.0909	671.5000	411.7500	324.0000	1.6711	.2475
AGRIPER	45.3636	23.0000	53.5000	47.8000	5.5580	.0307 *
INDPER	16.7273	23.5000	12.2500	17.6000	5.8358	.0274 *
LITERATE	71.2626	90.5000	68.2500	66.2000	1.7130	.2403
ELECTIONS	9.8182	10.0000	11.7500	8.2000	1.0644	.3892
TRADE	34.1818	19.0000	28.5000	44.8000	.8928	.4467

* Statistically significant value

TABLE 7

ECONOMY BY DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Anova Results

DEPENDENTS	TOTAL MEAN	GROUP 1	GROUP 2	GROUP 3	F RATIO	F PROB
Total Nations		2	4	4		
POPDIENS	9.7636	12.7500	8.5000	9.1500	.4188	.6733
VOTER	78.7273	61.0000	80.5000	86.0000	1.5898	.2696
IRREGT	4.2000	3.0000	4.6667	5.2500	1.5217	.2920
REGT	11.1818	12.5000	11.0000	11.7500	.0895	.9155
GNP	5907.7273	6397.5000	5967.2500	2869.7500	.0026	.9974
GNPPC	419.0909	582.0000	238.2500	482.0000	1.8918	.2204
AGRIPER	45.3636	47.0000	52.2500	40.5000	.5358	.6074
INDPER	16.7273	13.0000	15.7500	18.0000	.5464	.6019
LITERATE	71.2626	72.5000	61.5000	77.5000	.7960	.4881
ELECTIONS	9.8182	12.0000	9.2500	8.7500	.4595	.6494
TRADE	34.1818	36.5000	45.2500	23.7500	.6106	.5696

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA

LIST OF VARIABLES ON THE ACTIVE FILE

NAME		POSITION
ID	COUNTRY NUMBER AND YEAR OF DATA PRINT FORMAT: F4 WRITE FORMAT: F4	1
POP	TOTAL POPULATION: IN THOUSANDS PRINT FORMAT: F6 WRITE FORMAT: F6 MISSING VALUES: 0	2
POPENS	POPULATION DENSITY PER SQ KM PRINT FORMAT: F5 WRITE FORMAT: F5 MISSING VALUES: 0	3
VOTER	% VOTER TURNOUT IN ELECTIONS PRINT FORMAT: F2 WRITE FORMAT: F2 MISSING VALUES: 0	4
IRREGT	# OF IRREG TRANSFERS OF POWER SINCE 1948 PRINT FORMAT: F2 WRITE FORMAT: F2 MISSING VALUES: 0	5
REGT	# OF REG TRANSFERS OF POWER SINCE 1948 PRINT FORMAT: F2 WRITE FORMAT: F2 MISSING VALUES: 0	6
GNP	TOTAL GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PRINT FORMAT: F6 WRITE FORMAT: F6 MISSING VALUES: 0	7
GNPPC	TOTAL GNP PER CAPITA PRINT FORMAT: F4 WRITE FORMAT: F4 MISSING VALUES: 0	8
AGRIPER	% LABOR FORCE IN AGRICULTURE PRINT FORMAT: F2 WRITE FORMAT: F2 MISSING VALUES: 0	9
INDPER	% LABOR FORCE IN INDUSTRY PRINT FORMAT: F2 WRITE FORMAT: F2 MISSING VALUES: 0	10

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA

LITERATE % ADULT LITERACY (15 YRS & OVER) 11
 PRINT FORMAT: F2
 WRITE FORMAT: F2
 MISSING VALUES: 0

ELECTION # ELECTIONS SINCE 1948 12
 PRINT FORMAT: F2
 WRITE FORMAT: F2
 MISSING VALUES: 0

TRADE TRADE AS % TOTAL GNP 13
 PRINT FORMAT: F3
 WRITE FORMAT: F3
 MISSING VALUES: 0

MILITARY 14
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 0

VALUE LABEL
 1 INTERESTGROUP
 2 DOMINANT INT. GP.
 3 GOVT. CONTROL
 4 NO EFFECT

CHURCH 15
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 0

VALUE LABEL
 1 INTERESTGROUP
 2 DOMINANT INT. GP.
 3 GOVT. CONTROL
 4 NO EFFECT

PARTY 16
 PRINT FORMAT: F1
 WRITE FORMAT: F1
 MISSING VALUES: 0

VALUE LABEL
 1 INTERESTGROUP
 2 DOMINANT INT. GP.
 3 GOVT. CONTROL
 4 NO EFFECT

FILE: DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AMERICA

STUDENTS

17

PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 0

VALUE	LABEL
1	INTERESTGROUP
2	DOMINANT INT. GP.
3	GOVT. CONTROL
4	NO EFFECT

LABOR

18

PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 0

VALUE	LABEL
1	INTERESTGROUP
2	DOMINANT INT. GP.
3	GOVT. CONTROL
4	NO EFFECT

BUSINESS

19

PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 0

VALUE	LABEL
1	INTERESTGROUP
2	DOMINANT INT. GP.
3	GOVT. CONTROL
4	NO EFFECT

ECONOMY

20

PRINT FORMAT: F1
WRITE FORMAT: F1
MISSING VALUES: 0

VALUE	LABEL
1	MARKET
2	MIXED REGULATION
3	COMMAND ECONOMY

NOTES

¹Webster's New World Dictionary, rev. ed. (1975), s.v. "democracy."

²Monte Palmer and William R. Thompson, The Comparative Analysis of Politics (Itasca, IL: F.R. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1978), p. 24.

³Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer, eds., Empirical Democratic Theory (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969), p. 151.

⁴Ibid., p. 153. See also Palmer and Thompson, Comparative Analysis of Politics, p. 32.

⁵Cnudde and Neubauer, Empirical Democratic Theory, p. 44.

⁶Palmer and Thompson, Comparative Analysis of Politics, p. 29.

⁷Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960), p. 56.

⁸Cnudde and Neubauer, Empirical Democratic Theory, p. 212.

⁹Lipset, Political Man, p. 77.

¹⁰Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Correlates," cited by Palmer and Thompson, The Comparative Analysis of Politics, p. 33

¹¹Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," American Political Science Review 61(December 1967):1002-9, cited by Palmer and Thompson, The Comparative Analysis of Politics, p. 34.

¹²Cutright, p. 33.

¹³Neubauer, p. 35.

¹⁴Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1971), cited by Palmer and Thompson, The Comparative Analysis of Politics, p. 36.

¹⁵Cnudde and Neubauer, Empirical Democratic Theory, p. 46.

¹⁶Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, eds., Latin American Politics and Development (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1979), p. 20.

- 17 Irwin Isenberg, ed., South America: Problems and Prospects (New York: The H. W. Wilson Co., 1975), p. 17.
- 18 Ibid., p. 13.
- 19 Wiarda and Kline, Latin American Politics, p. 9.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid., p. 11.
- 22 Leslie Lipson, The Democratic Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 403.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Guy Stanton Ford, ed., Dictatorship in the Modern World (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1935), p. 181.
- 25 Ibid., 201.
- 26 Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1974), pp. 20, 33.
- 27 Ibid., p. 68.
- 28 Ibid., p. 228.
- 29 Ibid., p. 18.
- 30 Ford, p. 181.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 Isenberg, p. 16.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Fredrick B. Pike, The Conflict Between Church and State in Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 188.
- 36 Arpad von Lazar, Latin American Politics: A Primer (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), p. 64.
- 37 Isenberg, p. 13.
- 38 John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., Political Participation in Latin America, 2 vols. (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1978), vol. 1: Citizen and State, p. 21.
- 39 Ibid., p. 26.

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