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SENIOR THESIS APPROVAL

This Honors thesis entitled

**“Secularization in Orléans, France: A Case Study Utilizing Mark
Chaves’ ‘New Differentiation Theory’”**

written by

Stephanie J. Beck

and submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for completion of the
Carl Goodson Honors Program
meets the criteria for acceptance
and has been approved by the undersigned readers.

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April 15, 2011

Secularization in Orléans, France

A Case Study Utilizing Mark Chaves' "New
Differentiation Theory"

Stephanie Beck

April 15, 2011

Steeped in a heavily religious history, Europe and specifically France provide an intriguing backdrop for a closer look into secularization in present-day Orléans, France. Many various approaches to secularization theory have arisen over the past sixty years. This paper explores the evolution of secularization theory, delving into Mark Chaves' "New Differentiation Theory", based upon religious authority's influence on the individual, societal, and institutional levels. Though created by an American academician, the "New Differentiation Theory" provides a new basis of analysis with which one may draw conclusions regarding the state of secularization in a European city (in this case Orléans, France). Beginning with the broader European context then moving toward the specific case in Orléans, this paper analyzes historical facts and personal interview data from 100 French in Orléans in light of Chaves' categorical approach. This paper utilizes Chaves' secularization theory in order to investigate the interesting trends of religious authority's influence in Orléans, France, thus providing valuable data and analyses for future research in the field of secularization theory and religion.

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A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: EUROPE

There are very few who would disagree that a dramatic change has taken place in the religious environment of Europe as history has progressed from its roots in Christianity to its present state. Grace Davies in her book *Europe: the Exceptional Case* reveals such a change. She recounts a specific event that happened in 2000 at the Gallery of London. Davies describes an exhibition entitled 'Seeing Salvation' which depicted the story of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. Davies emphasizes that, despite its "unashamedly Christian" message, the exhibition was incredibly popular and attracted extraordinary numbers. A correspondence to the Director of the gallery congratulated the Director on his *courage* in displaying an exhibition with such an explicitly Christian theme. In contrast, a different situation occurred when the city added a bust of John Calvin in a heavily frequented location in Orléans, France. A Lutheran pastor with whom I spoke described the event saying news correspondents were outraged that the city would allow the explicit display of a religious figure in such a public setting. How Europe has transformed into a society so dramatically disconnected from its Christian roots is at the base of many historians' and sociologists' research. Looking back into historical examples of limited religious tolerance, emphasis of intellect over belief, skepticism of religion, and separation of church and state, one can see some of the complexities involved in the evolution of Christianity in Europe.

Limited tolerance in Europe arose in the wake of the Reformation. After the signing of the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, Europe was divided into the Roman Catholic Church and the Lutheran (Protestant) Church. Though the common principle had been to follow the religion of the king, several German cities allowed Catholics and Protestants to have equal rights. During the second half of the sixteenth century during the French Religious Wars, a *politique* party arose

which believed that imposing religious orthodoxy threatened peace. Though the French Religious War ended with a Catholic victory, the Edict of Nantes of 1598 permitted partial tolerance for Protestants. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 ended many years of religious war in Europe. Though these cases showed the beginnings of tolerance, the Protestant minority's rights were gradually taken away, even completely in France after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. In other areas of Europe, tolerance arose out of practicality. After a long war with Spain, the population of the Dutch Republic belonged to various religious communities. Civil war in England during the 1640s and 1650s also created much religious diversity. In these cases, one state religion would not have been pragmatic (McLeod 5-6). Even as tolerance expanded during seventeenth century Europe, it remained limited.

The eighteenth century Enlightenment saw the spread and growth of intellectual pursuits. The Enlightenment was an international movement that found its locus in the cultural capital—Paris, France. Most of the philosophers were French. Enlightenment philosophers, called *philosophes*, such as Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu and Adam Smith, presented new ways to view government and socio-political interactions. Montesquieu's works along with those of the late eighteenth century deist, François-Marie Arouet, known as Voltaire, attacked traditional religion. Voltaire, like many of the *philosophes* of the time, was a deist. In denying God's direct involvement in the world, deists further rejected religious authority. Some, however, completely rejected God. Denis Diderot and Paul d'Holbach were adversely opposed to any notion of God's existence, uncompromisingly retaining atheist views. Even the debate about women came into question. Before, men were considered to be superior to women. Yet with the onset of the Enlightenment, individuals such as Mary Wollstonecraft, an eighteenth-century advocate of women's rights, challenged those notions. Although racism was still present,

Enlightenment thinkers ventured to propose rights to Jews and Muslims, the most despised religious minorities of Europe. Society's mindsets began changing concerning many different areas of life. Overall, reliance upon intellect gained a strong foothold in European thought (McLeod 5-7).

While the Reformation had attempted to solidify religious sentiments, the opposite reaction occurred as people became disenchanted by religion. Europeans began questioning their beliefs and turning away from religion as they saw it to be strict, controlling, and intolerant. During the late seventeenth century, John Locke proposed that all humans were born *tabula rasa*, with a blank mind. Humans are thus created by their experiences and surroundings. This idea coupled with Isaac Newton's natural laws established a foundation based upon reason and intellect. Jean-Jacques Rousseau also asserted that children should be left to follow their natural instincts and emphasized the importance of a balance between the heart and mind. This belief would be foundational to the Romanticism that arose in the nineteenth century (Spielvogel).

Thus, the rise of tolerance and the Enlightenment gave birth to skepticism. This skepticism was tolerated in some countries like England and the Dutch Republic, but in other places like the strongly orthodox Catholic France, deism arose more discreetly. Yet by the second half of the eighteenth century, deism and even atheism, though not as favored, became viable religious options for men of the aristocracy and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Looking at evidence from France and Germany, it appears that religious observation began to greatly decline around this period. Around 1750 in France, recruitment to the priesthood and to religious orders was declining (McLeod 7). It is important to note that there are some sociologists who, rather than considering this a decline of Christendom, view the trend as a movement toward a different

mindset regarding Christianity. In other words, while Europe was moving away from Christendom, it was not necessarily undermining Christianity. Even though established churches were heavily attacked by antireligious intellectuals, Christianity still thrived. Religious devotion remained strong. John Wesley founded Methodism, representing a key revival of Christianity. It is also important to note that there were periods of revival within Christianity such as the Great Awakening. Between 1830 and 1960 still a sizable number of people within rural communities still practiced Christianity. The positive response to Billy Graham's 1950s Evangelistic Crusades is another testament to the durability of Christianity despite the apparent downward trend. Skepticism greatly increased in Europe, but Christianity did not die.

Whereas the church and state had strong ties in the past, European leaders began looking to the separation of church and state. In the late eighteenth century, laws of separation of church and state were enacted in France (1795) and in the Netherlands (1796). Even though Napoleon's defeat in 1815 meant that the church and state would be under the same control once again, this formal relationship between church and state became less significant again in the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Ireland (1869), France (1905), Geneva (1907), and Wales (1931) (McLeod 8-9). This trend affected education. Education became more and more secularized as schools introduced a wider range of philosophies to students and, in some schools, removed the requirement to attend mass. This separation of church and state most recently occurred in Sweden (2000), but there are other countries like Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and England where a formal separation has not yet taken place. Even though the separation of church and state resulted from some violent cases as seen in the French Revolution and the Spanish Civil War of 1936-9, Hugh McLeod in *The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000* asserts that the general tendency has been a gradual movement away from Christendom.

THE EVOLUTION OF SECULARIZATION THEORY

Taking history into account, sociologists and historians alike have created theories about this move away from Christianity and from religious belief in general. Since the mid-twentieth century, sociologists and historians have studied this idea of secularization in the effort to discover and present some sort of clarity to this trend. However, multiple theories have arisen and transformed as the centuries progressed, resulting in what some sociologists would describe as an end to secularization theory itself.

THE ROOTS OF "SECULARIZATION"

It is necessary to begin with a look at the etymology of "secularization". According to Swatos the word "secularization" comes from the Latin *saeculum*, meaning "an age (or era) but also, at least by the fourth and fifth centuries, 'the world,'" (Secularization). Monastic priests were distinguished from secular clergy in the sense that secular clergy went out into the world to serve the people rather than "stay under a formal "rule of life"...but it was also used to mean a life or life-style that is at odds with God. Thus people would enter monastic life to flee "the world". Later the term made a distinction between civil and ecclesiastical law, lands, and possessions" (Swatos). In the Germanic Empire during the Protestant Revolution, the civil state practiced secularized policies by distributing ecclesiastical property. During the French Revolution there was the "nationalization and sale of the property of the Catholic Church as "national goods" (Baubérot 452). In more ecclesiastical terms, "secular" referred to a cleric in the Catholic Church who lived outside the "siècle" in the "secular state", or "life in the world" thus distinguishing "regular priests", or monks, from "secular priests", who led the parishioners. Later during the nineteenth century, the British freethinker G.J. Holyoake would adopt the term

to create the Secular Society, a group dedicated to a just and moral order that would address human problems without the inclusion of supernatural explanations. This term already assumed some “ambiguous, but increasingly negative, use by the time it was adapted into social science” (Swatos).

KEY CONTRIBUTORS TO SECULARIZATION THEORY

Sociologists began exploring the link between modernity and the decline of religion in the 1950s and 60s (Berger, Faith 69). Emile Durkheim and Max Weber were the first to really begin exploring secularization theory. Max Weber began the idea of secularization during the early to mid-1900s. Weber’s view of religion was “more substantively conceptualized as bodies of beliefs and practices concerning salvation” (Chaves 750). The religious point of view, according to Weber, is in a state of competition against other claims which are all competing for authority. He also believed that the development of Protestantism had created a sense of disillusionment since Protestantism “reject[ed] magic means of achieving salvation like so many superstitions and sacrileges” for carrying out religious principles (Baubérot 453). Furthermore, the rise of industrial capitalism, according to Weber, necessarily drew people away from religion since “industrial production develops on a mechanical basis, favoring an instrumental rationality” (Baubérot 451). Peter L. Berger, another secularization theorist, asserts that, “ever since the Enlightenment, intellectuals of every stripe have believed that the inevitable consequence of modernity is the decline of religion” (Berger, Secularization). He cites Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud, prominent thinkers who believed that the progress of science and rationality was an inevitable replacement of religiosity, seeing religion as an “opiate” or an

“illusion” (Berger, *Secularization* 23). These views created more reasons to explore secularization theory.

As this topic expanded, several sociologists formulated their own set of views concerning secularization theory. Instead of religious competition, Larry Shiner in 1967 looked at the change in society’s view of traditions. Shiner defined secularization as the decline of religion. He related this concept to the decline of “prestige and influence” of religion’s “previously accepted symbols, doctrines, and institutions.” It is important to note that Shiner viewed secularization theory with much reservation because of the confusion that arose from the term “secularization” (Swatos). Yet Shiner nonetheless contributed to secularization discussions.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Bryan Wilson picked up this discussion and asserted that society experiences secularization when there is: “(1) a decrease in the portion of wealth devoted to the “supernatural”; (2) an increased independence of social behaviors from religion, linked to the idea that social practices change living conditions; and (3) an increasing justification of institutions functioning with little or no tie to religion” (Baubérot 453). Wilson claimed that modernization and secularization go hand in hand and “insisted that secularization refers to a process by which religion loses its social significance...a process by which it ‘has lost its presidency over other institutions” (Chaves 752). Wilson maintained a distinct difference between considering religion’s influence and “the mere existence of religious beliefs and sentiments among individuals” (Chaves 752). According to Wilson, secularization is “the process by which religion loses social significance” (McLeod 14). He then connected this occurrence to modern societies, highlighting different societal aspects that have promoted secularization. Wilson insisted that it is the “system that becomes secularized” (Chaves 753). So

in this sense, the substantial “action” associated with secularization is at the societal level more so than at the personal, internal belief level. This distinction will become more important as one explores Mark Chaves’ secularization theory later in the paper.

Sociologist Karel Dobbelaere’s (1981) view of secularization also bears some weight in secularization theory. Like Wilson, Dobbelaere presented secularization from the societal-level standpoint. He pays special attention to secularization as a societal-level process, “driven by functional differentiation, to which religious organizations and individuals react.” Later in 1991, Frank J. Lechner asserts the same argument: “secularization theory...as a theory of societal change does not primarily address religious behavior of individuals at all.” Thus, all individual-level experiences are considered irrelevant within the context of secularization theory.

In 1994, Mark Chaves drew heavily from Weber’s sociology of religion to formulate his definition of secularization as the declining scope of religious authority (Chaves 753-4). Chaves’ theory is similar to Wilson’s theory in that he refers to religious authority’s influence on different parts of society. We will go into greater detail about Chaves’ theory later in the paper. Soon after in 1995, Steve Bruce wrote *Religion in the Modern World*. He claimed that individualism was leading many to pick a religion based upon personal preferences, thus equalizing the religious market. Specialized positions within the church have arisen, which has decreased the functions of clergy and other church leaders. Connecting the increase of state power, as seen in growing corporations and bureaucracies, with the decrease of religion, Bruce argues that religion burgeons in smaller communities where personal, “face-to-face” contact is essential (McLeod 14). This overview of the evolution of secularization theory is not exhaustive. However, these

views set the foundation for the way present-day sociologists and historians view secularization theory.

CRITIQUEING SECULARIZATION THEORY: THE ISSUE WITH "RELIGION"

Even though secularization theory progressed with much interest, some doubt secularization's legitimacy. One of the biggest issues involves the questions surrounding the term "religion". A couple of questions that inevitably arise within this discussion are "What is religion?" and "How does one analyze religion in terms of secularization theory?" It is well-known that Weber himself never defined "religion". Durkheim ostensibly formulated a definition of religion, but this definition was "refabricated" by Talcott Parson, an American sociologist who served on Harvard's faculty from 1927-73. According to Parson, "religion unites all who adhere to it into a single moral community. Religion was the glue of society, the source of social solidarity" (Swatos). However, this definition did not stand when applied to pluralistic societies like the United States (Swatos). When C. Wright Mills summarized Parson's theory, he stated that there was a dramatic shift after the Reformation and the Renaissance when the "forces of modernization swept across the globe and secularization... [and] loosened the dominance of the sacred." Parson believed that the "sacred shall disappear altogether except, possibly, in the private realm" (Swatos). In other words, Parson believed that the rise of modernization would inevitably result in the disappearance of religion in society except that which one practices at home. However, Parson made this assumption with no historical evidence. Swatos asserts that one is incapable of analyzing religion because of its variable nature. Religion, according to Swatos, is therefore non-empirical and an "uncontrollable" referent. Furthermore, if one states that people are less religious now than they were a hundred years ago, one gets into the trap of

presuming to know how religious people lived a hundred years ago (Swatos). One could say that analyzing how religious people live today is possible, but then one still deals with this question of who is truly religious and who is not and upon what is this based? So we come full circle and see the difficulties in addressing secularization theory in terms of this complicated and oftentimes vague word, "religion".

Because of the issues surrounding the term "religion," many sociologists have changed their terminology or altered their view of secularization. Callum Brown observes that some sociologists have changed their terminology from religious 'decline' to religious 'change', acknowledging the complexities surrounding the term "religion" when discussing secularization. Others understand secularization in a purely historical sense, viewing the changes as historical development. In light of this, Brown presented his own definition of secularization: "'Secularization' represents a number of different things to scholars. First, it is a *theory* which, broadly speaking, defines the decline in the social significance of religion as a long-term and inevitable historical process, with short-term accelerants (such as the Reformation, the Enlightenment, industrialization and urbanization) and also short-term retardants (generally referred to as 'revivals')" (McLeod 37). There are various perspectives addressing religion and secularization. What is clear is that one should not ignore this term but seriously consider how one should approach secularization in light of the differing views of religion.

CHAVES' NEW DIFFERENTIATION THEORY: A NEW APPROACH

Since one of the biggest areas of tension relates to questions surrounding religion, one of the leading researchers of religion and sociology, Mark Chaves, has formulated his own theory. Chaves is currently a Notre Dame University researcher and has written such works as

Continuity and Change in American Religion (2011), *Congregations in America* (2004), and *Ordaining Women: Culture and Conflict in Religious Organizations* (1997). He has also written countless articles and chapters concerning sociology and religion and was the winner of the 2006 Distinguished Book Award from the American Sociological Association's Sociology of Religion Section. Chaves enters into this discussion of secularization theory by raising some legitimate questions: "Does the persistence of religion falsify secularization theory? Or does the form of religion's persistence render its persistence irrelevant to, or even supportive of, secularization theory?" (Chaves 750). This section of the paper will take a closer look at Chaves' "New Differentiation Theory" and what makes it a good choice for secularization research in Europe.

In order to address some of the complexities of religion, Chaves takes a different approach. Unlike other sociologists and historians, Chaves has not given up on secularization theory as a legitimate source of further debate or study. He asserts that one should evaluate what should be kept or abandoned. Chaves argues that one should not simply throw out secularization theory, but rather rethink and reformulate it. Regarding secularization, many say that a country or region is secularized when it becomes less religious, or because religion is in decline in that country or region. It is one thing to say that religion is in decline, but defining what that means is complicated because defining "religion" itself is a complex process. This would inevitably lead to a discussion concerning belief which becomes even more convoluted. However, if one shifts the discussion to observations concerning individual religious practices, changes within religious institutions, and religious institutions' interactions with other spheres of society, one gets closer to Chaves' position.

With an empirical focus in mind, Chaves seeks to reconceptualize the object of secularization through what he calls his “New Differentiation Theory”. It is “new” in the sense that secularization has not been studied before in quite this way; “differentiation” refers to Chaves’ categories and the way he focuses on religious authority’s influence on other spheres of society; and “theory” to refer to his specific research seeking to analyze secularization in the world. First of all, Chaves defines secularization as the declining scope of religious authority. So rather than making a broad statement about the decline or increase in religion itself, Chaves looks at how religious authority influences spheres of society. He expands upon this idea of different spheres by validating his research based upon recent studies, secularization literature, what he calls “Weberian insight”, and his claim to be more empirically founded in research technique.

Like other analysts of religion, Chaves establishes that numerous institutional spheres are different from religion. Here Chaves establishes religion as one sphere among many. But the question still remains, how is religion to be understood? How should one understand this religious sphere? Chaves claims that religion is “one relativized sphere among other relativized spheres, whose elites jockey to increase or at least maintain their control over human actions, organizational resources, and other societal spheres” (Chaves 752). However, the idea of ‘elite influence’ is a highly theoretical concept. In religion there are leaders or “elites” who exercise a certain level of influence within the religious sphere, such as pastors, priests, teachers, etc. It is difficult to clearly identify who these elites are and what level of influence they exert within a religious sphere. Based on Chaves’ information, I believe that he defines neither religion nor religious elites. He clearly desires that the focus be on the ends rather than the means within these three areas—social, institutional, and individual.

Other secularization theorists have presented theories that emphasize a societal view of secularization. Bryan Wilson asserts that secularization “does not even suggest that most individuals have relinquished all their interest in religion, even though that may be the case” (Chaves 752). Chaves agrees with this notion that separates religion’s effect from the existence of religious beliefs (752). Wilson asserts that it is “the system” that becomes secularized rather than the individual. With this insistence on “the system,” Wilson emphasizes societal secularization. Though Wilson has good insights, his perspective, according to Chaves, makes it difficult to “conceptualize the ways in which secularization is and is not manifested at the individual level of analysis” (753). Remember, Chaves seeks to address *all* levels of analysis, not just societal. Frank J. Lechner and Karel Dobbelaere present societal-level processes of secularization. Once again Chaves appreciates some of their ideas, but he still pushes for a multi-level approach to secularization theory.

Since Chaves’ theory is quite different from many other approaches, it is necessary to understand “religious authority”. Chaves looks at what he calls a Weberian approach to religious authority. As stated earlier, Weber himself never defined religion, but he did allude to religious authority by defining “religious organization”. Weber defined a “hierocratic organization” as “an organization which enforces its order through psychic coercion by distributing or denying religious benefits. . . . A compulsory hierocratic organization will be called a “church” insofar as its administrative staff claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of hierocratic coercion” (Chaves 754). In this, it is clear that Weber is thinking in political terms. But there are areas where Weber’s analogy of political authority breaks down when speaking about religious authority. We can legitimately say that, to an extent, political authority rests upon the “threatened use of

physical coercion” to gain complacency, but “psychic coercion” does not work in the same way. It is very difficult even impossible to explain the how’s and why’s of psychic coercion.

Instead Chaves asserts that a “religious authority structure. . . [is] a social structure that attempts to enforce its order and reach its ends by controlling the access of individuals to some desired goods, where the legitimation of that control includes some supernatural component” (755-6). By “authority,” Chaves means that which is “legitimated by calling on some supernatural referent” (756). This religious authority could refer to a god, multiple gods, or spirits, but it could also refer to the language employed by adherents or leaders so long as that language refers to the supernatural. One cannot define what those desired goods are since that depends upon the religion. Chaves claims:

The “goods” to which a religious authority structure controls access might be deliverance from sickness, meaninglessness, poverty, desire, sin, or other undesirable conditions. Or, religious authority might offer a positive good such as eternal life, nirvana, utopian community, perfect health, great wealth, or other valued states. . . The point here is that “religious goods” can be otherworldly or this-worldly, general or specific, psychic or material, collective or individual... [Thus] secularization as declining religious authority, then, will refer to the declining influence of social structures whose legitimation rests on reference to the supernatural. (756)

In other words, a social structure legitimates its control by referring to the supernatural through the use of religious goods.

Chaves shifts to the scope of religious authority. He separates the scope into three categories: societal, institutional, and individual. First, societal secularization refers to the extent

to which religious authority is able to influence non-religious institutional spheres. Chaves states that “secularization at the societal level may be understood as the declining capacity of religious elites to exercise authority over other institutional spheres” (757). This could be religious authority’s significance in political decisions or even in public works projects.

Institutional secularization is harder to conceptualize. Chaves states that “secularization at the organizational [or institutional] level may be understood as religious authority’s declining control over the organizational resources within the religious sphere” (757). Some assert that institutional secularization arises when religious organizations allow the secular world to influence internal affairs. This may be in the form of “adaptation” or “accommodation” to the secular world, or a “lack of depth” motivating religious activity (Chaves 766). However, Chaves asks, “But how, exactly, does one tell the difference between a sacred and a secular value? Between a religious and a secular activity? By what criteria are the current practices of religious organizations more secular than past practices?” (766). Chaves uses examples to explain organizational secularization. One can see organizational, or institutional, secularization in a Belgium Catholic school where the number of lay relative to religious professionals on the teaching staff is higher. Another example is in increasing numbers of denominational CEO’s with predominantly non-religious career backgrounds versus those who have had solely religious career backgrounds. These examples shed some light upon Chaves’ theory as it relates to institutional secularization.

In regard to individual-level secularization, the question does not involve belief, but rather refers to the “extent to which individual actions are subject to religious control,” or the “extent to which [individual] actions are regulated by religious authority” (Chaves 757, 768). Chaves’ examples of individual-level secularization include religious authority’s influence over

reproductive behavior, voting, diet, religious intermarriage, etc. Overall, Chaves emphasizes analysis based upon empirical, objective data.

In order to demonstrate the relationship between these levels, Chaves charts out his observations concerning societies and secularization at the societal and individual levels (refer to table at the bottom of the page). He observes that areas where institutions like education and science are influenced by religious authority reflect a low secularization at the societal level. This could happen historically as in traditional societies or “because a differentiated religious authority has managed to exert (or reexert) control over the other spheres as in medieval Europe or contemporary Iran” (Chaves 760). In contrast, more secularized societies are those places where religious authority tends to have a weaker influence on areas the state, the arts, the economy, etc. Similarly, the

less influence of religious authority at the individual level, the more secularized the individual level is. Chaves takes into consideration that the level of secularization will vary depending upon the community. Therefore, this model is not, as he calls it, a “sterile classification game”, but it could help one predict

Secularization in Two Dimensions: Social Settings

		Societal-level Secularization	
		High	Low
Individual-level secularization	High	Most areas of contemporary industrial society 1	Medieval Europe Colonial U.S. 2
	Low	African American communities U.S. Protestant Fundamentalism 3	Some traditional societies Contemporary Iran 4

(Figure 1 from Mark Chaves' "Secularization and Religious Authority" p. 761)

“the nature of the relationship between religion and social movements.” So one could say that areas with high levels of societal and individual secularization utilize religion as a “cultural resource for social movements” (Chaves 761). In other words, one may use religious symbols and themes to increase public support of a social movement, but religious organizations and leaders will not play a significant role.

CHAVES SECULARIZATION MODEL AND EUROPE

Chaves is an American sociologist, so many of his examples of secularization stem from America. However, this study proposes that one can use Chaves’ theory to analyze secularization in Europe. Referring back to the European history previously covered, it will be argued how, according to Chaves’ model of societal, institutional, and individual-level secularization, Europe has experienced secularization on all three levels.

CHAVES’ THEORY AND EUROPE

There are examples of societal secularization in European history. One of the major examples is the rise of tolerance, though limited, between Catholics and Protestants. After the Reformation and the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, the Roman Catholic Church had lost some of its political authority to the Lutherans. Before the rise of tolerance, allegiance to either Catholicism or Protestantism was incredibly important and had caused numerous conflicts for many years. After the rise of tolerance, individuals began to break away from established tradition and belief that related to the religion of the king—a Catholic king obligated you to Catholicism; a Protestant king to Protestantism. Tolerance served to break religious authority of their political influence. Being Protestant was no longer illegal. Whether true religious freedom arose out of this tolerance or not, establishing nation-wide tolerance led to the reduction of

religious authority's influence since the religious sphere no longer dictated a society's denominational preference.

The most salient examples of societal secularization in Europe were separation of religion from state and from education. The separation of church and state began in the eighteenth century and continued through the twenty-first century in countries such as France, the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, and Wales. Currently, many European countries have established some form of separation between church and state, though this separation may remain partial. Though some church-state connections still exist in selected countries, those ties have gradually loosened. This serves as one of the clearest examples of secularization at the societal level because two very distinct spheres, religion and politics, become mutually exclusive concerning the scope of authority. In other words, one sphere will not absolutely impose its values and views, its authority, on the other. The introduction of a secular educational system also signifies societal secularization. Whereas religious education was obligatory at one point, religious authority again lost its influence upon yet another important area of society.

One can see examples of institutional secularization in events not previously described, namely the secularization of schools. Since Chaves does not make institutional secularization very clear outside of the examples he provides, one can cite the transformation of the University of the Sorbonne in Paris, France as an example of institutional secularization. At its start in the thirteenth century, the Sorbonne primarily taught theology. Taught under the same professor, the discipline of the Catholic Church was not taught separately from theology. Theology lost its major role in the university, allowing institutions in the Arts and Sciences to gain priority. Since Chaves cites the growing number of non-religious teachers in religiously affiliated schools as an

example of institutional secularization, the divergence from religious foundations proves to be an example of institutional secularization as is the case with the Sorbonne.

Besides this example, one could also consider the implementation of limited tolerance as an example of institutional secularization. After the Peace of Augsburg, churches were required to legitimate Protestantism. Catholic authorities had to allow the people to choose Protestantism if they so desired. Their authority was necessarily weakened since they had influence over an increasingly smaller number of people as citizens chose to go to Protestant churches. The Treaty of Westphalia ended the religious wars in Europe in 1648. As stated earlier, some churches allowed tolerance out of practicality. In this situation, pragmatism grew stronger than the church's authority to keep the community under one sole religion. The changes that took place after the Reformation inevitably transformed the way church leadership, especially Catholic leadership, addressed religion within their own institution. Though this second example seems to fit Chaves' secularization theory, it is not completely clear. Therefore, one observes minimal secularization at the institutional level according to Chaves' theory and the available historical evidence.

After the Enlightenment, intellectual pursuits led to secularization in the individual sphere. Though few in number, the philosophies of the Enlightenment were far-reaching. By emphasizing the individual pursuit of knowledge, religious influence on individuals decreased in intensity. No other evidence so strongly supports the growth of this secularization at the individual level than the complete rejection of religion and belief. As more members of society questioned their beliefs, even turning to other belief systems such as deism, Locke's *tabula rasa*

philosophy, and skepticism, society became more secularized. Some historians refer to this period as the pivotal point in Europe's trend toward secularization (McLeod 6-7).

In addition, church attendance and the divergence from one religion to another points to individualized secularization. During the late 1800's, a decrease in church attendance was common to most parts of Europe, especially among the working class men and peasantry (McLeod 13). While it is agreed that this does not necessarily signal the decline of religion, the power of religious influence upon the individual and his or her quotidian decisions did not change this trend. It appears reasonable to argue that even the divergence from the traditional norms of belief seem to signal a certain degree of individual secularization. Many historians and sociologists postulate that many simply chose a different religion or belief system. One could argue that secularization is evident in this case since the religious influence upon the individual proved insufficient to keep him or her from changing belief systems.

Having surveyed the history of Europe and how Chaves' secularization model applies to it, I logically conclude that, where societal and institutional secularization began, individual secularization inevitably followed. In Europe this conclusion appears plausible since religious authority greatly revolved around the church's influence in political issues. For example, Kings, such as Louis XIV and James I of England, led because they were given the divine or God-given right to do so. Church leaders were deemed to be the only legitimate authorities on Scriptures, thus leading to a great reliance upon popes and priests, even if such religious authorities were corrupt. So in the sixteenth century when citizens doubted kings as rulers by divine right and when Christians no longer solely relied upon scriptural interpretation by religious leaders thanks to Martin Luther, the scope of religious authority on the individual inevitably declined. This

trend away from the traditional norm in European Christianity surfaces as a key to the whole secularization debate.

One might question the notion of secularization in Europe by referring to periods of religious revival (John Wesley and the Methodist Church, Billy Graham's Evangelistic Crusades, for example). However, these phases were momentary or short-lived (McLeod 37). On the whole, one can conclude that Europe has been secularized since, according to Chaves' model, there is proof in all three levels of analysis. However, more evidence exists for secularization in the societal and individual spheres. Chaves' definition of institutional secularization is somewhat vague. Therefore, Europe fits Chaves' New Differentiation Theory, though with some reservation due to the lack of numerous historical examples in support of institutional secularization.

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: FRANCE

Before taking a closer look at the city of interest for this study, namely Orléans, it is necessary to explore the historical background of the country in which it is situated—France.

The eighteenth century Enlightenment found its focal point in burgeoning Paris, France. Philosophers during this time encouraged an increasing independence of social conduct. They emphasized two "hopes": the first hope lay in the relationship between a better condition of life and the direction of progress; the second hope lay in the connection between technical progress and "increased satisfaction of the needs of humanity and the advancement of well-being; moral progress that lessens the violence in human relationships and leads to a harmonious coexistence; political progress permitting the gradual, historical realization of freedom, equality, and justice" (456). Even though society's gaze seemed fixed upon a societal ideal that seemed bent upon

peace and universal prosperity, the French quickly found themselves amid turmoil and revolution.

In the wake of the Enlightenment's utopian ideals grew an ever-growing tension that would affect the outcome of French society for generations to come. In 1766, the French governmental system was based upon absolute monarchy. Louis XV revealed the mindset behind absolute monarchy: 'Sovereign power resides in my person alone. To me alone belongs all legislative power with neither any responsibility to others nor any division of that power. Public order in all its entirety emanates from me, and the rights and interests of the nation are necessarily bound up with my own and rest only in my hands' (Price 82-3). And, as the clergy continuously asserted, this was God's will. Despite their claim to divine appointment, many rulers would not be able to hold society's loyalty for long.

Louis XVI considerably weakened the absolutist image with his inability to choose a successful chief minister. This weakness seemed to contradict his divine right to rule. His decision to isolate himself from the populace only undermined his authority. In 1786, the Controller General Colonne warned Louis XVI of a financial crisis. In order to raise support for the measures he suggested, Colonne called upon an Assembly of Notables whose 144 members "would be selected by the king from amongst 'people of weight, worthy of the public's confidence and such that their approbation would powerfully influence general opinion'" (Price 86). Colonne came under much criticism, so he was replaced by Loménie de Brienne, Archbishop of Toulouse, whose endeavors experienced no greater success. Brienne called upon Parliament for support but its members would not back tax increases without calling upon an Estates-General. A date was set for an Estates-General, but Brienne's failures led to a new

ministry under the direction of Necker. By this time, the reputation of the monarchical system was completely disgraced.

Destitution, riots, and disorder mounted as the country neared revolution. Poor cereal harvests hurt the economy which was already in shambles as some greatly prospered at the expense of the majority. The government's inability to effectively deal with the rising fiscal problems severely reduced its credibility. This failure also increased opposition and the drive toward constitutional reform. This was the tumultuous backdrop of the Third Estate issue. The Third Estate called for equal status among clergy and nobility. This led to the circulation of *cahiers de doléances*, pamphlets that presented and debated the political reforms each social group desired. In the end, there was a predominant sense of agreement between the desires of the three estates. The royal government's inability to effectively respond to the three estates' appeals increased revolutionary sentiment.

During these turbulent years, a modern political culture was created and widely circulated, transferring sovereignty from the king to the nation (Price 79). Poor leadership and bad political decisions continued to disintegrate the people's confidence in the government. Public tension erupted. Rioting groups burned internal customs posts and searched for arms through an attack upon the Bastille in Paris. "Solid middle-class citizens" established the 'Permanent Committee' in order to take the place of a royal municipality and "to create a citizens' militia to preserve order and protect the city against attack." A "new political culture" had been created through such actions as the establishment of the Declaration of the Right of Man and the Citizen (Price 100; 105-6).

Many viewed the Revolution and its transfer of sovereignty from king to nation as a nonreligious movement. Yet some historians believe that the Declaration of the Right of Man and the Citizen led to a notion of creating a “new man,” that the Revolution and all its ideals would somehow “regenerate the human being” (Baubérot 460). This Declaration and the Revolution itself sought nonreligious values and was even seen as a direct refusal of Catholicism. Yet some historians believe that, in rejecting the Catholic Church, this French republicanism created a “secular religion” (Baubérot 460).

If there was any hope in this new government, it was clouded by the counterrevolutionary threat which incited radicalism. This radicalism made it very difficult to instate new leadership within the new government. In 1789, the Assembly began taking active steps to reorganize the Church. The Declaration of Rights had established a precedent for the freedom of worship, so the Catholic clergy felt their autonomy threatened. The papacy objected to the democratization of the Church. Further objection to the Revolution arose when the community’s right to have a parish priest was threatened. Violence ensued as the struggle for power led to conflict between the politically opposing Montagnards (the radicals) and the Girondins. Then the Reign of Terror arose, adding more turmoil and chaos to the already tumultuous political environment of France (Price 120).

According to Price, the Terror led to a campaign of dechristianisation in some areas in 1793. A new calendar abolished Sunday. This reflected the anti-religious sentiments and anti-clericalism which led to a “new revolutionary cult of Reason and the Supreme Being” (Price 120). The Catholic Church has historically had a great impact upon France. One of the main issues that arose in French society dealt with “clericalism,” or, according to Baubérot, “the claim

of religion to political dominion over the country” (459). However, anticlericalism arose when the Church began to have an abusively dominant influence upon political affairs. They saw the Jesuits impact upon the youth as too intrusive. From anticlericalism, individuals began questioning the Church institution itself and started moving toward a “free religiosity,” or “a personal devotion where the relationship with the Divine supersedes ecclesiastical structures” (Baubérot 460). Later on, Victor Hugo would be one of the great advocates of this “free religiosity.” The growing reliance upon scientific ideology also led to an anticlericalism that “perceived religion as an outdated explanation of the world that offered only a backwards orientation, irrelevant to the context of modern democracies” (Baubérot 460). Though, one must note, that these radical measures against the Church also led to strengthened support of traditional religious customs in other areas.

A conservative First Republic arose but its politicians led to its own downfall. In 1799, the Consul was established after a coup d'état that was led mainly under the authority of Napoleon Bonaparte. After much military and political success, he was appointed consul for life. He later crowned himself Emperor Napoleon I. The Revolutionary-Napoleonic era affected the ways people thought about politics. Though the Revolution sought to limit arbitrary government, the leadership of Emperor Napoleon ironically led to a government “far more autocratic than the monarchy of the old regime” (Spielvogel 367).

During Emperor Napoleon's reign, crisis continued arising due to poor harvests. France became more industrialized, and “the Church had less immediate relevance in an increasingly urban environment” (Price 155). Property remained the source of social, intellectual, and moral adequacy. Even though society seemed to be moving away from the church, there were still

some who held to religious sentiments. Many believed that “it was God’s will that France should be cleansed of the remains of Jacobinism and atheism. They were inspired by an idealized conception of a Christian society, with the château at its centre in every village” (Price 159). In 1801, the Napoleonic Concordat established a privileged link between the French State and the Vatican. The state recognized the Church’s “special place in French life and compensated it for its losses during the revolution by paying the stipends of the clergy” (Price 203). In 1802, they extended this law to include Reformed and Lutheran Protestants and then Jews in 1803. Fath calls what came to be an increase in the number of Protestant denominations along with other religious convictions the “religious market” (Fath 402). This religious growth was rooted in the ability to have individual choice in such areas as militancy and the refusal of the church state system. What came to be known as evangelical Christianity arose after the Geneva Revival (1817-20). French Protestantism included such key beliefs as personal conversion and the inspiration of the Bible. As the Protestant movement continued during the early nineteenth century, missions grew, leading to the creation of the Methodist and Baptist churches in France. During this period evangelical Protestantism had the opportunity to develop as an “ultra-minority group” and their “social role was broadly recognized” (Fath 401). Areas such as Brittany that had deeply rooted histories in the Catholic tradition began to include more and more evangelical communities by the beginning of the twentieth century. Rather than do away with religion, the French State increased its ties with the Church.

Economic, political, and societal problems arose, but society kept fighting for a system that would improve life. The Revolution had occurred because the government had moreover shown excessive favor towards one element of this élite, the nobility, and in so doing threatened the status which other *notables* had enjoyed since 1789. From the 1840s, capitalism grew and

began to threaten artisanal traditions and work practices. Thus, the socialist ideal of a more egalitarian society founded upon self-regulating producers' cooperatives grew in appeal. After 1834, a repressive government arose whose firm leadership kept society under control. This resulted in a period of peace but not freedom. Society demanded universal suffrage once again. The desire for political reform led to the creation of the Second Republic. The fight for universal suffrage finally had an effect, albeit not universal, in 1848 when males could vote.

Ties between the Church and the state loosened again but would tighten when the state sought a means to establish moral order. Louis-Napoleon became the new Emperor Napoleon III under the Second Empire. The Second Empire enjoyed more support than previous governmental systems. The policy of liberalization led to the loosened alliance between Church and state, established during the Second Republic. The Third Republic began in 1870 after a military defeat in war. The succession of the throne was passed on to the House of Orléans. This new leadership was determined, with the assistance of the Church, to do the following:

[To] establish a regime devoted to re-establishing moral order. France needed to expiate the sins which had caused God to inflict military defeat on her armies. Religious revival seemed to promise both external, and through persuading everyone to accept the place in society which God had chosen for them, internal security. It was increasingly the defense of religion rather than monarchism which supplied cohesion and a sense of purpose to conservatives during these early years of the Third Republic. (Price 195)

It seemed that religion was again becoming an influential part of the political sphere.

Even with these religious measures, France still installed certain secular measures. The French government repealed the 1814 ban on Sunday work and re-established the right to

divorce. A secular education system was established as a way to combat “clerical obscurantism, of securing the emancipation of the individual and safeguarding the principles of 1789,” referring to the Declaration of the Right of Man and the Citizen. However, Price asserts that, during this period, “the status of the Roman Catholic church as the established state church was not threatened” (Price 197).

However, in 1905, the disestablishment of the Church, or the separation of church and state, terminated the Napoleonic Concordat. There was no longer a valid distinction between “official religions” and “dissident religions” (Fath 402). In 1904, Catholic teaching orders had already been suppressed and schools closed. When war broke out in 1914, the clericals believed that men would turn to the Church in search of “hope and consolation” (206). The war greatly surprised the vast majority of French citizens. A great sense of patriotism flooded France against German militarism. Price states that “the Catholic concept of the ‘just war’ and invocation of the spirit of Joan of Arc was widely accepted, far more so than the clerical conception of this time of trial as an opportunity for the expiation of sins. Nevertheless, the visible religious revival was short-lived. Yet, as Price continues, “the role of the Church in helping to maintain patriotic commitment should not be under-estimated. Neither should that of the schools and the pre-war processes of socialization they had promoted and which were now being put to the test” (210). The number of Protestant evangelicals grew from about 15,000 to 25,000 after the First World War, though these numbers were dispersed (Fath 402). Evangelical Protestant Bible institutions were created along with a well-established evangelical network. This growth included the increase of training institutions where students received pastoral, evangelistic, or missionary training.

However, war had weakened France and would do so again during World War II. Eight million men had been mobilized out of which 1,322,100 men (16.6 percent) were killed by the end of World War I. The post-war French economy experienced numerous hardships in its effort to rebuild the war-stricken country. Politically speaking, conservative élites tried to maintain their power while protests arose anytime this power was challenged. In the end, the Popular Front, composed of Socialists and Radicals, won the elections. Then, the Second World War broke out in France. Millions were taken captive and thousands killed by the Germans. After such a catastrophic situation, the Church and the state “sought to collaborate in the re-establishment of ‘moral order’” (Price 254). Marshal Pétain, leader of the Vichy regime, hoped that the French would adopt “some semblance of normality” among the chaos of war. “Catholics in particular welcomed the regime’s adoption of the Church’s teaching on morality, the family and the importance of spiritual values, and its benevolent attitude towards religious education” (Price 255). Cardinal Gerlier, Archbishop of Lyons, insisted that “if we had remained victorious, we would possibly have remained the prisoners of our errors. Through being secularized, France was in danger of death” (Price 255). Once again France turned to the Church, if even for a short amount of time, to foster French morale.

As the war progressed, the goal “changed from that of restoration of France to participation in an increasingly desperate German-led crusade against the Bolshevik menace to Europe.” The *Conseil National de la Résistance* was created under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle. It aimed to “dismantle and to nationalise the ‘feudal’ economic empires, to involve workers themselves in planning for a greater and more fairly shared prosperity and to create a social security system.” Working toward the institution of equality across classes, the state

encouraged the move away from individualism toward the notion that “poverty was as much the responsibility of society as of the individual” (Price 256, 268).

Finally, in 1945, economic and social stagnation came to an end. What followed was the *trente glorieuses*, a period of “sustained economic growth and social transformation” (Price 272). American aid through the Marshall Plan eased the strain of post-war reconstruction. The economic situation continued to improve, but inflation continued to rise. Price describes this period:

Of the three generations alive in the 1960s, the oldest had been formed by the experience of the First World War. Most had direct links with the rural world. Their children, born in the 1920s and '30s, and relatively few in number, had been marked by the experience of the second war and post-war austerity. This was nevertheless the generation which broke with tradition, with the 'eternal France'. Their children, those of the 'baby boom' were far more numerous, and had grown up in a world of plenty. These were the first children of the consumer society, their values profoundly different from those of either their parents or grand-parents...Traditional religious and moral values were questioned as part of a revolution in 'taste and expectations'. (288)

From 1942, France experienced the most rapid rate of demographic growth. Generous family allowances and a growing assurance in the future led families to have more children. During the 1970s, the growth rate decreased as those of the 'baby boom' generation entered retirement age and the newer generation preferred a smaller family in response to a consumer society. Women also desired more personal autonomy and preferred to continue working in order to ameliorate family living standards. More reliable methods of birth control made this easier, and the

influence of the law and religion concerning sexual activity gradually declined. Many historians hold that the 1975 law legalizing abortion did nothing more than relocate back-street abortions to sanitary hospitals. While the family still remained the fundamental social unit, France experienced a growing popularity of cohabitation outside marriage and of divorce. Also important to mention is the change that occurred in homes. The focus of family life shifted from the dining table to the television. One could say that “[g]reater spaciousness and physical comfort was accompanied by changing life styles” (Price 290-2).

Particular economic and educational initiatives greatly affected daily life. In 1981, the socialist party assumed power in France. France developed a welfare state. This helped reduce “perceived inequality” (Price 293). Social security aimed to protect family living standards, and economic expansion led to geographic and social mobility. The state played a major role in the change of education. They aimed to instill a “common culture and sense of civic virtue.” The exception lay with private Catholic schools which were known for their firm discipline and their “snob value” (Price 295). Yet this educational system has received much criticism “both for its elitism and neglect of scientific and technical instruction” (Price 295).

As leisure time expanded for workers, Sunday church-going declined. The significance of church-going declined, remaining merely a “formative cultural phenomenon.” Religious vocations collapsed in the 1950s. Priests aged and their numbers declined. Price says what McLeod would later assert: that “a new Sunday, for a new society, and a mass culture emerged in the 1960s” (Price 300). Pop culture emerged with such stars as Johnny Hallyday and Sylvie Vartan. Holiday expenditures boomed. However, consumerism, individualism, materialism, and decline of religious practice did not destroy the family, “the ultimate repository of moral values.

In spite of divorce, family loyalties remain of central importance and are based on more effective and less authoritarian relationships” (Price 301).

An increasing ambivalence toward institutions and moral rules has arisen, as well. However, one must keep in mind that morality remains an area of debate especially in the medical field. Medical institutions “have provided a secular brand of hope” in that the doctor’s particular religious convictions normally bear no weight upon his practice (Baubérot 458). However, many have become disillusioned since even the best medicine is no longer able to stop certain diseases like AIDS. The implication of heavy medication and euthanasia has led to debates that one could justifiably consider moral in nature. There was the belief that faith had “surrendered to progress caused by growing uncertainty and questions about the appropriate limits of progress” (Baubérot 462). The creation of the French National Ethics Advisory Council played a significant role in that it was responsible for reflecting upon the ethical effects of biotechnological progress. Here is an example of society’s hope increasingly resting on the progression of science independent from religious institutions.

Since progress and freedom from religion do not prevent the issues of morality that seem to inevitably arise, individuals become disenchanted with this whole notion of hope. Consequently, there has been a “resurgence of traditionalist undercurrents” (Baubérot 459). New religious movements have come about. So here is a very particular situation of disillusionment, reillusionment, and globalization, as Baubérot puts it, that leads the masses to favor “sensationalism over analysis in the news, emphasizing its entertainment value” and an unrealistic notion of daily life (459).

CHAVES' SECULARIZATION MODEL AND THE FRENCH CONTEXT

In the French context, it is impossible to ignore the deep roots of Christianity and of Catholicism in particular. Though France shares numerous characteristics with other societies, most notably European and North American, its own history and current affairs allow for certain distinctions in the realm of secularization (Baubérot 451). Therefore, much of this analysis will be devoted to dechristianization in France. This is done not to ignore or undervalue other religions that may have been present and dynamic during this period, but rather, to consider the religious environment of France as it relates to its historically prevalent religious affiliation. It will be investigated how Chaves' categories of secularization—societal, institutional, and individual—can apply to the history of France.

Societal secularization arose when French religious authority over politics and education decreased. During the periods of absolute monarchism in France, the King exercised more authority over religious affairs than the church over the political arena. One can argue for societal secularization since the religious authority of the Church was not powerful enough to exercise equal authority over the ruler. So rather than having a political figure highly dominated by religious affairs, France had political rulers who dominated all aspects of life, including the religious sphere. On the other hand, Church affairs and politics were so closely connected that allegiance to the King meant allegiance to the Church and vice versa. When French society demanded the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, the Church did not have a strong enough influence to change these policies. Baubérot states that, when the people established the revolutionary Declaration, this created a sort of "secular religion." Though society wanted change, history shows that this change was not particularly religious in nature. In fact, the

Catholic Church felt that its authority was being challenged, and it was. The Church once had a strong influence upon political and social life. The Reign of Terror abolished Sunday, a day set apart for religious gathering, from the calendar. Later, the 1814 ban on Sunday work was repealed. The Church's influence on society was declining.

Societal secularization also occurred through the separation of church and state and the secularization of the French educational system. One of the most important secularization events occurred with the 1905 termination of the Napoleonic Concordat and the separation of church and state. The French today refer to the 1905 separation to argue against the Church's involvement in political affairs. The same decree that lifted the 1814 ban on Sunday work also eliminated the restriction against establishing a secular education system. Previously, the Church had been the sole source of education, teaching students Biblical principles. However, education began focusing on how to be good citizens and challenged traditional ways of thinking which necessarily included religious teachings. Baubérot makes a distinction between "freedom of conscience" and "freedom of thought." While "freedom of conscience" allows for "diversity of belief in society and the freedom to express those beliefs," "freedom of thought ensures the right to independently reexamine beliefs received from family, social groups, and society as a whole. This way, a person can freely adhere to these beliefs, adapt them or turn from them to something else." The French began to view school as an institution where students are taught to "exploit their faculties of reason and to help them exercise freedom of thought" (Baubérot 461). Today, many people do not consider private Catholic schools to be any more religious than public schools. Many parents send their children to religiously affiliated schools for the good education rather than for the religious benefit. Secularization is present in many areas of French society.

The same examples from “Chaves’ Secularization Model and Europe” apply when discussing institutional secularization in France. The Sorbonne has already been cited as an example of institutional secularization. Other examples of religiously affiliated universities and schools decreasing or eliminating the importance placed upon religion would reasonably justify institutional secularization. However, no other significant evidence exists which defends institutional secularization in France.

There is no doubt that individual secularization has occurred on multiple levels in France. The Enlightenment was a clear source of individual-level secularization. One of the main objects of Enlightenment philosophy was to direct the individual’s attention toward the self—one’s thoughts and actions. The philosophers did not encourage individuals to look to the Church or to God for hope but to modern advances and even to personal thought. Additionally, the individual’s perspective of absolute monarchs transformed. The Church and the King used this idea of absolutism to gain control over people through this idea of divine rule. If individuals did not respect the absolute monarch who supposedly wielded divine right, there were eternal consequences. The Church played a large role in controlling society’s actions and allegiance to the King. This tactic generally succeeded until revolutionary sentiments gradually weakened and eventually destroyed the King’s authority. The people no longer feared eternal consequences if they disobeyed the King. Louis XVI was tried and executed by guillotine January 21, 1793. Individual secularization broke down the fear of eternal punishment.

The Church experienced more individual-level secularization as time progressed. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen liberated people from the traditional religious authority. Anticlericalism arose as a result of rebellion against the authority of the Church in

societal and individual affairs. Baubérot claims that the founding of secularization in France began with the “political victory of the anticlerical movement.” It is said that the anticlericalism in France during the Third Republic produced a mainly pacifist secularization, though secularization nonetheless (Baubérot 461-2). During the Third Republic, the right to divorce was reinstated, as well. In essence, the Catholic Church exerted their power to such a great extent that they, in fact, undermined their own authority. While evidence reveals a persistence of traditional religious customs in certain areas despite the Terror’s efforts to undermine Christianity, in some, the growing reliance upon man and technology weakened the French’s reliance upon the Church.

After the Second World War, France experienced an increase in individual-level secularization. As society moved toward socialist measures, an intriguing situation occurred: France, a historically Christian country, insisted that poverty was a societal responsibility. Christianity’s Bible teaches that followers of Christ should help the poor (Acts 9:36). Rather than encourage the people to help the poor based upon this Christian principle, they appeal to the individual and his or her allegiance to this all-encapsulating image of society, not the image of Christian community and good-will. The religious authority was not influential enough to keep individuals from questioning traditional religious and moral values or from becoming entrenched in this new consumerism, at odds with the Christian mentality of giving rather than receiving (Matt. 10:8; 2 Cor. 9:7). Whereas the Church taught sexual abstinence outside of marriage, the religious influence upon sexual activity declined. The Biblical teaching concerning sexual activity as a means of procreation also lost influence as women sought more reliable methods of birth control in order to remain at work. The decline in church attendance also showed individual secularization since the Church was not able to convince many of the importance of church-going and Christian fellowship. Family still remained the most important foundation of morality

but with less focus on religion and more concentration on family loyalty itself. This contrasted the previous concept of each family as part of many Christian families within society. Price states that, as priests aged and declined in number, there arose “clear signs of a crisis and of an inability to combat secularization, especially on such crucial moral questions as abortion and contraception and this in spite of the development of a less rigorist moral theology” (300).

AGAINST THE TREND

Chaves’ main argument asserts that, to call a society secularized, the society has to have evidence of secularization at all three levels—societal, institutional, and individual. We observed strong historical data supporting secularization at the societal and individual levels. Since the number of examples concerning institutional secularization is not as high as the other two levels, one can argue low-level secularization. However, French history shows examples of society working against this secularization trend, especially through Protestantism.

Even though this idea of secularization grew to have great pull in French society especially after the Revolution, certain efforts to strengthen the bond between Church and state show France’s particularly unique history. After the Reformation and the rise of limited tolerance, the Catholic Church lost its control of individuals’ denominational choice. This indicated both societal and institutional secularization because of the lack of authority the Church exercised over individuals. In contrast, Napoleon enacted the Concordat during a time when secularization was already happening within France. The extension of the Concordat to include Protestants and Jews demonstrated how the French government saw, if not the historical foundations, then the societal importance of religion. Fath describes the period from the Concordat (1801-1802) to the First World War (1914-1918) as a “slow learning process of

religious pluralism in a controlled religious market” where the state played a key role (400). Fath believes that the extension of the Concordat system (1801) to include Reformed and Lutheran Protestants (1802) and Jews (1808) points to the “first stage of laicization”, or the decrease in the Catholic Church’s authority through the extension of rights to other churches (Fath 401). The growing number of Protestants after the Geneva Revival indicate that, even with the rise of secularization in certain instances, Christianity thrived rather well as history suggests. Overall, the historical context was very important in this situation. Unlike the historical context in which limited tolerance arose, an underlying secularization already existed when Napoleon enacted the Concordat. Therefore, the extension of rights to other denominations suggests a move toward religion, Protestant Christianity in particular.

French history continues to reveal this back and forth movement between religious fervor and secularized hope. Though the ties between the Church and state had loosened, the Third Republic and the House of Orléans reestablished those ties. The House of Orléans desired a renewing of moral order, and not through societal progress but through the Church. Regardless of certain trends in secularization, it is evident that the religious influence upon society and the individual was strong enough to lead the government to see its necessity in encouraging moral order. Yet this did not dissuade the government from repealing the 1814 ban on Sunday work, from reinstating the right to divorce, or from establishing a secular education system. These last examples of individual and societal secularization reveal the move toward secularization that persisted despite governmental actions to support the link between society and the Church.

Though bursts of religious sentiment continued, these instances were short-lived. When France became embroiled in World War I, political leaders used religious dialogue and

encouraged the Church's teaching on morality in order to bring hope to the masses of disenchanting citizens. The fact that these religiously-based campaigns were successful, if even for a short period of time, reveals the significance the Church historically played in the lives of past generations. This makes the idea of secularization in such a setting that much more interesting. It is possible that there is no such thing as pure secularization. Society is always mixed with some religion. Even if these situational revivals did not seem to have a long-term effect, they are important nonetheless.

THE PROTESTANT EXCEPTION

As stated earlier, Protestantism began growing in France. Fath offers additional data concerning Protestant growth and considers this as an exception to the secularization principle. Between 1960 and 2005, the French religious market continued to diversify (Fath 403). The numbers of evangelicals increased from 100,000 to almost 350,000 with large numbers coming from Pentecostals (200,000), Baptists (40,000), and Charismatics. Other important denominations include Brethren Assemblies, Mennonites, Methodists, and others (Fath 403). "Whereas the Catholic Church has had to close seminaries, evangelical Protestants have had to respond to increased demand for training." Such demand led to the creation of the Free Faculty of Evangelical Theology in Vaux-sur-Seine (Faculté Libre de Théologie Evangélique) in 1965, and then the Free Reformed Theology Seminary at Aix-en-Provence in 1974 (Faculté Libre de Théologie Réformée) (Fath 404). Yet Fath admits this period is poorly documented.

In the late 1980s, there were numerous evangelical Protestant campaigns in France such as Billy Graham's French campaign in 1986, Charles Colson's visit to Paris in 1980, the "Fête de l'Évangile" near Nimes in 1980, the "Fête de Jeunesse" in 1985 in Vincennes, "Mission France"

with Billy Graham in 1986 in Paris and province, “Fêtons l’Evangile” near Nimes, “Mondial sport et foi” in Paris and province, and “Pentecost 2000” in Valence. Nonetheless, the 350,000 people that make up the French Protestants represent only 0.5% of the French population. In other words, French Protestantism remains marginal.

Fath offers two hypotheses for this: first, some see this as a sect that necessarily refuses modernity. Secondly, some argue that evangelical growth is not easily “transplanted” into the French situation. Fath states that many historians view evangelicalism as “an exogenous disruption of the traditional French religious field” (Fath 406). They see evangelicalism as having mainly an Anglo-Saxon origin. It is true that the Anglo-Saxon world has had a tremendous impact upon French evangelical Protestantism, especially after 1945. Dozens of American evangelical missions started work in France. However, such influence was frowned upon when many saw that these efforts generated dependence, especially financial, upon Americans. Thus, the French evangelical Protestants faced losing some of their independence to a culture other than their own. This led many to reject the label “Protestant” to avoid the “American style” (Fath 407-8). The third hypothesis is that evangelical churches found a certain “niche” in marginalized populations. Fath conjectures that evangelical churches became “places of community for transitional populations that are on the margins of a society into which they intend (or not) to fit” (408). Fath looks to the growth of ethnic churches as evidence of this hypothesis. It is important to note that the French republican tradition stands often “hostile” to such intermediary communities; they view them as “a threat to what is expected today of religious correctness: diversity, tolerance and openness” (Fath 408).

Some objections concerning evangelicalism in France are based upon the belief that evangelicals are secluded. Fath shows how this stigma does not hold since evangelicals widely network. This eliminates Weber's and Troeltsch's "sect" type used "to describe the religious framework of evangelical assemblies" (Fath 409). This use of networking even allows churches to join in the debates of global society. Furthermore, evangelicalism includes a major element of socialization. According to Fath, "most French evangelicals seem to be strongly engaged with their society and their own national culture. French evangelicals educate their children in the public school system contrary to American evangelicals, who often choose to educate their children in private institutions or at home" (Fath 410).

Some believe that American assistance and influence upon evangelicalism has caused some French evangelicals to become more American-like. However, this is not a strong argument since the French have since moved away from dependence toward independent growth. They have been able to appreciate the positive influence Americans have made upon the French situation while retaining their own cultural identity. Fath even states that there is a "French way" of being an evangelical, such as their tradition of drinking alcohol and wine, unlike traditional American evangelicals.

Overall, French evangelicals present an interesting case for those bent upon proclaiming absolute secularization or even the death of religion. Fath suggests that perhaps this indicates a transition in Europe "from a tightly structured religious market dominated by the unbalanced church-sect couple, to a more open and competitive market in which several denominations (among other types of religious organizations) coexist" (414).

ORLÉANS: A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The history of Orléans is closely linked to the history of France as a whole. One aspect that differs is the weight given to Joan of Arc, *La Pucelle*. The story of her bravery in rallying the French forces against the English during the Hundred Years' War stands out as an inspiring piece of early history. Later during the late 16th century and the War of Religions, the city of Orléans was taken by Huguenots and greatly damaged. When Louis Philippe became king in 1830 after the Glorious Revolution and with the beginning of the Restoration after the flight of Charles X and the Bourbons, the throne of France returned to the line of Orléans. Orléans suffered more destruction when it was attacked by the Prussians in 1870-71, by Italian forces in 1940, and by the U.S. army in 1944. Since World War II, the old city has been extensively restored. Orléans was also the birthplace of Charles Péguy, a Christian poet, philosopher, socialist, and patriot, who, regardless of the radical anticlericalism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, held firmly to his faith and integrity, testifying to the power of his faith. He, thus, had a great impact upon French intellectual thought (Konnert 148-9). Currently, an estimated 120,000 people live in Orléans (116,515 according to the 2008 official census) ("Populations légales 2008"). This is the historic city in which I conducted numerous interviews for my research.

RESEARCH IN ORLÉANS

CHOOSING THE QUESTIONS

Before going to France, I had just begun my study of Chaves' "New Differentiation Theory". As I formulated questions to ask the Orléanais, I avoided choosing questions solely based upon Chaves' theory so as to avoid creating evidence that would automatically support a

theory that I had not yet fully explored. I chose ten questions that would not be too invasive while giving me a deeper perspective of the religious environment of Orléans. Upon returning to the States, I was able to further analyze Chaves' theory and the possibilities of incorporating it into my research. Eventually, I decided that Chaves' secularization theory would provide an interesting case study for secularization in Orléans, France.

THE QUESTIONS

The semester before going to Orléans, France, I formulated ten questions that would give me a better perspective of the religious environment of Orléans according to the Orléanais. I asked the following questions:

1. Are you familiar with any churches in Orléans?
2. Do you go to church?
3. Are you Catholic, Protestant, or other?
4. Do you consider yourself a religious person?
5. Do you believe that there are a lot of Christians in Orléans, or in France in general?
6. Do you believe Christianity is increasing or decreasing?
7. Is there another system of belief that's taking the place of Christianity? If yes, what other religions?
8. What do the majority of French, or specifically Orléanais think of religion?

9. Does the image of religious buildings (cathedrals) have an effect on what one thinks about Catholicism or Christianity in general?

10. Do you believe religion should play a role in politics? Why or why not?

These questions led to very interesting and informative interviews that gave me a first-hand perspective of religion in France.

AMONG THE PEOPLE

During my semester abroad in the fall of 2009, I set off to the bustling streets of downtown Orléans, interviewing anybody who would take the time to answer ten questions. During weekends and after classes, I interviewed passers-by, loungers outside of the mall, and walkers along the banks of the Loire. I also interviewed some church-goers at a local church I attended. I interviewed a wide age range and tried to interview an even number of males and females (however, I inevitably ended up interviewing a greater number of women). In all, I spoke with 100 French citizens as well as three Protestant pastors and one Catholic priest in Orléans. All interviewees signed a consent form indicating they understood that their information would be kept anonymous. Thus, names of interviewees and churches will not be used within this paper.

RESULTS

Question	Response		
	Yes	No	No Response/ Don't Know
(Q 1) Are you familiar with any churches in Orléans?	81%	14%	5%

	Yes	Occasionally	No	Rarely	Only to Family Events	
(Q 2) Do you go to church?	19%	11%	58%	6%	5%	
(Q 3) Are you Catholic, Protestant, other?	Catholic	Protestant	Atheist/ nothing	Muslim	Other	
	47%	9%	29%	7%	4%	
	Yes			No		
(Q 4) Do you consider yourself a religious person?	26%			74%		
	Yes		No		No Response/ Don't Know	
(Q 5) Do you believe there are a lot of Christians in Orléans or in France in general?	59%		20%		20%	
	Increasing		Decreasing		Stagnant	
(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is increasing or decreasing?	8%		62%		12%	
	Islam	Buddhism	Sects	Atheism	Other	Don't Know
(Q 7) Is there another system of belief that's taking the place of Christianity? If yes, what other religions?	37%	11%	7%	54%	5%	20%
(Q 8) What do the majority of French or Orléanais think of religion?	Refer to Appendix B for detailed responses.					
	Yes		No		No Response/ Don't Know	
(Q 9) Does the image of these religious buildings (cathedrals) have an effect on what one thinks about Catholicism or Christianity in general?	26%		64%		9%	

	Yes	No	No Response/ Don't Know
(Q 10) Do you believe religion should play a role in politics? Why or why not?	12%	84%	3%

CATEGORIZING THE QUESTIONS

After organizing the data, I incorporated it into Chaves' "New Differentiation Theory". I matched the questions to Chaves' categories—societal, institutional, and individual-level secularization—based upon the potential to reveal enlightening links between the interview data and secularization.

I placed three of the questions within the societal level category. First, I chose the question about religion and politics. I justified this placement based upon the way education and politics are subjects that can reveal societal secularization, as seen earlier in the context of secularization and France. Furthermore, I included two of the questions that would reveal the extent to which Christians and churches influence the everyday life of the Orléanais. These questions were whether 1.) interviewees were aware of other churches in the area besides the main cathedral, St. Croix, and whether 2.) he or she believed there were many Christians in Orléans. In this sense, these last two questions address the scope of influence Christians and churches have within everyday life of the Orléanais. If a substantial number of people are opposed to any influence between religion and politics, and if they are not aware of any churches, perhaps societal secularization exists.

Fitting a question into the institutional category was challenging since Chaves' examples are specific. Earlier, I stated that the divergence away from Christian theology as a university's major domain reveals institutional secularization. This has been the case with the University of Orléans which emphasized theology but later law and the sciences, engineering, and the arts. Since the gradual divergence from hiring Christian teachers in religiously affiliated schools indicates secularization, one can reasonably conclude that the transformation of religious buildings such as cathedrals into non-religious buildings would also indicate institutional secularization. The data reveals that many individuals today consider the cathedral in Orléans to be simply a beautiful monument for tourism. This actually applies to all of Europe since many cathedrals are now historical monuments. One cathedral in Glasgow, Scotland has even been converted into a night club and pub. One can logically justify the use of this fact in analyzing institutional secularization. Although Chaves does not cite this as a specific example of institutional secularization, I believe there is some evidence regarding it.

More questions naturally lean toward the individual-level category. Within the individual-level secularization analysis, I included the questions about the interviewees' denomination; whether they consider themselves religious or not; opinions concerning the French views of religion; and church attendance. Since these questions are related to personal-level secularization opinions, convictions, or practices, they easily work within the individual-level category.

Two of the questions did not easily fit into Chaves' categories. Whether interviewees believed Christianity was increasing or decreasing and if they believed another system of belief was augmenting in its place were two questions that revealed interesting information about the

Orléanais personal views even if the questions do not fit into Chaves' categories. Even so, these questions provide new and interesting data utilized in this study.

CONCLUSIONS

After utilizing Chaves' secularization theory as the analytical framework of my research data, I conclude that Orléans has low-level secularization. The answers to the questions concerning societal secularization and politics were not surprising. From my other research, separation of Church and State has always seemed to be a strong view for many French. However, the results concerning societal awareness of churches were higher than one would expect from a completely secularized city. With 65 percent being aware of other churches besides the main cathedral, it seems as though Orléans institutions are moderately effective in spreading the word or at least making their presence known. One would expect a higher percentage of interviewees within a heavily secularized city to be unaware of any sort of religious presence within the city. Surprisingly, 59 percent of interviewees believe that there are many Christians in Orléans and France in general. The scope of religious authority, specifically that of Christianity, on politics is definitely minimal, even nonexistent. However, the results of the other two questions show that churches still hold enough authority to make many Orléanais aware of their presence and to also convince citizens to believe that there are many Christians in Orléans and France.

Institutional secularization is difficult to determine in Orléans since Chaves' theory is not as clear at this point. It has already been established that the once religiously oriented schools such as the University of Orléans are presently completely secularized. Additionally, cathedrals once had a strong religious influence in people's lives but are now less so. Orléans' history

makes a difference on how one analyzes secularization. Had this city's university not had a strong religious affiliation, this example would not prove to be a claim to institutional secularization. Thus, one can conclude that Orléans is institutionally secularized according to the declining and possibly nonexistent authority the Church currently holds regarding universities and cathedrals.

The study showed mixed results for secularization at the individual level. When asked about church attendance, 30 percent said they went to church or at least went to church occasionally. This low percentage would seem to suggest secularization; however, the European Values Study from 1999 reported that 12 percent of the French go to church at least once a month (McLeod 71). So even though Orléans' percentage seems low, it represents more than twice the percentage from 1999. Seventy-one percent of interviewees in Orléans claimed to be a part of some kind of religious denomination with the majority claiming Catholicism. This percentage is also higher than the 1999 study which showed 57 percent belonging to a religious denomination. The percentage of those claiming Catholicism in France in 1999 (53 percent) is about the same as in Orléans (47 percent). Yet, in Orléans, 9 percent claimed Protestantism while only 2 percent in France belonged to Protestantism in 1999. However, this being the case in 1999 one cannot completely know since data for Orléans in 1999 is not available. To continue, 29 percent of Orléans claimed either atheism or no religious affiliation, whereas 43 percent in France reported that they did not belong to any religion. Therefore, it appears that Orléans represents a specific case in France where a greater percentage of people claim a religious denomination. As stated earlier, former historical or sociological studies revealing trends or differences make a difference upon how one views secularization in Orléans. Moreover, the fact

that more than half of interviewees in Orléans claimed a Christian denomination indicates signs of low-level secularization.

The responses to the question “Do you consider yourself a religious person?” caution us from jumping to conclusions about religious belief and practice in Orléans. Though 71 percent claimed a religious denomination, a low percentage claimed to be religious. This reinforces the low-level secularization rather than a non-secularized status. Of the 71 percent claiming a denomination, 58 percent claim not to be religious. Twenty-six percent of interviewees in Orléans claimed to be religious, representing about half of the percentage from the 1999 study (44 percent). Seventy-two percent of Catholics said that they did not consider themselves to be religious people. In contrast, 78 percent of the Protestants and 71 percent of the Muslims interviewed considered themselves to be religious. Although the previous results show increasing numbers in church attendance and adherence to religious denominations, still a great percentage of Orléanais do not consider themselves to be religious. Since the results do not show increasing or high levels of individual-level secularization in all the categories of questions, I am reluctant to categorize Orléans as a high-level of individual secularization.

Considering the responses to the question “What do the majority of French or Orléanais think of religion”, one can see religion does not hold too much influence in their lives. Joining these responses with the 62 percent who believe that Christianity is declining, it is reasonable to state that Orléans is secularized at all three levels, societal, institutional, and individual, but at a low-level.

In addition to the 100 French I interviewed, I also had the opportunity to interview three Protestant pastors and one Catholic priest to hear their perspective on the religious environment of Orléans and to see how their responses differed from the other interviews, if at all. The pastors whom I interviewed stayed in close contact with other churches within the Christian community of Orléans, so their points of view have allowed me to see another facet of religious life in Orléans from credible sources.

I interviewed one Baptist pastor from Orléans who said that, in his church, between 80 and 100 adults plus 20 children regularly attend the services. I asked him whether he thought Christians in Orléans felt free to talk about their beliefs with others. He responded positively, stating that, in general, Christians in Orléans do feel free but only in the sense that they are not restricted by law. Though talking about one's faith, he added, demands courage to stand up against mockery and indifference. In answer to why mockery and indifference exist within the city, he cited the fact that France is democratic and citizens have great freedom, but that some are afraid to affirm their faith because of poorly understood secularism (here secularism refers to that which is separated from religion, or *laïc*; not to be confused with Chaves' definition of secularization). Furthermore, this pastor affirmed a growing tendency for young people to be less religious than their parents. When asked about the church and politics, his response confirmed the responses of the majority of interviewees who said that religion should not play a role in politics since there are so many belief systems in France. The Baptist pastor stated that he did not believe that a specifically Christian political party would have a large impact in France. Overall, he expressed that Christianity is declining in France even though it is rising in other countries.

I also spoke with a pastor of an evangelical church with a congregation of about 100 adults or 140 including children. He agreed that Christians in Orléans and France as a whole are free to talk about their faith, but are timid. The secularized (*laïc*) nature of the state makes one reluctant to talk about one's faith in public. He said that proselytizing is viewed badly in France though not restricted. When asked about the trend of Christianity, his responses were very interesting. He said that Catholicism and historical Protestantism, or the Reformed Church, were declining while evangelical churches like Pentecostalism were progressing. He said that many think Protestants compared to Catholics, are "nicer, cooler, livelier." He believes some find the lack of hierarchy within Protestantism more appealing than Catholicism which, according to some, is old, outmoded, not in contact with life or with young people. Yet even having said all this, he still sees some Catholic churches that are trying to increase in congregational numbers. The evangelical pastor sees himself and other Christians as a minority in France, but he prefers this. He believes that it is more important to have authentic faith than to have great numbers.

I also had the opportunity to interview a pastor of a Reformed Church in Orléans. Approximately 400 families have registered with his church, though only about 150 individuals regularly attend. He stated that these numbers line up with the majority of churches in France whose regular attendees equal about one-half of the total registered number. In his church, the older individuals make up the majority. The younger go to the services less frequently. Still, a sizeable number of 15-30 year olds attend the services.

Regarding freedom to speak about beliefs, the Reformed pastor said that few in France speak often about their faith. Children learn very early that one must not talk about beliefs with their elementary and high school professors. They are, according to Reformed pastor, practically

trained not to talk about their faith. The prevalent idea is that religion is private, thus one should not talk about it just as one would not talk about money. In response to a question addressing the difference between what the French think about Catholics versus Protestants, he stated that many negative images of Catholicism exist, so Catholics must justify themselves as Catholics. The image of Protestantism is better, more pleasant.

He believes that the number of those who practice Christianity is declining. In his church, the number of marriages and baptisms is in decline. On the other hand, the number of those interested in church events has increased. Overall, he worries about the increase in individualism and independence he is witnessing within the church. He has observed a loss in the sense of community. Individualism is currently very strong in France.

The Reformed pastor made some interesting observations among those who claim the Catholic tradition. Catholics, he says, desire a certain liberty they see in Protestantism. In fact, Catholics are in the process of pursuing practices that resemble Protestantism. Furthermore, the Catholic Church as a whole is in the process of revising its methods of counting the number of Catholics in France. The Church, according to the Reformed pastor, will begin taking into account non-practicing Catholics. Because of this, he sees the possibility of a state where the majority is in fact *not* Catholic.

While the other Protestant pastors said that the majority of French consider cathedrals to be historical monuments or just a building that gives a church more credibility, the Reformed pastor said that a sort of paradox exists concerning religious buildings like cathedrals. He affirmed that the buildings have a symbolic function even though people practice religion less frequently. According to this pastor, the buildings reassure the people of the existence of God as

would a photo of one's grandfather—a photo that shows one's roots. He recounted one specific event when the city hall of Orléans wanted to demolish an old church. A sociologist interviewed the people and every interviewee was against this action—"One must keep the building!" This adds an intriguing twist to the data concerning secularization in Orléans.

Finally, I interviewed a Catholic priest. After interviewing the Protestant pastors, I had the strong impression that the influence of religious authority in the lives of the Orléanais was minimal at best. However, I was surprised to hear that this church had three separate masses to accommodate the 1,000+ congregants. Each of the services varies in the age range of attendees. Few young people attend the early service, opting for the evening service. The second service is composed of many couples with children. This priest agreed with the Protestant pastors that the majority of French were becoming more and more individualistic. In fact, he said that the number of priests was in decline. Catholics were being forced to reorganize into smaller groups. He stated that many consider religion to be a taboo. The French are hesitant and do not dare talk about their faith with others.

Being a Catholic priest, he was able to reveal the attitudes many had toward Catholicism. First of all, he asserted that, when one thinks about Christianity in France, one thinks about Catholicism since, historically, the majority has been Catholic. Yet when one thinks about Catholicism today, one thinks about weighty positions of hierarchy (bishops and priests who are distant from everyday life). This has led many to consider Protestantism in a more positive way since less is known about it compared to Catholicism (which includes its history of unreasonably wealthy churches and, more seriously, pedophilia). However, Catholics are still finding ways to

adapt and live. Still this priest acknowledges that the large number of congregants in his church represents a very unique situation in France.

WHAT'S REPLACING CHRISTIANITY?

So what is replacing Christianity, if anything? Of all the interviewees, 37 percent said that Islam was gradually taking the place of Christianity. Many cited examples of immigration to justify this rise. Eleven percent said Buddhism, and 7 percent said different sects. The majority of responses, 54 percent, reveal that the French believe the trend is still in favor of atheism. The Baptist pastor whom I interviewed agreed that Islam was increasing. Yet due to indifference and a lack of knowledge concerning what Christianity really is, the overall trend shows an increase in atheism. The evangelical pastor also agreed that Islam was increasing. However, he believed that the kind of atheism which was once very anti-Christian is decreasing, being replaced by an increasing “21st century spiritualism”. He added that many assume a sort of relativism (“I believe this; you believe that, and this is good”). He stated that Europe has been given the nickname “the dark continent” since many believe Europe to be completely secularized. However, the evangelical pastor believes that Europe is somewhat wrongly named since there are still Christians in Europe. The Reformed Pastor stated that the majority of French are more likely to be agnostic but that the number of people who hold to some type of spirituality is increasing. Buddhism is also increasing in adherents. Many are choosing their own system of beliefs or are turning to esoteric philosophies such as those found in yoga and in “well-being” spiritualism. On the whole, the priest said that, even though Muslim numbers increase, nothing is really taking Christianity’s place except indifference. The interviews with the Protestant pastors and the

Catholic priest along with those of the 100 French citizens revealed intriguing perspectives that greatly aid this research on secularization in Orléans, France.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Chaves' "New Differentiation Theory" within the European context provided an intriguing framework for this case study on secularization in Orléans, France. After analyzing the European and French historical backgrounds, it seemed unlikely that one would be able to reasonably apply Chaves' theory at the city level since so much uncertainty remained concerning institutional secularization. Delving into institutional-level secularization proved to be complicated when considering a country or continent. However, analysis proved to be more reasonable on the smaller, city scale by looking at the secularization of universities and religious buildings such as cathedrals. Therefore, one could state that Chaves' categories proved more feasible on the city level. On the other hand, it is possible that examples of institutional secularization such as described by Chaves exist on the continental and country level but that more research is necessary. One can moderately accept secularization on all three levels for all three contexts—European, French, and Orléanais—but with reservation.

Overall, it is clear that Chaves' secularization theory provides a unique opportunity to explore different levels of analysis. By categorizing the interview responses, one can approach the research data from a new perspective. Despite the lack of details concerning institutional secularization at the continental and state levels, one can still use the examples Chaves provides to show secularization in Orléans, France, though at a low-level. While society shows a move toward atheism, high church attendance at one of Orléans' cathedrals continues. Thus, one could argue against high-level secularization. Taking all the historical, sociological, and interview

research into account, this study in secularization theory, specifically of Chaves' "New Differentiation Theory", provides an interesting framework by which one can explore secularization in Europe, France, and, specifically, Orléans. I hope other researchers will be able to utilize this information to continue studies on the religious environment of Orléans, France.

Appendix A

DATA SUMMARY

(Categorized according to Chaves' "New Differentiation Theory")

<i>Societal Questions</i>			
Overall Results (100)			
Question	Number of Responses		
	YES	NO	No Response/Don't Know
(Q 10) Do you believe religion should play a role in politics? Why or why not?	12	84	3
(Q 1) Are you familiar with any churches in Orléans?	81	14	5

<i>Institutional Questions</i>			
Overall Results (100)			
Question	Number of Responses		
	YES	NO	No response/Don't Know
(Q 9) Does the image of these religious buildings (cathedrals) have an effect on what one thinks about Catholicism or Christianity in general?	26	64	9

Individual Questions

Overall Results (100)

Question	YES	Occasionally	NO	Rarely	Only to Family Events
(Q 2) Do you go to church?	19	11	58	6	5
	Catholic	Protestant	Atheist/Nothing	Muslim	Other
(Q 3) Are you Catholic, Protestant, other?	47	9	29	7	1 Jehovah's Witness 1 Agnostic 1 Cath./Prot. 1 Christian who claims neither Cath. nor Prot.
(Q 4) Do you consider yourself a religious person?	YES	<i>(of the total of "YES" responses)</i>	<i>(of the total of "YES" responses)</i>	<i>(of the total of "YES" responses)</i>	<i>(of the total of "YES" responses)</i>
		Professing Catholic	Professing Protestant	Professing Muslim	Other
	26	8	7	5	1 Jehovah's Witness 1 Christian who claims neither Cath. nor Prot.
	NO	<i>(of the total of "NO" responses)</i>	<i>(of the total of "NO" responses)</i>	<i>(of the total of "NO" responses)</i>	<i>(of the total of "NO" responses)</i>
		Professing Catholic	Professing Protestant	Professing Muslim	Other
	74	34	1	5	1 Cath./Prot.
(Q 8) What do the majority of French or Orleanais think of religion?	(Refer to data below for more specific details)				

General Questions

Overall Results (100)

Question	Increasing	Decreasing	Stagnant	Don't Know		
(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is increasing or decreasing?	8	62	11			
(Q 7) Is there another system of belief that's taking the place of Christianity? If yes, what other religions?	Islam	Buddhism	Sects	Other	Atheism	Don't Know
	37	11	7	3 Agnosticism 2 Judaism 1 Scientology	54	20

Appendix B

DATA BREAKDOWN

<i>Societal Questions</i>				
Aged 18-24				
Question	Number of Responses			
	YES	NO	No response/?	Notes
(Q 10) Do you believe religion should play a role in politics? Why or why not?	4	46	2	<p>7 interviewees said something about the two not working well together and causing conflict when mixed. 4 said no because there are a lot of religions and 4 said no because religion and politics are not the same.</p> <p>One person said, "No! This is 2009!"</p> <p>Another "No, but I don't know why"</p> <p>And yet another said, "No, the world leads politics"</p>
(Q 1) Are you familiar with any churches in Orléans?	44	7	2	14 of interviewees know only major cathedrals like St. Croix
(Q 5) Do you believe there are a lot of Christians in Orléans or in France in general?	35	13	4	<p>1 person said 50/50-Christian/Muslim</p> <p>2 people said "no, there are not a lot of practicing Christians"</p>

Age 25-34				
Question	Number of Responses			
	YES	NO	No response/?	Notes
Do you believe religion should play a role in politics? Why or why not?	2	10	1	2 mentioned that this is too difficult with many beliefs. One even said no because she believes the Pope has different ideas than the rest of the world. One said yes, in order to change the point of view of things in relation to catastrophes—faith”
Are you familiar with any churches in Orléans?	8	3	2	2 interviewees were Muslim. 1 interviewee said s/he knew only St. Croix Cathedral
Do you believe there are a lot of Christians in Orléans or in France in general?	4	3	6	Split with the majority not being sure.

Aged 35-49 (13)				
Question	Number of Responses			
	YES	NO	No response/?	Notes
Do you believe religion should play a role in politics? Why or why not?	2	11	0	One said that countries where religion is big are not good countries. Another said, “No, we are a community of people. If someone does not believe the same thing, that causes problems with the community. That will not allow for choice.” One said yes since people are very attached to religion in general.
Are you familiar with any churches in Orléans?	11	1	1	1 interviewee was Muslim so mentioned how he knew Mosques in the area

Do you believe there are a lot of Christians in Orléans or in France in general?	8	2	3	
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Aged 50-64 (13)				
Question	Number of Responses			
	YES	NO	No response/?	Notes
Do you believe religion should play a role in politics? Why or why not?	0	13	0	Several mentioned that there are a lot of religions. They especially mentioned the rise of Islam.
Are you familiar with any churches in Orléans?	12	1	0	2 said they knew a lot of churches
Do you believe there are a lot of Christians in Orléans or in France in general?	7	0	6	Evenly split between yes and unsure

Aged 65+ (8)				
Question	Number of Responses			
	YES	NO	No response/?	Notes
Do you believe religion should play a role in politics? Why or why not?	4	4	0	Equal split. 2 said that religion should play a role in politics but not as much as Germany. 2 mentioned their disagreement with the Pope's convictions
Are you familiar with any churches in Orléans?	6	2	0	2 said they were familiar with all of them. One specified several Catholics and Protestants churches. 1 mentioned just the St. Croix
Do you believe there are a lot of Christians in Orléans or in France in general?	5	2	1	2 said there were a lot less Protestants than Catholics

Institutional Questions

Aged 18-24 (53)

Question	Number of Responses			
	YES	NO	No response/?	Notes
(Q 9) Does the image of these religious buildings (cathedrals) have an effect on what one thinks about Catholicism or Christianity in general?	13	34	5	<p>Several said yes, for those who are Catholic or who believe in God.</p> <p>“Yes, they give an image of life.”</p> <p>“If there are more churches in a city, this city is more Catholic.”</p> <p>“Yes, it reflects the image of Christianity.”</p> <p>“No, people give an image of religion, not the building itself.”</p>

Aged 25-34 (13)

Question	Number of Responses			
	YES	NO	No response/?	Notes
(Q 9) Does the image of these religious buildings (cathedrals) have an effect on what one thinks about Catholicism or Christianity in general?	3	10	0	<p>“One thinks about Jesus and the Gospel”</p> <p>“There is historical importance: it shows the political power of the Church.”</p>

Aged 35-49 (13)

Question	Number of Responses			
	YES	NO	No response/?	Notes
(Q 9) Does the image of these religious buildings (cathedrals) have an effect on what one thinks about Catholicism or Christianity in general?	4	8	1	<p>“They have a good effect on religion with faith and history, but, that also depend on the person.”</p> <p>“No, atheists avoid cathedrals.”</p> <p>“One thinks about faith.”</p>

Aged 50-64 (13)

Question	Number of Responses			
	YES	NO	No response/?	Notes
(Q 9) Does the image of these religious buildings (cathedrals) have an effect on what one thinks about Catholicism or Christianity in general?	3	8	2	<p>“That depends on the person; this is a great monument with faith as its material.”</p> <p>“Yes, they make one believe that religion is a good thing; they are mystical works of art.”</p> <p>“Because of priest involved in pedophilia, they give a bad image of religion.”</p>

Aged 65+ (8)

Question	Number of Responses			
	YES	NO	No response/?	Notes
(Q 9) Does the image of these religious buildings (cathedrals) have an effect on what one thinks about Catholicism or Christianity in general?	3	4	1	<p>“This is just a building that does not have an effect on belief. Belief is in the heart. Beliefs are deep in the heart.”</p> <p>“They are more mystical with an ambiance of ritual.”</p>

Individual Questions

Aged 18-24 (53)

Question	Number of Responses				
	YES/Occasionally	NO/Rarely	Only to Family Events		
(Q 2) Do you go to church?	8/3	35/3	3		
	Catholic	Protestant	Nothing/Atheist	Other	Comments
(Q 3) Are you Catholic, Protestant, other?	21	3	21	8	5 Muslims, 1 Jehovah's Witness, 1 Agnostic, 1 Cath/Prot. As many professing Catholics as atheists.
	YES	NO			
(Q 4) Do you consider yourself a religious person?	8 (4 Catholics 1 Muslim, 1 Jehovah's, 2 Prot.)	45 (18 Cath., 4 Muslims, 1 Cath/Prot)			One girl claimed to be Protestant and Catholic because one parent is Catholic and the other Protestant. She says she is not religious because of her education.
Responses					
(Q 8) What do the majority of French or Orleanais think of religion?	23 are unsure or do not know	8 think that the French don't think about religion at all.	4 believe religion is not important to the majority; 1 thinks the Orleanais think religion is boring; 5 believe religion is a source of very strong negative feelings	11 think that adherents to religions think a lot about God, have respect toward religion	Others had divided opinions- "Christians think good things about religion, but atheists think about bad things concerning religion"

Aged 25-34 (13)

Question	Number of Responses				
	YES/Occasionally	NO/Rarely	Only to Family Events	3 Muslims go to the Mosque	
(Q 2) Do you go to church?	1/2	7/2	1		
	Catholic	Protestant	Nothing/Atheist	Other	Comments
(Q 3) Are you Catholic, Protestant, other?	6	0	3	1 Christian (doesn't claim Prot. Or Cath.)	
				3 Muslims	
	YES	NO			
(Q 4) Do you consider yourself a religious person?	7 (all 3 Muslims said yes)	6			
Responses					
(Q 8) What do the majority of French or Orleanais think of religion?	3 said that everyone has their own opinions or that it's a personal thing.	2 said people think of sects	2 said people make fun of religion	4 said they didn't know "One doesn't talk about religion. It's taboo."	1 said religion is for parents and that fewer are going to church"

Aged 35-49 (13)

Question	Number of Responses				
	YES/Occasionally	NO/Rarely	Only to Family Events	2 Muslims; 1 went to the Mosque	
(Q 2) Do you go to church?	1/0	10/1	1		
	Catholic	Protestant	Nothing/Atheist	Other	Comments
(Q 3) Are you Catholic, Protestant, other?	7	1	3	2 Muslims	
	YES	NO			
(Q 4) Do you consider yourself a religious person?	2 (1 Cath. 1 Muslim)	11 (1 Muslim; 6 Catholics; 1 Prot)			
Responses					
(Q 8) What do the majority of French or Orleansais think of religion?	"A lot of young people don't think about religion after communion; they don't go to church anymore."	"Everyone has their own beliefs"	"One doesn't think about religion a lot."	2 said, "One doesn't have respect for religion"	"Everybody is very very full of belief."

Aged 50-64 (13)

Question	Number of Responses				
	YES/Occasionally	NO/Rarely	Only to Family Events		
(Q 2) Do you go to church?	4/5	4/0	0		
	Catholic	Protestant	Nothing/Atheist	Other	Comments
(Q 3) Are you Catholic, Protestant, other?	8	3	1	1 Christian (doesn't claim Cath. Or Prot.)	
	YES	NO			
(Q 4) Do you consider yourself a religious person?	4 (3 Prot. 1 Christian)	9 (all 8 Catholics responded "No")			
Responses					
(Q 8) What do the majority of French or Orleanais think of religion?	3 said, "One thinks that religion is the opium of the people; when one has difficulties, one turns to religion"	One simply said that the French think about religion.	One said, "Like the majority of France, one thinks that only the minimum is necessary with religion. Then one forgets about religion."	2 "Nobody talks about religion." 2 "One doesn't think about religion. And if one does, it's not a lot of good things."	

Aged 65+ (8)

Aged 65+ (8)					
Question	Number of Responses				
	YES/Occasionally	NO/Rarely	Only to Family Events		
(Q 2) Do you go to church?	5/1	2/0	0		
	Catholic	Protestant	Nothing/Atheist	Other	Comments
(Q 3) Are you Catholic, Protestant, other?	5	2	1	0	
	YES	NO			
(Q 4) Do you consider yourself a religious person?	5 (3 Cath. Both (2) Prot.)	3 (2 Cath.)			
Responses					
(Q 8) What do the majority of French or Orleanais think of religion?	"Religion doesn't catch people's attention"	"The French think about religion."	6 didn't know.		

GENERAL QUESTIONS

Aged 18-24 (53)

	Increasing	Declining	Stagnant	Don't Know
(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is increasing or decreasing?	4 (2 said Prot. in particular was increasing)	33 (2 said Cath. was in decline)	8	5
	Which Religion	Atheism/Non-belief/Nothing	Don't Know	Comments
(Q 7) Is there another system of belief that's taking the place of Christianity? If yes, what other religions?	14 Islam 6 Buddhism 4 sects 2 Judaism 1 Scientology	30	9	Most people who said "stagnant" said they didn't know if/what other religions were increasing. "Religion in general is in decline." "With immigration, one can travel more easily which leads to a rise of other religions." 2 said, "People waste time on religion. One has other things to do."

Aged 25-34 (13)

	Increasing	Declining	Stagnant	Don't Know
(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is increasing or decreasing?	0	12	0	1
	Which Religion	Atheism/Non-belief/Nothing	Don't Know	Comments
(Q 7) Is there another system of belief that's taking the place of Christianity? If yes, what other religions?	5 Islam 1 Buddhism	10	2	"Atheism is rising because of this generation."

Aged 35-49 (13)				
	Increasing	Declining	Stagnant	Don't Know
(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is increasing or decreasing?	2 (1 Prot. increasing in particular)	4 (1 Cath. decreasing in particular)	3	4
	Which Religion	Atheism/Non-belief/Nothing	Don't Know	Comments
(Q 7) Is there another system of belief that's taking the place of Christianity? If yes, what other religions?	8 Islam 3 sects 2 Buddhism	6	1	"Christianity is increasing because of crises." "There is a rise in sects that steal our money."

Aged 50-64 (13)				
	Increasing	Declining	Stagnant	Don't Know
(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is increasing or decreasing?	1 (3 Prot. increasing in particular)	8 (4 Cath. decreasing in particular)	0	0
	Which Religion	Atheism/Non-belief/Nothing	Don't Know	Comments
(Q 7) Is there another system of belief that's taking the place of Christianity? If yes, what other religions?	8 Islam 3 Agnosticism	5	5	"There are young people who are beginning to believe in God. There are Christian associations for young people."

Aged 65 + (8)				
	Increasing	Declining	Stagnant	Don't Know
(Q 6) Do you believe Christianity is increasing or decreasing?	1	5	0	2
	Which Religion	Atheism/Non-belief/Nothing	Don't Know	Comments
(Q 7) Is there another system of belief that's taking the place of Christianity? If yes, what other religions?	2 Islam 2 Buddhism	3	3	2 said, "There are fewer practicing Christians." "There are a lot fewer Protestants than Catholics."

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