The United States and African Nationalism in British East Africa Since 1945

Clarence A. Allison

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THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICAN NATIONALISM
IN BRITISH EAST AFRICA
SINCE 1945

A Thesis
Presented to the
School of Graduate Studies
Ouachita Baptist University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Clarence A. Allison
August 1967
## THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICAN NATIONALISM IN BRITISH EAST AFRICA SINCE 1945

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"The African is beginning to realize that he is a member of the human race. ""Self Africa cannot,"" on the basis of a report made by the United States, December 24, 1955.

CHAPTER I

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND COLLECTION
AND TREATMENT OF DATA

British East Africa has long been the playground of American millionaires, who have shot its wild game, drunk whiskey on its lonely plains, marvelled at its primitiveness, ignored its poverty, and proudly returned home with cartons of trophies.

East Africa has not been well known in the United States, its status as a paradise for hunters notwithstanding. Americans have been preoccupied with other things, and Africa has remained the dark continent for them. They recoil in horror when one tells of African customs of marriage, puberty, mourning, or medicine. Such practices represent, for the average man, the epitome of degradation.¹

However, since World War II, Africa has emerged from its colonial status into full partnership with the other nations of the world in all the affairs of mankind. "The African is beginning to realize that he is a member

of the new 'one world.' No longer will he accept with grati-
tude anything that is given him."\(^2\) Africa, whether one
approves or not, is now the partner of other powers in
international affairs.

American involvement in Africa is of recent origin,
principally since World War II:

\[ \ldots \text{there has never been, until the end of} \]
\[ \text{World War II, an actual policy commitment, a} \]
\[ \text{systematic, continuous concern with African} \]
\[ \text{affairs, unless a purely negative, passive} \]
\[ \text{posture may be described as continuous policy.}^3 \]

East Africa has played a vital role in the total
effort of Africans to emerge from colonial status to
that of independence.

To become conscious of community, define it, and
assert it, requires a complex development and, in the case
of Africa, the consent of the great political powers of
the world.

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Africa, because of the direct interests of nations
so closely allied with the United States, remained on the

\(^{2}\text{H. B. Young, "Black Africa Seethes," Christian} \]
\text{Century, 62:1318-19, November 28, 1945.} \]

\(^{3}\text{Henry L. Bretton, "United States Foreign Policy} \]
\text{Toward the Newly Independent States," African Independence} \]
\text{Peter Judd, editor (New York: Dell Publishing Company,} \]
\text{1962), p. 445.}
fringe of diplomatic concern until quite recently. The existence, however, of a democratic state, such as the United States, with a history of revolution and a tradition of resistance to non-democratic methods, served as a stimulant to Africans as they began to emerge into the arena of political activity.4

Identification of American and African ideals had been made about the beginning of this century.5 Further identification was encouraged by various people and circumstances throughout the years following World War I, especially in the period just prior to and during World War II.6

W. E. B. DuBois and Marcus Garvey are generally considered the originators of the modern African national consciousness. Both men were instrumental in awakening the Africans to the possibility of national identity and self-respect.

DuBois organized several Pan-African Congresses in the years after 1900, the last one being held in London in 1945.7 He represented African aspirations at the Versailles

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6Ibid. 7Ibid., p. 25.
Peace Conference in 1919. Circulating freely throughout the world, DuBois encouraged young Africans to assert their peculiar identities.

American documents of state are studded with slogans praising the virtues of democracy. Statements of the presidents gave comfort to the aspiring nationalists, especially in the years after 1945.

The Atlantic Charter was quoted by the London Conference of African nationalists as evidence that the Western Allies would give independence to their colonial peoples.

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

President Truman's concern for the East European countries evoked statements designed to persuade the Russians to give them freedom of choice. Africans understood his statements to be universally applicable and insisted that self-determination be granted to themselves as well as to Europeans.

8Ibid.


Mr. Truman was preoccupied with Europe. His concern with Africa was limited to the North, and that he gave no credence to the possibility that Black Africa was headed for independence is evident. Speaking on foreign policy at Navy Day celebrations in 1945, he said:

We believe that all peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own form of government by their own freely expressed choice, without interference from any foreign source. That is true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, as well as in the Western Hemisphere.\(^1\)

East and Central Africa were important to the United States for two reasons. First, most of the uranium used in atomic enterprises came from the Belgian Congo, as well as other strategic metals in Central Africa.\(^1\) Second, East and Central Africa was to become a staging area for troops if the Russians began to advance southward through the Middle East and the Mediterranean area.

The first of these made it imperative that the free flow of materials be maintained to the Western World. The Western nations are dependent upon the mineral resources of Central Africa.


Because of its geographical relationship to the highways of the Mediterranean, to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and to the oil fields of the Middle East, Africa would immediately become part of the global front line in the event of war. If the influence of the West continues to deteriorate in Egypt and the Arab areas generally, East Africa in particular would be an indispensable staging area.13

The second called for elaborate planning and covert operations to prepare for the eventuality of war with Russia. Communications were to be established between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Ports had to be made adequate for future traffic. Railways had to be built. Highways had to be planned and built, if possible. Air bases had to be strategically located in the area to protect the installations.14

M. S. A. and other loans can be regarded as "economic statesmanship" only if the well-being of the territories receiving them is considered synonymous with the interests of their European exploiters.15

East Africa was strategically indispensable in plans for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. The paper will elaborate on these involvements.16


The United States "discovered" Africa in 1952. In that year Mau Mau broke to the surface in Kenya and began its bloody career in the news of the world.\textsuperscript{17} "It was not until 1952, indeed, that the African continent as a whole thrust itself decisively upon the American consciousness."\textsuperscript{18} Prior to 1952, little was known of East Africa by most Americans. However, Mau Mau changed that. The world began to know about Kenya.

In 1958 the State Department formed an entirely new section for the continent of Africa. Until then the affairs of Africa had been handled through the appropriate European section.\textsuperscript{19}

In the meantime, by its membership on the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, the United States had taken the side of the black Africans in Tanganyika, insisting that progress toward self-government be allowed and encouraged by the British.\textsuperscript{20}


\textsuperscript{19}Bretton, \textit{loc. cit.}

Education became a determining factor in the struggle for independence, as young men began to seize the initiative from the reactionary colonials. Many African students came to the United States to study. They usually studied political science and turned their knowledge against their colonial rulers.21

Also, Americans worked in the educational institutions within the countries. Missionaries, especially, were active, often carrying the main burden of educating the Africans.22

The United States has been deeply involved in the freedom movement in Africa. The full story of that involvement has not yet been told. It is the goal of this study to make known the American role in East Africa.

II. DEFINITION OF TERMS

Relations. This word is used to mean all those contacts between Americans and Africans of the British sphere of East Africa. Usage is not limited to governmental or


official relationships. All those relations which have affected, or been affected by, the development of nationalism in British East Africa are included.

**Nationalism.** Nationalism is used in a broad sense to include more than politics. All those feelings of community which form the basis of national identity are embodied in the term.

**African.** The word African is used to distinguish between the nationalist tendencies of the black African, the Asian, and the European. All these groups are resident in East Africa and nationalistic ties have knitted each group together within the larger context. The particular concern of the paper is with the development of nationalism among the black Africans.

**British East Africa.** The area of Africa known as British East Africa is composed of the four countries of Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika and Zanzibar (Tanzania).

**Since 1945.** Of primary interest is the tracing of relations since the Second World War, with 1945 used as the generalized date for the end of the war. However, certain events antecedent to that year are included because they are germane to the discussion. One chapter is given to a discussion of the Pan-African development from 1900 to 1945.
III. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Chapter two is devoted to the development of African nationalism from 1900 to 1945, with particular reference to its American origins. This chapter deals with the Pan-African Congresses and the important contributions made by W. E. B. DuBois and Marcus Garvey.

Chapter three is given to the development of American attitudes toward African nationalism in the years from 1945 to 1965. This chapter shows the gradual change of attitude from that which leaves the Africans completely in the hands of the colonial powers to that of active participation in the movement toward independence.

The following chapters are concerned with topical subjects. They include material from the 1945-65 period, but they are developed topically rather than chronologically.

A chapter is devoted to a discussion of the relevance of American political ideology to the African development. The discussion is concerned with American ideals and actual involvement of the United States in the political organization of the African states.

Economic matters are given separate treatment. That the United States has a vested interest in the
stability of African states is evident and that this has been a motive for activity in Africa is a reasonable conclusion.

Missionary enterprises have been active in East Africa since the nineteenth century. American religious groups have been interested chiefly in the last thirty years, and they have been instrumental in the development of African national feeling. Their motives are mixed, combining Christian zeal with more mundane cultural motives.

Education has played a decisive role in the preparation of Africans for self-government. Americans have played a prominent role in this field.

A concluding chapter summarizes the American interests in East Africa.

IV. DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study is concerned with the United States' relationship to the development of the awareness of national identity among the African population of British East Africa.

The study is not concerned with other nations, except as they are incidental to the stated problem.
Sources for this study include the personal papers of the presidents, memoirs of the presidents, policy papers of the Department of State, various books which analyze the relations of states internationally, newspapers, with special reliance on The New York Times, religious and secular journals, news magazines, United Nations journals, and the unpublished minutes of the Baptist Mission of East Africa.
CHAPTER II

THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM

August, 1945 brought the end of World War II, the greatest paroxysm of carnage ever suffered by the nations of earth. In the swirling up-draft of the fission bomb, the hopes of the Japanese to establish an oriental hegemony was brought to an ignominious close, just as Germany had been forced to abandon her dream of European domination a few months before.

Those anguished days could not obscure the stirring of Asian nationalism which had been in evidence for many years. Out of the post-war adjustments emerged a new family of nations. They were Asian nations, primarily, with the Arabs also receiving the right of self-government. In the midst of the cataclysm another wind was blowing. Years later it would be called "the wind of change." But, very few men in positions of control could foresee Africa's surge toward independence. In 1945, few thought of the "dark continent" as potentially able to govern itself. Yet, within fifteen years of the end of World War II, nearly all the geographical subdivisions of Africa were

self-governing. Nationalism was at work, and what had seemed impossible in 1945 was an actuality in 1960.

What caused this sudden rush to independence? Had Africans, without a history of their own suddenly blossomed without benefit of seed-time and growth? Had these backward peoples merely taken advantage of a momentary pause in the all-encompassing domination of Europeans over the rest of the world? Was the judgment true, which was made by some, that Africans had no historical preparation for self-government? Could the world look to Africans with expectations of order and friendly participation in the politics of the world?

The progress of African countries toward independence was not rapid, of course. In fact, the era of colonialism was but an interlude in the history of the continent. Political organization in Africa was notable and extensive in the early part of this millennium, marked by the existence of the ancient states of Mali, Ghana, Songhai, Bornu, and other lesser states. Actually, colonialism was an


interruption of African political organization, rather than the beginning.\textsuperscript{26}

All authorities on Africa acknowledge that the United States was the incubator of modern African nationalism. This is recognized by African nationalists themselves.\textsuperscript{27}

American Negroes developed an interest in their African origins, and this interest grew until it became a deep sense of Negro identity. Kohn and Sokolsky point out:

Carter G. Woodson, founder of the \textit{Journal of Negro History}, was pre-eminent in this absorption in the African background, his \textit{The African Background Outlined} being a symbol of the aroused interest.\textsuperscript{28}

Next, in their order of appearance and importance, were W. E. B. DuBois and Marcus Garvey. DuBois made his entrance at the first Pan-African meeting in 1900.\textsuperscript{29} Garvey appeared in the 1920's but quickly passed from the scene when he was prosecuted for irregularities in his affairs.\textsuperscript{30} DuBois is generally accepted as the "father"


\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 22.


\textsuperscript{30}Kohn and Sokolsky, \textit{loc. cit.}
of Pan-Africanism although others, too, have played an important part in creating an interest in the "African personality."\textsuperscript{31}

A series of Pan-African meetings was held following the 1900 conclave. Colin Legum lists six of these, beginning with the 1900 meeting and ending with the Manchester Congress of 1945.\textsuperscript{32}

The Congress of 1900 set the tenor of the meetings which followed. Those who organized and directed the meeting were concerned with Negro rights primarily, but those rights were irrevocably bound up with their African origins and kinship with all living Africans. Basil Davidson points out:

> These men looked across to Africa with a bitter awareness of their own unity in disenfranchisement: here in the New World all Africans had lost their separate ethnic loyalties, languages, cultures, sense of difference from one another; and so it appeared natural to regard all Africans as belonging to the same great territorial unit, Africa, however much that unit might be divided within itself by "the frontiers of foreign rule."\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., p. 21.


\textsuperscript{33}Davidson, \textit{loc. cit.}
The first meeting of a Pan-African nature occurred just at the turn of the century, when the colonial powers were in the process of consolidating their gains on the African continent, and when anti-Negro sentiment was at its height in the United States. The world climate in 1900 reveals two of the objectives of Pan-Africanism in its larger involvements. First, of course, is the objective of ejecting the colonial nations from the African lands. Second, and not so obvious, is the universal Negro protest against racism, particularly that of the American and West Indian Negroes, which remains an aim of Pan-Africanism.34

The second of the Pan-African Congresses was held in 1919 during the Versailles Peace Conference. There, incongruously, DuBois, and others, were engaged in conversations with the men who were attempting to re-establish the balance of power in Europe, and to make equitable redistribution of African colonies among the victors in World War I.35 Africans at Paris were not subdued, nor were they timid in their demands on the colonial powers. Basil Davidson makes the following comment:


35Kohn and Sokolsky, op. cit., p. 25.
The delegates boldly addressed themselves to the Powers. They called on them to "establish a code of law for the international protection of the natives of Africa, similar to the proposed international code for labour," and laid down a list of "principles" by which "the natives of Africa and the peoples of African descent" should henceforth be governed.  

That the gains of the Africans at Paris were unimpressive is no surprise, for the Europeans were only beginning to gain control of their African colonies. To consider granting them independence was unreasonable to them. Additionally, Woodrow Wilson was not prepared to insist that provisions be incorporated in the Peace Treaty, other than that the Trusteeship system be set up, whereby colonial territories of the Central Powers were mandated to the victorious Allies. Yet, the influence of the 1919 Congress was important and lasting, and within that Congress, the dominating figure was DuBois. As Davidson remarks:

\[\ldots\] these demands of the second congress pointed forward to a steady crystallization of new ideas. They were Pan-African and they were libertarian. Moreover, and the influence of DuBois counted for much in this, they gave due weight to the customs and beliefs of pre-colonial Africa--to all that complex of tradition which had carried Africans through the years before the conquest.  

The demands of the Congress included preservation of land, conservation of natural resources, regulation of

\[36\text{Davidson, op. cit., p. 62.} \quad 37\text{Ibid., p. 63.}\]
investment and concessions, abolition of slavery and forced labor, education at public expense for all Africans, and the speedy grant of political rights. However, even the radical men of Pan-Africanism recognized a need for preparation of Africans for governmental participation, and did not mention independence.

The next two Pan-African Congresses did not accomplish much. But, they served the purpose of keeping the movement alive and preserving the spirit of African identity. The third Congress was held in 1921 and met in London, Brussels, and Paris, with forty-one of the delegates coming from Africa.

The American character of the movement remained as the Congress of 1923 met. "In fact, DuBois acknowledges, even after the third Pan-African Congress, held in London and Lisbon, in 1923, that the Pan-African idea was still American rather than African." During the twenties Marcus Garvey made his sweep across the Pan-African scene, saying, "We believe in the freedom of Africa for the Negro people of the world ..."

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38Ibid.  39Legum, op. cit., p. 29.
41Ibid.
we also demand Africa for the Africans at home and abroad. Such precepts, pronounced with all the fervency of an evangelist, fell on responsive ears throughout the world.

Garvey was ambitious and organized various enterprises, including the Universal African Legion, an African Orthodox Church, and the Black Star Lines. His parent organization was called the Universal Negro Improvement Association, and served as his base of operation. Through the official voice of the organization, Negro World, Garvey proclaimed the motto of his movement: "One God, One Aim, One Destiny."

Garvey's influence upon the nationalist movement in Africa was far-reaching. Kwame Nkrumah paid him homage by attributing to him many of the basic concepts which he held and practiced.

His contemporaries were sympathetic, but critical of the methods Garvey used to further his goals. J. A. Rogers, a close associate of Garvey, makes this observation:

---

42 Marcus Garvey, quoted by Kohn and Sokolsky in African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, p. 23.

43 Kohn and Sokolsky, op. cit., p. 23.

"His cause was just, too, but his methods were twisted, archaic, perverse. He undoubtedly wanted to help the downtrodden blacks but like every other autocrat believed that the end justifies the means." 46

DuBois, dedicated Africanist that he was, criticized Garvey severely for his intemperate propaganda, poor finance, demagogic tendencies, and the apprehension he aroused among the colonial nations who controlled the destiny of the African people. 47

The fourth Pan-African Congress, or fifth in the reckoning of Colin Legum, was held in New York in 1927. Only a few Africans were present and the Pan-African movement was experiencing a decline. Shortly the depression would strike the world and further efforts would be hampered by the lack of funds. 48

However, the cause was not lost. The efforts of DuBois and his aides were not to be lost in the pages of history, for at the close of World War II the last and most important meeting of the Pan-African movement convened


48 Kohn and Sokolsky, op. cit., p. 27.
at Manchester, England, a suburb of London, and carried the vision of DuBois to fruition. Kohn and Sokolsky agree that:

The Fifth Pan-African Congress in 1945 was far more important than any of its predecessors. Again, DuBois was a moving spirit but this time, Africans themselves played a major role in the proceedings. Two hundred delegates met in Manchester, England, October 15-21; prominent among them were Dr. P. M. Milliard, T. R. Makoonen, George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumah, Peter Abrahams, and Jomo Kenyatta. 49

In the 1930's and 1940's, increasing numbers of Africans went abroad to study. They suffered misery, rejection, loneliness, and alienation, but they persevered, keeping the goal of African self-determination always before them. Kenyatta studied in Britain. Nkrumah, and others, travelled to the United States. Nkrumah, the future leader of Ghana organized the African Students' Association of America and Canada, which was an expression of the Pan-Africanist influence from North America. 50

These men, possessed by a vision of independence for their continent, were the moving spirit of Manchester, making it the most important of all the Pan-African Congresses. Kohn and Sokolsky further point out that:

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49 Ibid. 50 Ibid., p. 22.
it was this Fifth Pan-African Congress that provided the outlet for African nationalism and brought about the awakening of African political consciousness. It became, in fact, a mass movement of Africa for the Africans.

Perhaps the explanation for the energy generated by the Manchester conference of 1945 is to be found in the fact that a majority of those present were African. The movement became African rather than American, and it became a dynamic movement.

Also, the apprehension aroused by the Pan-African movement was, no doubt, caused by its distinct orientation toward Marxism. Colin Legum asserts that:

For the first time we find the forthright challenge: "We demand for Black Africa autonomy and independence, so far, and no further, than it is possible in this one world for groups and peoples to rule themselves subject to inevitable world unity and federation."

The determined men at Manchester were no longer calling for justice within the framework of colonialism, but for the right to determine their own destinies, in their own ways, according to their own traditions, and by their own institutions.

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51 Ibid., p. 28.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid.  
The Congress of Manchester set up an organization with a permanent secretary and a journal. Although it later was to be banned in the colonies, the journal served as an expression of the "positive action" called for by the Congress. "Aided by the world-wide surge of anti-imperialism, Pan-Africanism entered a new phase—the march toward freedom—freedom for individual African countries."\(^{55}\)

The Manchester Congress cited a document which had been prepared several years before its meeting, and which was written without thought of the Africans south of the Sahara, the Atlantic Charter:

Bringing its deliberations to a close, it asked the colonial powers to honor the Atlantic Charter, and ended its plea with, "We are determined to be free... Therefore, we shall complain, appeal and arraign. We will make the world listen to the facts of our condition. We will fight in every way we can for freedom, democracy and social betterment."\(^{56}\)

Particular reference was to the third article of the Charter, which said, "They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; ... ."\(^{57}\)

\(^{55}\)Kohn and Sokolsky, op. cit., p. 29.

\(^{56}\)Kohn and Sokolsky, African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, p. 28, citing the Atlantic Charter.

That document, drawn as a proclamation of Anglo-American unity and for the inspiration of the East Europeans in the depths of war, stirred excitement beyond comprehension in the minds of Africans. Albert Luthuli, the dean of South African nationalists, makes the following statement:

In the Xuma era (1940-49), Congress gradually began to take on a new character. It began to formulate its aims and policy far more clearly than hitherto. Inspired by the Atlantic Charter, and by a war for human freedom, it drew up a precise document called "Africa Claims." Young men began to come into their own, and the Congress Youth League injected new determination and vitality into the organization.58

What was true of South Africa was true of the rest of Africa. Those men, mostly young men, dedicated to the proposition that Africa should determine its own course, took their inspiration from the United States.

East Africa was an integral part of that movement. Kenyatta, the revered leader of nationalism in Kenya, was a participant in the Manchester Congress.

An unusual circumstance made nationalism easily transmitted in East Africa. A lingua franca, Kiswahili, and the rule of Britain over all the political divisions,

gave the nationalists there a feeling of unity and the ability to communicate with one another with a facility unknown in much of the continent.\(^{59}\)

What had begun in 1900 as the expression of protest by American Negroes, culminated in 1960 in the independence of sixteen African nations.\(^{60}\) Appropriately, the man who seized the opportunity of 1900 to demand recognition of Negro rights, W. E. B. DuBois, lived to see the "great year of independence."\(^{61}\)

The patriarch of African nationalism died on August 27, 1960, a citizen of Ghana, and an avowed Communist. He was ninety-five years of age.\(^{62}\) His contribution to the nationalist movement of Africa will be difficult to assess, but it is true, beyond doubt, that no one contributed more to the inception and nurture of the spirit of Negro self-consciousness than William Edward Burghardt DuBois.

\(^{59}\)Kohn and Sokolsky, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 90.

\(^{60}\)Davidson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 64.

\(^{61}\)\textit{Ibid}.

\(^{62}\)Kohn and Sokolsky, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 97.
Modern African nationalism was begun in the United States by DuBois, Garvey and others. Though one may not assert that the government of the United States exerted much influence, for it manifestly did not encourage the movement until the late 1950's, it must be recognized and credited that the original impetus for African national consciousness was American—Negro American, which identified with all men of color in a struggle for recognition and independence.

President Truman called 1942 the "Year of Decisions." The title was appropriate, for Truman assumed the presidency with little knowledge of war and soon the turbulence of policy under Roosevelt. He was left with the decision about employing the atomic bomb, and countless other vexing problems.

One of the most determinative events of the year was the conference held at Potsdam. Here, the new President conferred with Stalin, Churchill, and others. For Truman, the critical element of the conference was the personality of Stalin. He reported after the meeting, "There is no one thing the Russian understands."}

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63 Harry S. Truman,edited Volume 2 of his memoirs, 1942: Year of Decisions.

CHAPTER III

THE PROGRESS OF AMERICAN POLICY

I. POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Nineteen forty-five was the year of triumph for the Western Allies. Germany was finally overwhelmed, when she would not capitulate unconditionally. Months later, after the devastating introduction of the Atomic Age, Japan also was in subjection to the Allied Powers.

President Truman called 1945 the "year of decisions." The title was appropriate, for Truman assumed the Presidency with little knowledge of what had been the substance of policy under Roosevelt. He was left with the decision about employing the atomic bomb, and countless other vexing problems.

One of the most determinative events of the year was the conference held at Potsdam. Here, the new President conferred with Stalin, Churchill and others. For Truman, the critical element of the conference was the personality of Stalin. He remarked after the meeting, "Force is the only thing the Russians understand." 64

63 Harry S. Truman titled Volume I of his memoirs, 1945, Year of Decisions.

The Potsdam Conference had been called because no understanding could be reached about Eastern Europe, especially Poland.\textsuperscript{65} Poland became a focal point in the lack of understanding between the Western Allies and burgeoning Russia.

Truman was an idealist and he could not comprehend the attitude of Stalin in regard to Eastern Europe. Repeatedly he stated his idealism in words like those delivered to the Congress at the death of Roosevelt: "In this shrinking world, it is futile to seek safety behind geographical barriers. Real security will be found only in law and in justice."\textsuperscript{66}

Later, when the United Nations was forged in San Francisco, Truman delivered the following statement of ideals: "With this charter the world can begin to look forward to the time when all worthy human beings may be permitted to live decently as free people."\textsuperscript{67}

Again, in October, 1945, speaking at Navy Day celebrations in New York City, Truman said:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{65}Ibid., p. 292.
  \item \textsuperscript{67}Ibid., p. 142.
\end{itemize}
We believe that all peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own form of government by their own freely expressed choice, without interference from any foreign source. That is true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, as well as in the Western Hemisphere.68

These statements placed him diametrically opposite Stalin, who was working diligently to bring the Eastern European nations under Russian hegemony. Truman could not understand why Stalin refused to accept the statements of the Western Allies that they were seeking to live in peaceful relationships.

The President expected that Russia would be willing to cooperate in the post-war arrangement of the world in such a way as to avoid the likelihood of another war on the scale of World War II. The conference at Yalta, at which Roosevelt was quite ill and unable to match wits with Stalin, gave credence to the expectations of Truman. He had reason to believe that Russia was interested in preserving a balance of power in the world based on the conclusions of Yalta.

It had been agreed at Yalta that the United States, Britain, Russia, China, and France would draw up a new trusteeship system to replace the mandate system of the League of Nations. These five nations were to make up the permanent

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68 Ibid., p. 434.
membership of the Security Council. This trusteeship machinery would be made a part of the charter. 69

Truman's awakening came when Russia would not allow a genuinely representative coalition government to be formed in Poland. It was in response to the problem of Poland that the Potsdam Conference was called. At that meeting it became evident that Russia had her own plans for other parts of the world. Of course, it was not a secret that Russia had designs on Eastern Europe. That was written in the history of the relations of Russia with her European neighbors. Potsdam revealed that Russia held some hopes of gaining a part of the North African territory formerly held by Italy. 70

That Russia had an interest in the Middle East was no surprise, but that she held hopes of establishing herself as a Mediterranean power, especially in Africa, was significant. Churchill seemed to be aware of this desire, but Truman was not. 71

An outline of the direction in which Russia was moving would begin with Poland, through the Eastern European countries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria,

69 Truman, 1945, Year of Decisions, p. 304.

70 Ibid., pp. 412-13.

71 Ibid.
the Balkan States, Greece, and Libya. The latter was a matter for the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, but the others were vulnerable and Stalin set out to establish friendly governments in all of those areas. In all of these, except Africa and Greece, Russia was successful in having her way, managing to carry them along in the way she would have them go.\(^72\)

Greece was a prime target for the Communists, and the period just after the war was a time of civil disturbance, designed to establish there a government friendly to Russia. Truman successfully countered this move with the Truman Doctrine in 1947, enabling forces who were friendly to the West to re-establish their power.\(^73\)

The Truman Doctrine, not surprisingly, also included other areas, particularly those of the Middle East which bordered on Russian territory.\(^74\) The whole tier of nations from Greece to Iran was included in the statement of policy made to the Congress on March 12, 1947:


\[^73\text{Ibid., pp. 127-29.}\]

\[^74\text{Ibid.}\]
I believe . . . that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. \(^{75}\)

In response to the Russian pressure on her neighbors in Europe and the Middle East, and the suspected designs she had on other areas of the world, the Truman administration devised a policy of "containment." \(^{76}\) The Western Powers would restrict the Russian expansion, not allowing her to conquer any more territory.

Regarding Africa, it was the policy of the United States to remain aloof from the problems of that portion of the world out of deference to her allies. In the meeting between Clement Atlee, McKensie-King and Truman on November 10-15, 1945, not a word is mentioned regarding the implications of their statements for African dependencies. \(^{77}\)

Also, in Truman's memoirs there is no mention of the implications of his foreign policy speech on Navy Day, 1945,

\(^{75}\) Ibid.


\(^{77}\) Truman, 1945, Year of Decisions, pp. 591-98.
in which he advocated giving self-government to people who were ready.78

American expressions of sympathy for national feeling were regular occurrences, and Truman makes the following statement in his Memoirs:

I had always been opposed to colonialism. Whatever justification may be cited at any stage, colonialism in any form, is hateful to Americans. America fought her own war of liberation against colonialism, and we shall always regard with sympathy and understanding the desire of people everywhere to be free of colonial bondage.79

Truman unquestionably understood the role of the United States in the post-war world, remarking that:

Out of this conflict have come powerful military nations, now fully trained and equipped for war. But they have no right to dominate the world. It is rather the duty of these powerful nations to assume the responsibility for leadership toward a world of peace. That is why we have here resolved that power and strength shall be used not to wage war, but to keep the world at peace, and free from the fear of war.80

The role of Russia was also appreciated in the United States. One analysis of the economic alignments of the world, by Alvin W. Hansen, sums up this role:

78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid., p. 306.  
80 Ibid., p. 324.
What, now, are the prospects after World War II?
A great new fact emerges from World War II. It will change the face of Europe. It will profoundly dominate the course of world history in the generations that lie before us.

This great new fact is the rise of Russia on one side of the globe and the economic and military power of the United States on the other. A happy geographical accident—two great powers occupying vast continents and controlling vast resources in areas that are noncompetitive—this fact must be set down as a dominating and directing force in the future course of history. 81

This quite hopeful assessment of the rivalry between Russia and the United States was based on the geographical separation of the interests of the two powers. 82

Hansen's geographical theory is interesting, as is his assessment of the post-war power of Britain. Such an estimate would explain the United States' reluctance to bring pressure to bear on matters relating to the colonies.

In between those two powers on opposite sides of the globe is the British Empire which emerges from World War II absolutely stronger than ever before. 83

Had Britain been able to assume her former role in the world, the alignment would have been of a different nature. However, Britain was not able to take her former place


82 Ibid., p. 17.

83 Ibid.
in the world economy or government, as Truman realized near the end of his tenure. In early 1952, Churchill came to the United States for urgent consultations with Truman.84

At that time, The New York Times stated that the British problem was basically economic. She imported more than she exported and her reserves were dropping, placing her in a precarious economic position.85

The relative weakness of Britain was becoming apparent, and the implications for the United States were emphasized by the fact that Truman and Churchill gave a large portion of their conversations to the problem of strategic metal imports, from Africa, as well as their division among the Western Allies.86

Topics on the agenda included the Atlantic community, Soviet policy, the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, raw materials problems, Germany, NATO and atomic energy.87

85 Ibid.
Submerged in this maze of problems was the fact that practically all of the fissionable materials for atomic energy came from the Belgian Congo, and a great portion of the copper came from the central African area, which included the Congo, and the Rhodesias.

Africa, as a part of the world's power structure, had not yet emerged. But, the statements of ideology, which were unavoidably encouraging to the African nationalists, were continuing. The seeming commitment of the United States to the principle of self-determination was feeding the flame of rebellion among the black people of the world. And, there were reassessments of the importance of the British Empire, making more realistic appraisals of its strength and resilience, because, since 1945, Britain had lost some four hundred million people from its control.88

Because of the impending demise of the British Empire, and the tendency of Americans to look upon themselves as the saviours of mankind, the statements of officials began to sound charismatic. Truman, in his State of the Union message of 1952, said:

"The things we believe in most deeply are under relentless attack. We have the great responsibility

of saving the basic moral and spiritual values of our civilization." 89

John Foster Dulles, a Special Advisor to the State Department, remarked:

"It is worth remembering that our nation had its greatest influence for good and also its greatest security during the last century, when we had little military strength and were not wealthy enough to give much away, . . . our greatness lay in producing exportable ideas." 90

II. THE UNITED STATES "DISCOVERS" AFRICA

Africa remained on the fringe of American diplomatic concern. Through all the years following World War II, the Western Allies were preoccupied with matters in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

The links between the United States and Africa extend far back into history; yet Africa was the last of the inhabited continents to assume a regular place in the grand design of American foreign policy. 91


Events were not to leave the United States free to ignore the continent after 1952, for the spotlight of American concern centered upon Africa during that year.

Some Americans were already aware of the problems of Africa. The Manchester Congress had not passed unnoticed by everyone, and not everyone was indifferent to the fate of Africans. An article in *Christian Century* in June, 1945, had advocated that the Western Powers recognize in the peace treaties that Africa was not the "... rightful possession or permanent asset of European nations." Further, the article urged that "... principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter should be made applicable to Africa, ... ." 92

Yet, the United States continued to view Africa as a province of Europe. It was not possible that America would view Africa with indifference, but, she did regard the continent as out of bounds for political interests.

One journalist has observed:

"... our lack of knowledge and contact on the one hand and our close and vital relationship with Europe, the master of Africa, on the other,

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led us to view Africa primarily through European eyes. This is leading us to act in Africa on the basis of European interests.93

Africa received scant attention from American interests, either governmental or private. "Our foreign aid programs made only token contributions to African development. Of our $30 billion of overseas investment, less than three per cent was in Africa."94

East Africa burst on the scene in 1952. One is impressed as he scans the issues of The New York Times, to find that before 1952 very little was written about developments in East Africa; yet, from the early part of 1952, that area of the world was quite prominent in the news. Beginning then, however, countless news items and articles were printed exposing the happenings in Africa.95

Worthy of note also was the suggestion in May, 1952, that a mid-African conference, led by the United States, be held to develop policies which would fall somewhere between


"Malanism" and North African "liberalism."\textsuperscript{96} Others called for the United States to heed the call of Portugal for such a conference, and to develop a consistent policy on Africa south of the Sahara.\textsuperscript{97}

American preoccupation was with Britain and her ability to hold on to her colonial holdings. One example of her cooperation with the status quo in East Africa was the incident involving a man named Hugo Gatheru, who was a student at Lincoln University. In September, 1952, an agent of the United States Justice Department went to Lincoln University and questioned Gatheru for four hours. The student received a letter on November 5, 1952, telling him that he must leave the country within thirty days or face deportation.\textsuperscript{98}

Gatheru was a student, and simply a student, but the fear displayed by the British, that those who went abroad for education would return to assert their political rights, seemed to have eroded their sense of propriety.

That the United States Government allowed itself to be drawn into the affair in this manner brings into question


\textsuperscript{97}The New York Times, May 18, 1952, page 1, col. 3.

its entire intelligence arrangement as well as its valuation of human freedom. The Kenya Africans, and their friends, certainly viewed the matter in this light.

The Kenya authorities know that Mugo is neither Mau Mauist or Communist. Are they simply determined that he shall not graduate from Lincoln? Or could it be that American immigration officials cannot distinguish Gold Coastism from Communism and have ordered Mugo deported as "subversive"? Mugo-son-of-Gatheru is waiting to see whether the Statue of Liberty means what he thought it meant.\(^99\)

Gatheru had incurred the suspicion of the British colonial administration of Kenya because he had once written a letter asking when Africans would be able to vote. He had corresponded with people in America, and in 1948, a group called the Afro-World Fellowship, obtained a scholarship for him. He was not allowed a visa because he was looked upon as a trouble-maker due to the letter mentioned above.\(^100\)

Gatheru's subsequent trials in making his way to the United States and taking advantage of the opportunity to study, make interesting reading, both in regard to the efforts of the British to thwart his quest to obtain an education, and the American official willingness to cooperate with the British in their actions.

As will be shown later, the United States was committed to the support of Britain because of the strategic

\(^{99}\text{Ibid.} \quad ^{100}\text{Ibid.}\)
importance of East Africa militarily, and it did not take seriously the nationalist efforts in Africa south of the Sahara.

East Africa was news. And, the American public, as well as the government, took note of the area. There, in the far-off jungles, raged the naked passions of primitive men, with savages stalking the country-side wielding spears and knives. Wild animals roamed the plains, elephants trumpeted, lions roared, leopards screamed, and the hyena projected his insane laughter through the still nights of the plains. Books, movies, magazines, as well as other communications media emphasized the romance and excitement of a far-away country complete with the atmosphere of a nineteenth century adventure into the dangerous frontier. 101

III. THE EISENHOWER ERA

General Dwight D. Eisenhower came to the Presidency of the United States from command of the unified defense organization in Europe in 1953. Eisenhower, who had had no domestic political experience, and who had only a military orientation in international politics, acceded

to the Presidency of the United States with the attitude that the NATO arrangement was necessary for the survival of Western civilization. 102

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was foremost in the consideration of Eisenhower during the latter part of his military career, and the Atlantic community continued to be his first concern during his tenure. Particularly, when the interests of Europe and Africa came into conflict, as they did in Kenya in 1952-56, he consistently chose to support the colonial powers. The problem was stated in the following manner:

"A central question is how U. S. operations in Africa relate to, and what is their effect on, the colonial interests and administrations of our NATO allies."103

His policies were always predicated on the premise of legality, and he was hesitant to offend either the colonials or those who were coming to power in the newer states of Africa.104 However, expediency, with respect to


the declining capabilities of the British Empire, regularly won the day in American foreign policy. The colonies represented a formidable asset for Britain, and Eisenhower, with his close ties with Europe, knew how desperate Britain had become in trying to maintain a prominent place in the government of the world.

The importance of the colonies was spelled out by Elspeth Huxley in an article written for the magazine, *Foreign Affairs*:

> It is to Africa that Britain must look for that field for investment, source of raw materials and expanding market which she needs in order to survive, and she must win it quickly from the swamps and forest and high veld of the last continent to be pioneered.¹⁰⁵

The article continued to spell out the strategic importance of Africa for Britain, and forcefully denigrated the abilities of Africans to govern themselves.

Eisenhower, as did Truman before him, consistently couched his policy statements in terms designed to take advantage of the American history of revolution, and to encourage those behind the "iron curtain" to rebel against their rulers. A typical statement of policy are these words, spoken at Columbia University in 1950:

"The best foreign policy is to live our daily lives in honesty, decency, and integrity; at home, making our own land a more fitting habitation for free men; and, abroad, joining with those of like mind and heart, to make of the world a place where all men can dwell in peace."106

However, as President, Eisenhower developed a remarkable affinity for John Foster Dulles, his Secretary of State, and gave him extensive power to make policy and to determine action. It is instructive to note that President Eisenhower's inaugural address made no mention of Africa.107 Also, Dulles' first speech as Secretary of State referred to Africa only to suggest that trouble there would be because of Communism.108

Governmental thought had apparently been influenced by the opinions of such men as Sir Philip Mitchell, former Governor of Kenya, who said:

When the British penetrated East Africa its natives "had no wheeled transport . . . no roads nor towns . . . no tools . . . They had no means of writing, even by hieroglyphics, nor of numbering except by their fingers or making notches on a stick . . . Perhaps most astonishing of all to


the European mind, they had no calendar nor notion of time."109

Africa had erupted in 1952. Kenya had suffered the Mau Mau rebellion, which captured the attention of many Americans. North Africa began to experience the agony of colonial rebellion as the Arab people expressed their long suppressed desire to rule themselves once more. 110

Alan Paton, the eminent authority on Africa, wrote:

The white man in Black Africa moves to give the African what he demands. He is there to teach, which he does nobly some of the time. But in the South, he is called on to share with the African, which is much more difficult to do.111

The importance of the movement toward independence had been emphasized by the American representative on the United Nations Trusteeship Council when he wrote in 1950:

The policies which we adopt toward the backward areas of Asia and Africa will have consequences quite as far-reaching and profound as will the more spectacular decisions which we make in the stupendous struggle now raging


between Soviet Russia and the free world. On their outcome hangs the future of civilization.112

Men from the emerging nations also pointed up the importance of the events in the areas that had been ruled by colonialism. Moshe Sharett suggested before the United Nations that there were two struggles going on in the world; one of them was the contest between East and West, or the "cold war." "The other—which was to prove equal if not greater concern to this Assembly—had as its scene a vast belt of territories in Asia and Africa."113

An indication of the direction of United States policy with regard to Africa generally, and East Africa specifically, was a controversy which came before the United Nations in 1952 concerning the summary removal of a group of Africans, from tribal lands on the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro, to less productive areas. In the voting on resolutions dealing with the Wameru removal, the United States voted with Britain to validate action of the colonial government of Tanganyika, justifying their actions on the


grounds that it enabled the country to more efficiently use its land in the production of exportable commodities, especially coffee.\textsuperscript{114} 

The United States was caught in a dilemma. On the one hand she had sympathy for those who were trying to overthrow colonialism, but on the other she had to pacify her partners in the Western defense arrangement. De Kiewiet asserts that, "... the African policy of the United States is split down the middle by a stubborn and troublesome contradiction between immediate strategic and ultimate historic interests."\textsuperscript{115}

Paul H. Nitze, former Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State noted the necessity of a change of attitude in the men who determined policy with regard to those areas which were coming to independence:

My former colleague, C. B. Marshall, has emphasized the point that the test of a nation's greatness is whether it can adjust from a position where it once disposed to a position where it must deal with problems. The Spaniards were not able to make that transition successfully and suffered the consequences. At one time the West disposed with


respect to Africa. Today it is necessary to deal with Africa. The basic challenge is whether the West can do this constructively and imaginatively.\textsuperscript{116}

John Gunther summed up American attitudes toward East Africa in 1953 with these words:

United States interest in East Africa is not pronounced. Washington has always thought of it—indeed the whole world of the Indian Ocean—as predominantly a British sphere.\textsuperscript{117}

What was true of Kenya was also true of the rest of Africa. They were looked upon as provinces of the colonial powers and the United States had no direct interest in their internal circumstances.

IV. THE TIDE TURNS

The action of world politics had been moving gradually from the North to the South. Truman had his first taste of conflict with Russia in Poland. As the cold war wore on events moved slowly southward through the East European states and into the Middle East, bringing necessary adaptations of policy and attitudes.


President Eisenhower emphasized this change of arena in his memoirs:

Beginning in the latter months of my first term and for several years thereafter, no region of the world received as much of my close attention and that of my colleagues as did the Middle East.118

The Middle East crisis of 1956, closely connected with the Hungarian uprising, marked a turning point in the entire relationship of the United States with the emerging nations of the world.

In Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser had taken over the Suez Canal in response to a move by Secretary of State Dulles cancelling proffered American aid for the Aswan Dam. Claiming that such a move was necessary in order to pay for the dam, from the revenues of the canal, Nasser was able to gain support from Russia and whip the Western nations into line.119 It was a diplomatic coup for Nasser and for Russia.


The President himself indicated the reason for United States temporizing in the Suez crisis:

We could not permit the Soviet Union to seize the leadership in the struggle against the use of force in the Middle East and thus win the confidence of the new independent nations of the world. But on the other hand I by no means wanted the British and French to be branded as naked aggressors without provocation. I therefore instructed Foster to draft two statements: an announcement of our suspension of all military and some governmental economic aid to Israel; and a moderate resolution for submission to the General Assembly in an effort to block a resolution—certain to be an objectionable one—by the Soviet Union.120

Dulles apparently did not believe, prior to Suez, that Egypt could manage the seizure of the canal from Britain and France, or operate it. But, with Russia on the verge of gaining the complete confidence of the Arab nations, and thereby threatening to extend her absolute influence beyond Europe into the strategically important areas of the Middle East, the United States had to act to retain the trust of the newly independent nations, saving some semblance of Western influence in all these important areas.

Nasser's success brought a new assessment of the emerging nations by the United States, especially in Africa. In a conversation with Nehru of India, the timeliness of a

120 Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 1956-61, p. 83.
policy change was underscored. The United States must now act in a direct relationship with the emerging nations in order to salvage Western influence in those countries. Nehru talked to the President about nationalism as related to the two power groups of the world:

This would be a propitious moment, he suggested, because of the blunder of the Soviets in Hungary, for the Free World to move to strengthen the faith and hope of those who would like to live in independence but who have been misled, at least partly, by Communist doctrine.121

The realization that Africa was progressing inexorably toward independence and that the colonial powers were losing their positions there had finally dawned upon the American administration. This, coupled with a puritanical obsession with the American role of leadership, led the President and his advisors to revise their estimates of, and policies toward, the African nationalists. President Eisenhower commented:

The United States was not directly involved, for we had no territorial claims in Africa. But, with a position of leadership in the Free World, we did not want to see chaos run wild among hopeful, expectant peoples and could not afford to see turmoil in an area where the Communists would be only too delighted to take an advantage. In spite of the relatively high regard in which the United States was held in most of the newly emerging nations because of our anti-colonial

121 Ibid., p. 109.
tradition, our close alliances with some of the former colonial powers caused vexing complications in Africa.\textsuperscript{122}

The United States began to search for a policy which would allow it to be connected with both the old colonial powers and the new nations as they took their places in the councils of the world. Vernon McKay wrote in 1957 about the developing political awareness in Tanganyika, when Julius Nyerere, a teacher from the Lakes Region of that Trust Territory, began to organize the nation for independence.\textsuperscript{123} McKay's comment on the efforts of the United States to evolve a policy is pertinent and incisive:

The policy which has come out of these deliberations is veiled in ambiguity and expressed in generalities that have lost their glitter, but its essence is that the United States supports the goal of self-government or independence for all peoples who have the desire and the capacity to maintain it. In government circles this is called a balanced or middle-of-the-road policy of constructive moderation. The public calls it fence-sitting. There is an element of truth in both descriptions.\textsuperscript{124}

Eisenhower sent Vice-President Nixon on a trip to Africa in 1957, seeking some light on the conditions there

\textsuperscript{122}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 572.


\textsuperscript{124}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 307.
and looking for ways to maintain the ambivalent policy which had been pursued for so long. His report to the President was presented on April 7, 1957.\textsuperscript{125}

However, Nixon's trip did not bring him into meaningful contact with the forces of nationalism in southern Africa. The United Press made the following comment on his itinerary:

Apart from a brief stop in Uganda, Mr. Nixon had no opportunity to examine the tensions associated with political and economic growth in those African countries that stood lower down on the timetable of independence.\textsuperscript{126}

Perhaps the most meaningful action taken by the United States in the post-war years, in relation to Africa, was the creation of the Bureau of African Affairs. This action was taken in the latter part of 1957 and marked a significant step forward in the relationships of the United States with the area of Africa south of the Sahara.\textsuperscript{127}

Surprising and enlightening is the comment of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. as he reviewed the establishment of the Africa Bureau, that in 1957 there were still more


\textsuperscript{127}Schlesinger, \textit{loc. cit.}. 
Foreign Service functionaries in West Germany than in all of the countries of Africa.\textsuperscript{128}

But, the establishment of the Bureau did not alter the attitudes of those who determined United States policy. In commenting on the course of Africa toward independence, Joseph Palmer, II, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, remarked:

"It is, of course, a matter of the greatest importance that the word 'orderly' be emphasized in this connection. It is axiomatic that membership in the family of nations carries with it responsibilities to the group. It is a matter of vital importance that this be known and accepted by the emerging peoples. In the long run, premature independence may contain as many dangers for Africa and Africans as the denial of that status."\textsuperscript{129}

But, the establishment of the Bureau was a needed step to remedy the problem faced by the United States in communicating with the Africans. State officials now recognized that Africa should receive the same attention as other geographical areas of the world.\textsuperscript{130}

American commitment to qualified independence continued through the later years of the 1950's.

\textsuperscript{128}Ibid.


Secretary of State Herter reiterated the conviction that careful preparation for independence should precede the granting of self-government to the colonies. Yet, Herter also went forward to a new position when he remarked:

"Political advancement in the non-self-governing and trust territories of Africa is a tribute to the imagination, good will, and skill of the peoples of those territories and of the powers that administer them. It is also a tribute to the encouragement and assistance given by the United Nations and the specialized agencies to the advancement of these territories."\(^{132}\)

Africa had not occupied the attention of American diplomatic concern prior to the crisis of 1956, because it was considered to be both beyond the bounds of proper involvement by the United States, and because it was thought to be out of the arena of the cold war.\(^{133}\)

However, the events of 1956 and 1957, the Lebanon crisis bringing the assertion of the Eisenhower Doctrine, injected new elements into the international consciousness. Until that time, the Middle East was considered relatively free from the influence of the Soviet Union. But, the


\(^{132}\)Ibid.

series of happenings in those years indicated both the continued interest of Russia in the Middle East and the willingness of the newly independent states to cooperate with them.

Indeed, for many years the foreign policy of the United States had been dictated by simple reaction to Russian action. 134

Constant reference to Soviet initiative is made by the top echelon of American policy makers. In January, 1959, Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon made the following comment on policy considerations of the United States:

"To meet the Soviet challenge and to give reality to our own effort to help the people of the newly developing nations in their attempts to fight their way out of the bitter slavery of poverty, ignorance, and disease, we must marshal all the peaceful tools of trade and aid available to us." 135

American relations with African states are pointed up by dealings with Sekou Toure of Guinea, when in 1958 he defied de Gaulle's attempt to cement the French international


community with binding ties. "Toure turned to the East, secured arms from Czechoslovakia. Then the United States acted, but only tentatively and niggardly."136 This reactionary policy by the United States said to the African states that, "... we were not interested in Africa, except as a cold war bastion..."137

The ambivalent attitude of the United States was dictated by the complex mixture of Western alliances, domestic idealism, economic interests, and the felt necessity to counter the actions of the Communists.138

V. THE CHANGED DEFENSE POSTURE

One final element of the policy decisions of the Eisenhower Administration is to be noted in the virtual destruction of Western defense arrangements in the Middle East, or, at least, the danger of such disruption.

Dulles had attempted to surround the Soviet Union with a ring of defensive alliances. The NATO alliance was the first of these treaties. This was followed by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, designed to thwart any

137 Ibid.
138 Ibid., p. 446.
Communist attempt to break out of the ring thrown around Communist states from Japan to Pakistan. But, the area of the Middle East, particularly with the events of 1956, indicated a decided weakness in that area. As one military man commented:

The loss of the Middle East would, if it included Egypt, give the enemy access to the African continent by land. The way then would lie open to thrusts westward along the North African coast and southward into the Sudan and through Ethiopia. The prize along the latter route would be British East Africa and South Africa. We would then have the Soviet Union at our own doorstep, the control of the Atlantic challenged and South America threatened. This is the nightmare that, in the years to come, we must prevent, either in whole or in part, ever becoming reality.\textsuperscript{139}

This analysis by Admiral Richard L. Conolly, indicated the seriousness with which the United States viewed the events in the Middle East in 1956 and 1957. He indicated that the United States considered British and French plans for defense of the continent to be inadequate and suggests the extent of those plans in the heart of Africa. He suggests that the departure of Britain from the Middle

East left that front line virtually defenseless and the second line inadequately prepared.

In the case of the British, the defense in depth extended from Palestine, where they did have a considerable number of troops (although in a politically precarious position), thence back through the Suez Canal, Egypt, and the Sudan. It was finally to be based on British East Africa, where a new Britain overseas was envisaged. This development apparently was to include new military—and naval-base facilities that would provide for the possible loss of Suez. 140

Evidently, the Western Allies viewed the impending exit of Britain and France from positions of dominance in the Middle East with grave concern.

Efforts were made to effect an alliance of those new states of the Middle East which would deny Russia access to that area and which would make for security of lines of communication with sources of supply in Africa, as well as staging areas for possible troop movements threatening the Western Hemisphere.

East Africa was central in the plans of the Allies to draw an effective line of defense farther south in East and Central Africa. 141

Clearly, if the defensive posture of the Western Allies was to be maintained, new relationships needed to be

140 Ibid., pp. 57-58. 141 Ibid., p. 61.
formed with the emerging nations. The Baghdad Pact eventually was formed to be the basis of retention of the Middle East as the first line of defense.\textsuperscript{142}

Because of the urgency of the defensive consideration, the United States began to renovate its official relations with the new states. Thus, the significance of the formation of the Bureau of African Affairs within the Department of State is clarified.

The old policy of Secretary Dulles had insisted on an absolute adherence to one side or the other in the cold war. Further, he injected into the American mind the conviction that those who were neutral were taking an immoral position.\textsuperscript{143}

However, with the vain effort in 1957 to persuade the Africans to line up with the United States in the cold war, a search was begun for more workable policies regarding the African states, precisely because of the strategic importance of certain parts of that continent to defense arrangements.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{142}Eisenhower, \textit{Mandate for Change: 1953-56}, p. 574.

\textsuperscript{143}Schlesinger, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 506.

VI. EISENHOWER AND DULLES

General Eisenhower constantly iterated American idealism, speaking about such matters as freedom, self-determination, economic progress, and all the things men speak of when talking in generalities. Indeed, one pertinent criticism of Americans is that they have consistently refused to recognize the reality of the circumstances of the world when they have uttered platitudes regarding freedom, plenty, liberty or other ideals. And, the policy of the United States remained that of maintaining the status quo, which vitiates all the idealism expressed by the leaders of the country.\textsuperscript{145} Henry L. Bretton said:

It is not suggested that there existed in United States official circles no genuine devotion to humanitarian principles or a real commitment to freedom and human dignity. What matters here is that, by its own preference and in the face of prevailing domestic and international political pressures, the United States government over the years has lagged behind not only the Soviet advocates of anti-colonialism, but even the colonial powers themselves. For in London, Paris and Brussels the need for substantial reform and change was being recognized while United States officials still insisted on stability and observance of "law and order."\textsuperscript{146}

\textsuperscript{145}Bretton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 451.

\textsuperscript{146}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 448.
VII. THE KENNEDY COURTSHIP

Developments in the politics of nations after World War II made it inevitable that the United States would be increasingly occupied with matters relating to Africa in the second half of the twentieth century.147

Accordingly, an increased interest in the continent arose throughout the American populace. Every phase of the American nation was attracted to the area that had been neglected for so long. This interest became increasingly apparent in the election campaign of 1960, and in the year immediately preceding it.148

American change of attitude toward Africa was part of a larger revision which encompassed all the underdeveloped nations of the world. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. has commented: "Of the various transformations wrought in the Kennedy years none was less noted or more notable than the revolution in American attitudes toward the uncommitted world."149


149Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 507.
John F. Kennedy had been a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and had been Chairman of the African Subcommittee. In that capacity he called attention to the vital changes that were taking place in the newly developing countries, and focused the concern of the United States on the problems of Africa to an extent now known before.\(^{150}\)

During the campaign of 1960, Kennedy made 479 references to Africa in his speeches.\(^{151}\) Appropriate indeed was the development that the candidate who knew most about the continent came to the Presidency in that crucial year.

However, Kennedy could not overcome the inertia of years of policy developed in previous administrations. And, as a matter of fact, the Kennedy Administration endorsed the policy of the previous administration.\(^{152}\)

Although the new President and his close advisors wished to revise the policy of the United States, they had to consider first those who had obtained, through long years of association, positions of power and influence in the President's party.\(^{153}\) Thus, in the 1960's there

\(^{150}\)Ibid., p. 554.  
\(^{151}\)Ibid.  
\(^{152}\)Bretton, op. cit., p. 459.  
\(^{153}\)Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 509.
emerged the necessity to slowly and carefully revise the attitudes of government in policy matters. This is a long and tedious task. As the Council on Foreign Relations noted:

Even in 1961, Africa retained a certain novelty as an area of American concern, and American policy there continued to be marked by a spirit of originality and, at times, of frank experimentation.⁵⁴

Few in the United States shared the concern for Africa that Kennedy had shown in his Senate tenure, and the Senate Subcommittee lapsed into inaction when Senator Gore resigned from the chairmanship in 1963.⁵⁵

As the new administration began its formidable task in 1960, at the height of the Congo crisis, Kennedy appointed G. Mennen Williams to the sensitive post of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, the first appointment he made in the Department of State. In making the appointment he remarked that it was a position of highest importance in the administration.⁵⁶

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⁵⁵Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 557.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 555.
Also worthy of note is the assertion of Schlesinger that because of the sensitivity of Africans to racial difficulties within the country, Kennedy was persuaded to remove the name of Senator William Fulbright from the list of possible appointees as Secretary of State.\(^{157}\)

As is true throughout the post-war years, the idealism of the United States, at least in public statements meant for the ears of foreign diplomats, served to heighten the feeling among African nationalists that the United States and African nations shared the same goals.

By promoting an image of an identity of goals between the American and African revolutions, through repeated references to such terms as "freedom," "democracy," "liberty," invocations of the words of the American founding fathers and so on, the American public was being subjected to a massive misrepresentation.\(^{158}\)

Many public figures were affected by the desire to win the Africans to our side in the cold war, and they missed few opportunities to make it clear that Africa and the United States shared the same anti-colonial desires.

Kennedy felt that the new nations of Africa and Asia were the new field of operations in the conflict between democracy and Communism and that a new policy of recognition

\(^{157}\)Ibid., p. 140

\(^{158}\)Bretton, op. cit., p. 466.
and respect for the neutrals was most likely to win their cooperation in the international councils of nations.\textsuperscript{159}

Consequently, when Liberia placed before the Security Council of the United Nations, in February, 1961, a resolution calling for Portugal to comply with the United Nations' policy against colonialism and proposing an inquiry into the Angola circumstances, Kennedy took the opportunity to indicate a change of American policy.\textsuperscript{160}

Although the resolution failed in the Security Council, the United States had projected a new image, and would not thereafter be automatically thought of as an advocate of colonialism.\textsuperscript{161} It was a tentative stand, but one designed to say that the Americans were taking a position somewhat removed from those European Allies who had been so determinative of her attitudes in the post-war world.

An incident which points up the importance attached to the new policy towards Africa occurred in 1961. G. Mennen Williams was making one of his frequent trips to Africa, and made an unfortunate reference in favor of "Africa for the Africans." Of course a howl of protest went up, since the

\textsuperscript{159}\textit{Schlesinger, op. cit.}, p. 507.

\textsuperscript{160}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 512. \textsuperscript{161}\textit{Bretton, op. cit.}, p. 461.
statement was made in Nairobi, Kenya, the stronghold of British settlers. President Kennedy thought it expedient to uphold the Secretary and gave his endorsement to a qualification made by Williams.\textsuperscript{162}

Such an incident served the purpose of shifting United States policy from that of automatic support of European nations allied in the various defense arrangements to that of a uni-lateral policy which would take into consideration all facets of the world situation in making policy.

American policy toward Africa was stated by Williams in a Department of State Bulletin in March, 1964, which was an extension of the policy received by the Johnson Administration at the unfortunate demise of President Kennedy:

In recent years governmental assistance has been added to private efforts to help meet Africa's needs. We are now assisting African nations through such organizations as the Peace Corps, the Agency for International Development, the Export-Import Bank; through exchange programs and scholarships; and through our contributions to international organizations.\textsuperscript{163}


Although concern for Africa increased during Kennedy's years in office, the many tasks of governing did not allow him to focus his attention on the continent. However, Schlesinger points out that:

... his curiosity was unremitting. He cared very much, for example, about the performance of his African ambassadors and rarely failed to see them when they came home on consultation.\(^{164}\)

The United States was preoccupied with other problems of the world to a greater extent than with Africa. The annals of foreign policy repeatedly indicate that the United States could not afford to maintain a policy that would vitiate the positions of her European Allies. Practicality dictated that the United States not destroy their power precipitately.\(^{165}\)

It could be said that in a world where the warning sirens are constantly shrieking in one corner or another, Africa has still not become enough of a danger point to command full American attention.\(^{166}\)

To this point, at least, Africa has not demanded as urgent a consideration as other areas. Consequently, she remains on the fringe of United States interest.

\(^{164}\)Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 556.


\(^{166}\)Ibid.
Semantics makes personal communication a difficult art. Whether they are differences involved in dialects within a country, or the more hopeless efforts of communicating between languages, one must have respect for the problem of determining the meaning of words.

After World War II, the matter of communications assumed an even greater gravity. Although Stalin may have talked about democracy, the word conveyed an entirely different concept to him than to Truman. Self-determination was also much talked about, but it meant different things to Truman and Jomo Kenyatta.

Differences in concepts may account for many of the seeming deviations from idealisms which were expressed by Africans and Westerners alike. When Truman spoke of self-determination, or democracy, or freedom, or some other word in the Western vocabulary, those words did not necessarily mean the same things to nationalists in Africa, who were intent upon achieving for themselves the privilege of self-rule.
I. THE MEANING OF IDEOLOGY

For the purposes of this study, the following definition of ideology, given by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., will be used:

Ideology is a set of value-related beliefs which are at least partly systematized. The three necessary components of an ideology are beliefs, values, and system (interdependence). Values account for action orientation and commitment associated with ideology.\(^\text{167}\)

Within the framework of this definition, all peoples are capable of ideology. No matter how primitive their culture, it is based on a set of values, and is systematized, therefore it is an ideology.

While there are men who would deny that Africans are capable of such sophistication, they are few at the present time. However, in the years preceding the attainment of independence by African countries, such men were not only numerous, they were influential. Estimates such as that of Sir Philip Mitchell, once Governor of Kenya, to whom reference was made on page forty-six, reflect the conviction that Africans are not capable of ideology.

A similar statement may be found in the article written by Margery Perham, who often has been quoted as an

expert on African affairs. In defending the British against the criticisms of Americans regarding their colonial policies, she uses the words "backwardness," "uncivilized," "semi-civilized," "unproductive," "unorganized," and other similar words to describe the accomplishments of the Africans before the British came upon the scene. 168

II. WESTERN PRONOUNCEMENTS

From the inception of the Atlantic Charter, to the present, statements poured from the lips of Western leaders that whetted the appetites of African nationalists.

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. says, "Since the time of Franklin Roosevelt American policy had had a nominal commitment to anti-colonialism."

Truman, on numerous occasions, talked of the right of self-determination for all peoples. His pronouncement in asserting the Truman Doctrine, gave hope to all those in Africa as well as those of the Middle East. In his memoirs,


the President said, "I still believed in Woodrow Wilson's philosophy of 'self-determination.'" Also, after the meeting of Truman and Attlee in December, 1950, their final communique committed both to certain principles:

It reaffirmed that the objectives of our two nations were the same; namely, to maintain world peace and respect for the rights and interests of all peoples, to promote strength and confidence among the freedom-loving countries of the world, to eliminate the causes of fear, want, and discontent, and to advance the democratic way of life.

President Eisenhower also seemed to place the United States on the side of the Africans when he made his trip to Africa in 1959. He later stated:

I believe that our talks, formal and informal, helped to persuade national leaders and millions of people that the United States had no selfish purpose in cooperating with them; that we sought no territory; did not wish to dominate; and believed in freely chosen governments for peoples and nations everywhere.

Eisenhower seemed to be on safe ground at the time, for he did not envisage the possibility of any new

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African countries coming to independence, and he was supported by his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.\textsuperscript{173}

The independence march gained ground in 1960, and forced Eisenhower to reassess the rapidity with which African nations were advancing toward their goal. On September 20, 1960, he addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations and proposed in part:

\begin{quote}
\ldots a pledge by all countries represented at this Assembly to respect the African peoples' right to choose their own way of life and to determine for themselves the course they choose to follow \ldots \textsuperscript{174}
\end{quote}

John F. Kennedy brought youth and vitality to the Presidency. He too pronounced the commitment of the United States to the principles of independence and self-determination. An example is his speech in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on July 4, 1962, in which he stated:

"The theory of independence, as old as man himself, was not invented in this hall, but it was in this hall that the theory became a practice, that the word went out to all the world that 'the God who gave us life gave us liberty at the same time.'"\textsuperscript{175}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
Kennedy, perhaps more than any other leader in the post-war years, gave the impression that the United States sympathized with the aspirations of the African nationalists in their search for identity and self-government. Below are some of the apparent differences between African and American thought.

III. THE COLD WAR

Nothing was more on the minds of American officials than the contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. Beginning in the waning days of World War II and continuing to the present, it has claimed all elements of policy for its own, giving no area of state relationships freedom from its demands. Schlesinger gives the following assessment of the polarization of the world and its effects on policy under Dulles:

In the 1950's John Foster Dulles had transmuted this from an assumption into a dogma. The Dulles world rested on unitary conceptions of the opposing blocs: on the one hand, the "free world," capaciously defined to include such places as Spain, Paraguay, Batista's Cuba and Mississippi and destined ultimately for the private enterprise of the Secretary of Commerce and the god of the Secretary of State; and, on the other the "communist camp," a monolithic conspiracy with headquarters in Moscow, enslaving captive peoples and orchestrating global crises according to a comprehensive master plan.176

176Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 506.
Dulles insisted that the struggle between the continental powers was one of moral systems and that it was a struggle for continued existence of the right way of life. Consequently, he insisted that to be neutral in the struggle was to be immoral.

Further, in January, 1953, Dulles commented that the Communists sought to incite natives to revolt against the Western Europeans in their fight for independence. He thus directly injected the cold war issue into the future relations between the United States and the African states.177

Dulles fully thought that Russia was gaining much prestige in Africa, especially in Kenya, where the Mau Mau rebellion was raging at the moment. However, a week before Dulles made his statement, C. L. Sulzberger had written in The New York Times:

Communism as an ideological force is not yet widely understood in Africa. But, as one Negro remarked to this writer, "If people call it Communism every time we try to help ourselves, it causes many of us to think there must be something good in it."178


An African opinion was expressed by Tom Mboya, the Kenya politician, who said that "... many parts of Asia and independent Africa have remained neutral in the ideological struggle between East and West."\textsuperscript{179} He said simply that Africans preferred to be listed as "don't know" in the poll of world opinion.

The cold war was injected into the relations with Africa. American officials felt that they could not discount the influence Russia was apparently developing in the continent, especially after the Afro-Asian Conference of 1957 to which the Russians and Chinese were invited.\textsuperscript{180}

Coincidentally, 1957 was the year of the formation of the African Bureau in the Department of State.

It seems that there was a lack of common understanding about the substance of the cold war. The United States viewed it as encompassing all the world in a titanic struggle which would see the emergence of one strong power dominating all the rest. The Africans tended to view it as


a struggle between two supremely strong nations in which the smaller nations could not afford to participate directly.

But, it has been suggested that the rivalry of the United States and Russia, lately also China, has been the "sinews" of African diplomacy. They have pitted the two large powers against one another, playing a dangerous game. Were it not for the existence and rivalry of the large powers, African nations would have no leverage at all in their diplomacy. 181

IV. AFRICAN NATIONALISM

The United States often seems to have incorrectly estimated the nature and strength of the nationalist movement in Africa.

One mistake was to view the African pronouncements as reflecting a Soviet line of thought simply because they sounded somewhat like the propaganda emanating from Moscow. The Africans were militant, non-aligned, socialistic, and had similar methods, goals and terms of reference. 182


Because the Africans sounded much like Moscow in their attacks on the Western Europeans in Africa, American policy was formed on the assumption that this was true.

The national movement began in 1944 as a study group. In 1946 it became the Kenya African Union, and James Gichuru was the first president. Jomo Kenyatta returned to Kenya in 1947, after years of residence in Britain and travel to other places, including Moscow, and was made president of the Kenya African Union.183

The Mau Mau uprising began in 1948 and the government banned numerous organizations, which were promptly replaced by new ones. By 1953 an article in Commonweal described the armed state of the settlers in Kenya, and held Jomo Kenyatta responsible.184

The fear of many was that Mau Mau was an extension of Russia's design to foment rebellion in colonial areas in order to benefit by the confusion.185 And, it is true that some native organizations in Kenya were approved by the Russians. The mistake of the United States was to confuse the voice of


African nationalism with that of Moscow when they happened to harmonize. Cyril Bryner, writing in *Current History* at the time said:

"But Soviet approval has never been permanent endorsement. It is difficult to distinguish in many native leaders of these regions whether they are talking with the voice of Moscow or of the London School of Economics. In any case, they speak in very personal voices." 186

By comparing the voices of the nationalists with that of Moscow, the United States missed many nuances that might have been heard there. An article in *Nation*, written in December, 1953, contained one of those notes of despair. Elizabeth E. Hoyt quotes a Kenya student:

"Help to get education for the Kikuyu . . . Help to spread understanding of the tensions that torment us. You could find a way to do that without offending anybody, perhaps by speaking through the United Nations. Those are the important things because they are the foundation of everything else." 187

It was reported to *The New York Times* by C. L. Sulzberger that there was little Communism in Africa generally, and he stated, " . . . it is also true of Kenya, 

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where the Mau Mau terrorists are giving the British colonial government a great deal of trouble . . . ."\textsuperscript{188}

But, the United States temporized in the case of Kenya, giving support to the British because the United States believed that, "... where there is revolutionary smoke there must be Communist fire."\textsuperscript{189}

The substance of this policy was an ambivalence, which tried to retain the respect of both the British and the nationalists.

The answer must be one that meets the needs of the black African and allays the fears of his white countryman; that gives the black what he is entitled to as a human being without depriving the white African of his status.\textsuperscript{190}

American experience in relation to Tanganyika was happier, probably because the circumstance was vastly different, in that Tanganyika was a Trusteeship Territory, mandated to Britain under the League of Nations, and renewed under the United Nations, giving the world body a strong voice in the administration of the territory. The United


\textsuperscript{189}Ibid.

States was given a place on the Trusteeship Council, making it directly involved in the development of Trusteeships.

However, in 1952, the United States voted to sustain the colonial government of Tanganyika in the action depriving the Wameru tribe of ancestral lands.\textsuperscript{191}

The Tanganyika African National Union was organized by Julius Nyerere in 1954, out of the old Tanganyika African Association.\textsuperscript{192}

The report of the Visiting Mission of the Trusteeship Council in late 1954 estimated that Tanganyika would be able to gain self-government "... within the present generation on the basis of a political time-table."\textsuperscript{193}

The question of self-government was raised again within the Council during 1955 and Mason Sears, United States' Representative, sided with Britain's view that a target date should not be set. The final vote was three favoring adoption of the report, two rejecting it, and seven abstentions. Russia was one of those who abstained.\textsuperscript{194}


\textsuperscript{192}"Africa: Who is Safe?" Time, 83:30, March 13, 1964.


But, the weight of the Trusteeship Council was supporting the Africans, and in 1958 Africans were given representation in the Legislative Council of the Tanganyika Government.\textsuperscript{195}

TANU, the political party of Nyerere, was well organized by that time, and it was being financed to the extent that it then had a fleet of ten Land-Rover automobiles and had some eight hundred officials receiving salaries.\textsuperscript{196}

Tanganyika achieved independence in 1961, and at that time maintained the best of relationships with the United States.

Uganda and Zanzibar were special entities which already had highly developed governmental bodies. When they came to the point of independence, it was merely a matter of the withdrawal of the British from the physical domain. Thus, the United States was not faced with the problems which she faced in regard to Kenya and Tanganyika. In those countries she had to decide whether she would support the establishment of governments where there had never been governments, while in Uganda and Zanzibar, the governmental units had existed prior to British control.


\textsuperscript{196}Nye, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 101.
The latter 1950's saw the United States change from a policy which recognized British sovereignty over the African states, to that of support for indigenous rule.\textsuperscript{197} Africa was rapidly assuming the role of full partner in world politics.

Slowly, the United States had come to recognize that Nationalism, not Communism was the ideology of the mid-century years. Senator J. W. Fulbright expressed the percept in the following words:

Nationalism, I believe is the most powerful single force in the world politics of the twentieth century, more powerful than communism or democracy or any other system of ideas about social organization.\textsuperscript{198}

V. NEUTRALISM, OR NON-ALIGNMENT

Having misunderstood the nature of African nationalism in relation to the struggle between the super powers, the United States also misconstrued the meaning of the Africans when they spoke of being neutral.


Aside from the influence of a national tradition in which the principles of equality and independence had occupied a central place, it was fully realized in Washington that the emergence of new African states was altering the distribution of political power in the world, especially in the United Nations, in a manner that made it increasingly imperative to pay attention to African attitudes.199

Africans were quick to recognize the leverage they possessed because of the cold war, and they began to take advantage of that power. The Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Belgrade in 1961, attracted ten African states. That conference was preceded by a preliminary meeting in Cairo, which defined a non-aligned country in the following way. A non-aligned country would: pursue independent policies of peaceful co-existence; would not participate in multi-lateral military alliances such as NATO, SEATO, and CENTO; would support liberation and independence movements; would not enter into bi-lateral military alliances with the great powers.200

Africa had no reason to become involved in the cold war. It had enough problems without restricting its alternatives in the international arena. Kenyatta was


once quoted as saying, in the words of an African proverb, "When two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers." If Africa became involved in the East-West struggle directly, then the newly independent governments would be the losers.

Washington and Moscow wanted them to become involved. That was the policy of Dulles. He insisted that each nation must take part in the struggle, and not to do so was moral turpitude. He did not believe that one could indeed remain neutral.

But, Africans insisted otherwise. Julius Nyerere asserted that the Africans would indeed be able and intended to be neither Western Democrats nor Communists. Nyerere did not assert that Africans would be indifferent to the developments in the international arena, rather, he indicated that neutrality was not the intention of Africa, but independence.

Tom Mboya expressed the principle in the following manner:


202Legum, op. cit., p. 114.

203Kohn and Sokolsky, op. cit., p. 17.
Neutralism in the foreign policy of African states simply means that they will not take sides permanently and automatically with either the United States or the Soviet Union. We intend to decide on every international issue on its merits.204

The new states are concerned about their integrity as states, and are guarding jealously the right to determine their own directions. Nyerere said:

The first responsibility of the government--its first principle--is the protection of Tanzania's independence and its freedom to determine its own policies, both internal and external.205

This concern for the viability of their infant countries has led East Africans often to take an anti-American attitude. Many Americans have indicated dismay when such attitudes were expressed in official communications and positions of the governments. However, Mr. Nyerere cogently explained this circumstance in an article in Africa Report, when he said:

... until independence, the West never had to consider Tanzania at all. It was automatically "on their side." Now they find that our support is not assured--and this results in an illogical

204 Mboya, Freedom and After, p. 235.

belief that we have become "unfriendly." They have not yet accustomed themselves to the idea that we are independent, and that our friendship will now be genuine but our decisions will be our own.206

The Tanzanian President used the analogy of a football game to describe his country's policy of neutrality. It was the intention of Tanzania to win the game for itself. Tanzania has no other object in the international arena than that of its own security and advancement.207

If the East African states, especially Tanzania, have seemed to be anti-Western, the reason is that the West has been more involved in that area than any other power. Nyerere admits that Tanzanian utterances and policies have been hostile to the West on occasion, but justifies this by saying, "... both before and after independence, Western countries have interfered more actively--for both good and evil--in Africa than have the Eastern powers."208

The neutrality of the African states has led them to reject military alliances with all powers. They have felt that to allow the establishment, or continuance of bases on

206 Ibid., p. 63.  
207 Ibid., p. 61.  
208 Ibid., p. 63.
their soil would make them immediate targets in the event of another general war. Consequently, the Kenyans have insisted that Britain liquidate its bases on their soil, and the forces of the West have been withdrawn from East African soil. Such a policy has not been viewed with equanimity by the West, since the absence of military power in East Africa makes sources of strategic minerals vulnerable in case of war with the Communist states.

One result of such a neutral policy has been that the West has decreased its aid to that part of the world. And, Julius Nyerere wrote a defense of his policy in Africa Report saying, "If our determination to pursue this objective annoys some people who might otherwise have assisted us in our economic development, what are we supposed to do? Abandon our objective?"

Recent developments in Tanzania have indicated that that country fully intends to remain aloof from the power struggle between the American and Russian governments.

Many have thought that East Africa was drifting dangerously close to orbit in the Communist galaxy. But, a number of blunders, by the Chinese in particular, have

209Mboya, Freedom and After, p. 236.

210Nyerere, op. cit., p. 67.
indicated that the leaders of those countries have not been mesmerized by the Orientals.

In August, 1965, a Chinese correspondent was expelled from Kenya because of his activities in the political arena. From that point, relations between the United States and Kenya began to grow more cordial. Richard P. Stebbins summed up the situation in this way:

Nowhere was this apparent reaction against Communist interference more noticeable than in Kenya, whose venerable President, Jomo Kenyatta, was actively engaged in curbing the pro-Communist maneuvers of Vice-President Oginga Odinga. "It is naive to think there is no danger of imperialism from the East," Kenyatta declared. "In World power politics the East has as much designs [sic] upon us as the West."212

The crux of the situation arrived in the person of Chou en Lai, who visited Tanzania in 1965. While making an address in Dar es Salaam, he made the mistake of saying that an "... exceedingly favorable situation for revolution prevails today in Africa."213

Kenya immediately issued a statement that she would avert all revolutions, for her own position was not yet

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211"From One, Many," Newsweek, 66:45, August 9, 1965.


secure, and Nyerere took the trouble to say that his government's position was one of non-alignment with the Communist states as well as the West. 214 The Chinese had also failed to fully appreciate the strength of the East African determination to remain independent of the power blocs of the world.

Russia, too, suffered in the eyes of the East Africans, when a number of students returned from Moscow because of the treatment that had been accorded them there, and because of the death of a Ghanaian student under suspicious circumstances. 215

Tom Mboya has declared that, "there are already several examples of occasions when Asian and African states have successfully influenced the United Nations in the interests of world peace." 216 Clearly, that is the hope of the East Africans. They wish to exert their influence upon the great powers and to enhance their own goals and power, in the hope that a third power can be made viable in the present power struggle.


215 Ibid., p. 199.

216 Mboya, Freedom and After, p. 236.
VI. COLONIALISM

Perhaps nothing has affected the United States' relations with East Africa more than the issue of colonialism. Previous reference has been made to the United States' commitment to an anti-colonial policy. Major policy statements over the past twenty years frequently have indicated such a stand. The question is whether the commitment has always been real or merely for the record.

The discussion of colonialism was begun as early as 1944 when Julian Huxley wrote an article for the New Republic about the colonies and freedom for dependent peoples. In the article, Huxley scored the United States because the discussion of colonialism always was in regard to British colonialism. He spoke of a period measured in decades before independence could be considered for the dependent territories of Britain. 217

An answer to the Huxley article was made by Melville J. Herskovits, in which he spoke of the American experience in the Philippines as an indication of what might be expected of dependent peoples. He advocated "... freedom for

all men and women to live their lives in their own ways, and in terms of those ways of life, to govern themselves."  

Herskovits also wrote an article in 1944, for Foreign Affairs, in which he cited Uganda as an example of the ability of Africans to govern themselves. Uganda was a standard example of the Africans' capacity to organize themselves politically. Herskovits called for sincere, effective preparation of the native peoples for independence.  

Walter Sulzbach, writing in the American Scholar, cited the necessity of restricting the sovereignty of the national states of the world if conflicts were to be settled peaceably, and he said, "The solution of the colonial problem lies in the same direction. There is no other choice if national liberty is to exist without the complement of international anarchy."  

The issue was joined before the war had ended. The United States called for an end to colonialism in the post-war era. Her allies insisted that there was neither moral nor political grounds for doing so. On the contrary, as has

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218 Ibid., p. 101.
already been cited, Britain and the United States were dependent upon the strategic metals and the strategic defense value of East and Central Africa for the support of their massive production of goods.

Because of preoccupation in Europe with Russia's threat to expand farther toward the Western Allies, Truman and his colleagues were not in a position to pursue the matter of independence for Britain's colonies, especially those of Africa.

In 1952, the North African scene began to burn with the fires of rebellion. Egypt forced the abdication of its king, and revolutionaries took over the country. And Russia began to attack the West on the colonial issue.\textsuperscript{221}

Colin Legum has written:

Two important events intervened between the last Pan-African Congress (1945) and the first Conference of Independent African States (1958). The first was Egypt's February 23rd Revolution (1952) which marks the breakthrough of modern Arab nationalism; the second was the Bandung Conference (1955) which was symptomatic of Asia's arrival on the world scene.\textsuperscript{222}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{221}The \textit{New York Times}, February 3, 1952, page 3.
\item \textsuperscript{222}Legum, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 39.
\end{itemize}
These two events heralded the entrance of former colonial states into the world arena. After this time the newer states could be ignored no longer. The West was forced to accept and evaluate their judgment of world affairs. The weapon of the newly independent countries was the United Nations. The new states were admitted to membership in the organization and proceeded to make it do their bidding, as evaluated by the Council on Foreign Relations:

The primary function of the United Nations, in the eyes of its founders, had been the adjustment of disputes among individual states, not the accommodation of a quasi-revolutionary movement which in fact was sweeping over half a world and respected neither political boundaries nor legal and administrative forms. 223

The Charter of the United Nations was filled with idealistic statements which promised equal rights and self-determination, and was interpreted by the newer nations to mean that foreign rule over dependent peoples would have to be brought to an end. 224

Subjugated people of the world were uniting and they were determined that colonialism would end. That determination was not lost on the United States, for the African

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224 Ibid., p. 250.
Bureau was created in 1957, in response to the evident need to establish contact with the African states themselves, rather than conduct future business through the European sections of the State Department.

President Eisenhower indicated 1960 as the year of real re-evaluation, saying:

In early 1960, when the independence movement really began to snowball, it became obvious that our traditional policy of refraining from involvement in areas considered to be under the hegemony of other nations had to be re-examined.225

Why the re-examination did not take place sooner was not explained by Eisenhower, for in his second inaugural speech in 1957, the President said, concerning the colonies, "There harshly blow the winds of change."226 However, the United States was reluctant to abandon the status quo, in dealing with the dependent states, until 1960.

Henry Cabot Lodge manifested the changed attitude of the United States in his participation in the Security Council debate, even at the risk of arousing the ire of friendly nations, such as the Union of South Africa.227


226Ibid., p. 103.

In gearing its policy to broad support of African nationalist aspirations, the United States faced hazards potentially more serious than the alienation of some tens of thousands of white East Africans.\textsuperscript{228}

Included in the risks assumed in supporting the anti-colonialism of the Africans was the possibility that they would align themselves with the Communist bloc, or that they would deny the West access to their rich stores of raw materials.

However, before it is concluded that the policy of the United States had taken a complete turn about, it should be noted that in regard to the resolution presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations in December, 1960, the United States abstained from voting. The following excerpt from Schlesinger's book, \textit{A Thousand Days}, is enlightening:

Our delegation even had the concurrence of the State Department in Washington in its desire to vote for the resolution. But the British were opposed, and Harold Macmillan called Eisenhower by transatlantic telephone to request American abstention. When an instruction to abstain arrived from the White House, James J. Wadsworth, then our ambassador to the UN, tried to reach Eisenhower to argue the case. Eisenhower declined to accept his call. Wadsworth loyally defended the American abstention in the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{229}


\textsuperscript{229}Schlesinger, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 510.
Such a performance, after the President had appeared before the Assembly to present a plan for the aid of the African states, hardly testified to a change of policy with regard to colonialism.\textsuperscript{230}

Of much significance also was the fact that in the debate Khruschev demanded the immediate liquidation of colonial holdings, and the Soviet Union was listed as voting in the affirmative on the resolution, while the United States and eight other non-Communist states abstained.\textsuperscript{231}

Additionally, the United States abstained on an African resolution which called for the recognition of Africa as a "denuclearized zone."\textsuperscript{232}

John F. Kennedy brought a new interest to the government concerning Africa. He took the first opportunity to reverse the impression made in December, 1960, by the Eisenhower Administration. The resolution on Angola gave him a chance, and shortly afterward he expressed verbally his sympathy for the people of Africa in their struggle.\textsuperscript{233}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[230]Bretton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 460.
\item[233]Schlesinger, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 556.
\end{footnotes}
Schlesinger gave this opinion of Kennedy's view of colonialism: "... Kennedy saw it as inherently non-genteel and probably inseparable from disorder, excess and a certain bitterness toward the West."\textsuperscript{234} In his view, to strengthen the African states would be to preserve the favorable attitudes of the governments of the new states, whether or not they accepted the system of the United States.\textsuperscript{235} Khruschev taunted Kennedy about American policy in regard to colonialism. He suggested that Kennedy's policy was uneven and timid and that:

... it might endorse anti-colonialism for tactical reasons, but its heart was with the colonialists. Why not adopt the Soviet policy of tolerance and non-interference?\textsuperscript{236}

American influence had a part in the demise of colonialism. In many ways, official and private, intentional and unintentional, idealistic and selfish, the United States has presented the picture of a state which is opposed to the foreign rule of any people.

However, no matter what the American contribution may have been, American foreign policy conduct over the years appears to have been more responsive to the facts of United

\textsuperscript{234}Ibid., p. 508.  
\textsuperscript{235}Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{236}Ibid., p. 364.
States domestic and of international politics than to humanitarian, idealistic goals.\textsuperscript{237}

Probably, there is nothing more deflating to an American than to discover that his government has been and is now following a policy that is dictated by sheer politics rather than by high idealism.

VII. AFRICAN SOCIALISM

Socialism, regardless of its qualifying word, is not a well respected concept in the United States. Because of this, there has been an attitude of suspicion when the Africans speak of their own peculiar brand of Socialism.

The contrast between traditional African society and the modern industrial society of the West is striking. As Mboya has observed, the acquisitive instinct in the West has been responsible for many of the excesses to be found there, and this acquisitive instinct is largely lacking within the traditional African society.\textsuperscript{238}

Barbara Ward, writing in The New York Times in 1952, stated that "... hitherto, the transfer of wealth to

\textsuperscript{237}Bretton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 444.

\textsuperscript{238}Mboya, \textit{Freedom and After}, p. 163.
other areas has been thought of almost exclusively in terms of profit."239

Julius Nyerere has pointed out the genius of the African society:

Traditionally we lived as families, with individuals supporting each other and helping each other on terms of equality. We recognized that each of us had a place in the community, and this place carried with it rights to whatever food and shelter was available in return for the use of whatever abilities and energies we had. The old, and the sick, or those whose crops had been destroyed by natural disasters, were not left alone in their suffering.240

Nyerere recognized the difficulty involved in transferring the traditional values to the modern social organization, yet, he apparently intends to try to retain the purpose of the traditional society saying:

... The purpose remains the same as in the traditional society. That is, the welfare of every individual in the context of the needs of the society of which he is a member.241

The fear of the Capitalist society that Socialism produces laziness is countered by the citation of an old


240 Nyerere, op. cit., p. 67.

241 Ibid.
African proverb which says, "Mgeni siku mbili; siku ya tatu mpe jembe," (Treat your guest as a guest for two days; on the third day give him a hoe).  

The land is a crucial point in the African concept, for it is the one source of wealth for the great majority of the population. Contrasted with the Western view of land as personal property, the African traditional society is undeniably egalitarian. Any member of the society has available to him the means of subsistence. He cannot be denied that right so long as he is a responsible participant in the group life.  

Mboya has said that:  

The practice of African Socialism involves trying to use what is relevant and good in these African customs to create new values in the changing world of the money economy, to build an economy which reflects the thinking of the great majority of the people. Few Africans are so Westernized and de-tribalized that these attitudes no longer have their hold on them.  

In the effort to establish viable states in areas that are united by tenuous national feelings, the African statesmen are seeking to utilize the traditional social organization, which is socialistic, to promote the feeling

\[242\text{Mboya, Freedom and After, p. 163.}\]
\[243\text{Ibid., p. 164.}\]
\[244\text{Ibid., p. 163.}\]
\[245\text{Ibid., p. 167.}\]
of commonality. This is called "familyhood" by Nyerere and may be found in varying definitions in the statements of other apologists of the African cause.  

That the concept of African Socialism is greatly different from Western Capitalism is not questioned. Nyerere has made the contrast in very strong terms. But, it is pointed out by Tom Mboya that African Socialism is also unlike European Socialism. These men are saying that they are trying to organize African life in a peculiarly African way, not patterned on life in other areas of the world.

Julius Nyerere has expressed the aim of the African leaders:

We need to live harmoniously among ourselves; we need to safeguard our society; we need to respect ourselves and deserve the respect of others. These things are equally important. "Man does not live by bread alone."  

\[\text{\textsuperscript{246}}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 168.}\]  
\[\text{\textsuperscript{247}}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 169.}\]  
\[\text{\textsuperscript{248}}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 167.}\]  
\[\text{\textsuperscript{249}}\text{Nyerere, op. cit.}, \text{p. 67.}\]
VIII. THE ONE-PARTY STATE

Most of the new African states have adopted a one-party political system. With a few notable exceptions, they have seen fit to either continue the single party which brought them to independence, or to unite all parties into one national party after independence has been achieved.\textsuperscript{250}

Western leaders have been critical of the single-party system because it seems inconsistent with the concept of democracy which they cherish. They have argued that it gives rise to dictatorships which will not allow the formation of opposition parties, or, at best, will not allow them to function as true oppositions.\textsuperscript{251}

President Nyerere has entered a plea for understanding of the difficulties involved in consolidating the fruits of independence, and asking for time to develop the institutions of political life necessary for the functioning of a modern state.\textsuperscript{252}


\textsuperscript{251}Ibid., p. 8.

"African arguments supporting the single-party system are based on both pragmatic and theoretical grounds."\textsuperscript{253} African leaders claim that a strong power is needed in the initial stages of independence, and that there is no necessity for multi-party arrangements in order to maintain democracy. Also, Sulzberger observed, "Democracy, as defined in terms of the present broad world cleavages, has provided no answers other than shibboleths."\textsuperscript{254}

Mboya presented the following argument to support the claim of Africans that they do maintain democracy:

A government which gives all citizens the right to vote, the right to contest elections and the right to express themselves freely inside and outside of parliament is not undemocratic.\textsuperscript{255}

Mboya also says that the opposition parties must develop naturally, out of the issues which present themselves to the country, not because the political science textbooks say so.\textsuperscript{256} The Africans are well aware of the

\textsuperscript{253}Cowan, \textit{loc. cit.}


\textsuperscript{256}Legum, \textit{op. cit.}, p.123.
length of time it has required to develop the political institutions of the West, and that those institutions are still developing. Therefore, they do not accept the Western definition of democracy, which seems to require simply more than one party.257

Nyerere has said that an opposition party is a matter of indifference, because it will not affect the free discussion of the issues, or the equality found in that freedom of discussion.258

According to Nyerere, the substance of democracy is freedom of discussion and equality among those who participate.259 If these are maintained, then democracy is a fact, even though a political opposition may not be organized. The Western structure is considered alien to African society and incompatible with its goals and psychology.260

The question for the United States is whether it can accept a definition of democracy which runs counter to popular concepts, in the special case of Africa. The matter seems to cause no difficulty in regard to other countries such as Portugal, Spain, and the South American countries.

257 Cowan, op. cit., p. 9.
258 Legum, op. cit., p. 123.
259 Ibid., p. 122.
260 Cowan, op. cit., p. 11.
Further, will reaction to the African concepts of democracy adversely affect American aid to those new countries?

IX. CONCLUSION

The foregoing are some of the issues which have affected the relationships between the East African countries, especially Tanzania, and the United States.

The United States has been sensitive to these matters throughout the period discussed here. And, the sensitivity of the government to the possibility of African support or rejection has caused relations to become strained at times. A careful inquiry into the significance of African ideas and customs might aid in the establishment of more harmonious relationships with East African governments.
CHAPTER V

THE ECONOMIC FACTORS

The waning days of World War II saw the United States faced with a formidable economic problem. How could the government prevent the collapse of the economy when the heavy demand upon its productive facilities by war no longer existed?\(^{261}\) The country was faced with the necessity of converting the economy from wartime production to a peacetime basis.

A solution to the problem began while the war still was in progress. The administration viewed the problem as one of prime importance.\(^{262}\) The obvious answer lay in securing foreign markets for the produce of the economy. This meant that a liberalization of world trade would have to be effected and the free flow of goods allowed.\(^{263}\)

Alvin W. Hansen suggested three means to achieve a balance in international trade and production:


\[^{262}\text{Tbid.}\]

\[^{263}\text{Tbid.}\]
The main means to achieve international equilibriums are (a) the promotion of full employment in the industrially mature countries, and especially in the United States, (b) the development and industrialization of the backward countries designed to change the structure of their economies, and (c) a liberalization of commercial and tariff policies throughout the world, and notably in the United States. 264

Hansen also suggested that the end of the war signalled a change in the economic relationships of the nations of the world. He asserted that the old routine of exchanging raw materials for the finished product would end and a new, complex trade between highly diversified economies would emerge. 265

An international conference was called in 1944 for the purpose of dealing with the post-war economic problem. The Bretton-Woods Conference dealt with the necessity of the United States, and other countries, to maintain the export sectors of their economies. 266

Bankers objected to the establishment of the International Monetary Fund, which would maintain an equilibrium among the industrial nations of the world. They charged

265Ibid., p. 19.
266Rippy, op. cit., p. 10.
that such an organization would introduce lending methods
which were not in keeping with accepted credit principles. 267
While the bankers did not object to the United States play-
ing a role in the international economy, they did have some-
thing to say about the methods used in performing that role.

The primary concern of the planners in the last stages
of the war was the ability of the United States and Britain
to maintain their positions in the production and trade of
the world. 268

Adolf A. Berle, Jr. has suggested that the United
States had three alternatives in the post-war economic world.
One was to persuade the government to conquer as much terri-
tory as was necessary for the purpose. Another was to enter
into direct competition for sources of raw materials and
markets. The third, and feasible one, was to enter into
cartels with the Europeans in the allocation of raw materi-
als and markets. 269

The last of these suggestions is the one adopted by
international businessmen, because it was necessary.

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267 "Bretton-Woods Conference," *Time*, 45:86,
February 12, 1945.


269 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., *The Twentieth Century
Capitalist Revolution* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
But, the government frowned upon such activity, and prohibited the formation of such organizations in the domestic sector, which suggests an ambivalence on the part of the government. Domestically it did not allow the practices which it condoned, of necessity, abroad.

Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius said, in his report to President Truman after the San Francisco conference, that economic prosperity for the United States involved restoration of other economies of the world.\textsuperscript{270}

The policy of the United States then began to point to the assistance of other governments. By strengthening the economies of other states, the United States would be strengthening her own economy. President Truman justified his program of aid with the assertion that a two per cent rise in living standards in Asia and Africa would keep Western industry booming for a century.\textsuperscript{271}

Three external forces raised the sensitivity of the United States to events in the world economy. They were the Soviet-bloc rivalry, the intervention of the less

\textsuperscript{270}Rippy, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{271}Truman, 1946-52, \textit{Years of Trial and Hope}, p. 275.
developed nations in international relations, and the strong competition of Western Europe and Japan.\textsuperscript{272}

The phenomenon called "Soviet effect" was noticeable throughout the post-war era.\textsuperscript{273} The results of the reaction to Soviet action were seen in every area of economics:

In the sphere of United States foreign policy in particular, Soviet-bloc rivalry dominated the magnitude and direction of the government's foreign aid program, totaling almost $73 billion between mid-1945 and the end of 1959.\textsuperscript{274}

So, the policy of the United States was based on at least two principles. One was the need to strengthen the export sector of the economy by aiding other economies. The other was the reaction to the Soviet initiative.

Whatever the motives may have been, the policy of the government in the post-war world was to allow American capital to flow out to the rest of the world, particularly Europe, in order that those countries might become importers of United States goods. In this way the United States became an exporting nation rather than an importing nation.\textsuperscript{275}


\textsuperscript{273}Ibid., p. 258. \textsuperscript{274}Ibid., p. 17.

\textsuperscript{275}Ibid., p. 20.
Interest in Africa developed along with the normal interest in overseas investment. The United States had always had a sizeable interest in South Africa, and the export of capital caused outflows of money to that country as well as other areas that were of strategic importance or were promising fields for investment. 276 Also, it was recognized that the very size of American businesses made them determinative in the economies of other nations. 277

When Eisenhower became President the ideology did not change. He comments:

"When shallow critics denounce the profit motive inherent in our system of private enterprise, they ignore the fact that it is the economic support of every human right we possess and that without it all rights would soon disappear." 278

Harold G. Vatter makes this statement:

Review of American foreign policy in the 1950's has revealed a persistent conflict between historic mercantilistic drives and a new sensitivity to the economic needs of other nations. Morality and utopian notions of selflessness aside, it is


277 Berle, op. cit., p. 119.

difficult not to see the mercantilistic considerations in every major aspect of policy. 279

Materialism is inherent in capitalism. There is no way by which the system may be anything else, in its present form. The surprising thing is that so few Americans seem to recognize that they are materialistic. The materialistic outlook is readily evident to foreigners who come to this country, however. One student from Kenya has commented that American fear of Communism was based on the assumption that it would take away their wealth and possessions. He further stated:

Whenever I have been given a ride to the college by my fellow students I am asked, "Do you like cars?" or "Do you have many cars in Kenya?" or "What type of houses do you live in?" or "Do you like TV?" To me there is nothing wrong with asking these questions except that they reveal the kind of things you live for. Nobody has yet asked me how we are trying to develop Kenya or what Kenya's real needs are as she approaches the day of her independence. 280

The United States proceeded to build up a prodigious economic capacity. And, coupled with the productive

279 Vatter, op. cit., p. 279.

capacity of other nations of the world, mankind had the resources and the power to wipe poverty from its midst. 281

Near the end of his tenure as President, Eisenhower began to stress the need of Africa south of the Sahara, and to make provision for the development of that area in the foreign aid enactments of Congress. He proposed, in 1960, a special allocation of $20 million to initiate a program of education and training in the southern part of Africa. 282

The United States realized its mistake in underestimating the virulence of the national movements in Africa. Now it began a concerted effort toward regaining the confidence of the new states. As Nyerere said, the United States had missed its opportunity in regard to the freedom movements, but it could still claim opportunities in the economic field. 283

That the economic policy of the United States was directed toward the enhancement of its own position seems clear. DeVeere E. Pentony has remarked:


283Ibid.
The economic interests of the United States in the growth of the less developed members of the Free World community are real, but probably not critical, in relation to the total size of our economy. Nevertheless, development of a part of the world containing over a billion people who now produce and consume too little could hardly fail to add to the size of our foreign trade, perhaps to increase it considerably. It should also enrich American lives by increasing the variety of goods in our markets, and by increasing opportunities for work and travel abroad. 284

Schlesinger has said that by 1960 the foreign aid policy of the United States had stagnated, both in its concepts and programs. 285 The Kennedy Administration set out to remedy the situation, as it conceived the problem. Kennedy is quoted by Schlesinger:

"The fundamental task of our foreign aid program in the 1960's is not negatively to fight communism: its fundamental task is to help make a historical demonstration that in the twentieth century, as in the nineteenth--in the southern half of the globe as in the north--economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand." 286

Kennedy asserted that the goal of American aid to the African states should not be to make them pawns in

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the cold war. He felt that the cold war angle had been overemphasized as the only apparent way to persuade Congress to vote necessary funds.\footnote{287 The New York Times, July 6, 1959, page 26.} Significant, however, is the fact that funds for foreign aid declined during Kennedy's Administration.\footnote{288 Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 599.}

The enlightening report of the Clay Committee, which investigated the activities of the Agency for International Development, reveals the extent to which the United States government was committed to the profit motive. Schlesinger remarks:

\ldots Buried in the report was a systematic hostility to forms of development which did not yield private profit. Most of the changes it proposed were intended to promote American private investment. Some abroad read the document as a statement of the thesis that the point of foreign aid was to facilitate the penetration of the developing world by American business.\footnote{289 Ibid., p. 598.}

Perhaps most revealing of all is the statement made by G. Mennen Williams in 1964:

When our AID program provides a bulldozer, or a shipload of wheat from our farm surplus, the story does not end at that point. The first shipment may be paid for by a grant or a loan
provided by the U. S. taxpayer. But bulldozers need spare parts and must be replaced one day, and telecommunication networks are often extended. Even dietary habits may change through increased use of American food products. New tastes and needs for American products can lead to new commercial sales, and this development can be an important end result of our AID program around the world.290

Then, the economic policy of the United States since 1945 has had as its goals the rebuilding of European economies, the establishment of a sound economy in newly independent states, the isolation and weakening of the Soviet Union, and the enhancement of its own economy.291

This study is now concerned with the directions this policy took in the years since 1945, particularly in relation to East Africa.

I. THE DIRECTIONS OF UNITED STATES' ECONOMIC POLICY

The Marshall Plan, which provided for rebuilding the war-ravaged areas of Europe, met with great success. As the effectiveness of the plan continued, the administration began


to look for new areas of penetration. Greece was aided in 1947 in her fight against the Communist effort to take over the country, and Turkey also received aid.292

Additionally, the International Monetary Fund was in operation by 1947, dealing only with non-Communist member governments and their banks.293 This fund allowed governments faced with financial difficulty to draw upon the resources of the other member countries when feasible.

In 1949 Truman proposed a plan for aiding countries in economic distress. The fourth point of his plan committed him to a program of direct aid to the underdeveloped countries of the world.294 The plan called for exportation of surplus capital that had been accumulating.295 Under the program, implemented June 5, 1950, and called simply "Point Four,"296 the United States carried the cold war to the Soviets with confidence that the American system would prevail and that stable political systems would

292Truman, 1946-52, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 265.
293Vatter, op. cit., p. 276.
294Truman, 1946-52, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 269.
295Ibid., p. 268.
296Ibid., p. 271.
be established in the newly independent states. Those governments were expected to be friendly to the United States.\textsuperscript{297}

Point Four fulfilled the expectations of the Truman Administration. He remarked in January, 1952:

This is Point Four--our Point Four program at work. It is working--not only in India--but in Iran, in Paraguay and Liberia--in thirty-three countries around the globe. Our technical missionaries are out there. We need more of them. We need more funds to speed their efforts, because there is nothing of greater importance in our foreign policy. There is nothing that shows more clearly what we stand for and what we want to achieve.\textsuperscript{298}

In the same month this statement was made, Walter Van Kirk told a group of missionary executives that Point Four was being diverted from its humanitarian aims and was being used for military purposes and for cold war strategy.\textsuperscript{299}

In March, 1952, Truman submitted a request to the Congress for $5,350,000,000 for foreign aid. Of that amount $4,070,000,000 was to go to Western Europe for weapons. The Middle East and Africa were allotted $656,000,000 in

\textsuperscript{297}Ibid., p. 276.


technical aid and other assistance. In making his request, Truman cited the danger of Communist penetration, but he also said that the United States was dependent on foreign sources of raw materials.\textsuperscript{300}

Several versions of international cooperation organizations were brought forward in the succeeding years. The Economic Cooperation Administration, 1948-51, The Mutual Security Administration, 1951, The Foreign Operations Administration in 1953 and The International Cooperation Administration in 1955 all carried forward the initial goals of the foreign aid programs.\textsuperscript{301}

The Mutual Security Administration attempted to emphasize investment in the less developed areas of the world, but ended with the preponderance of its funds invested in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{302}

The Mutual Security Administration included military goals within its guidelines. Ostensibly, the aim of the M. S. A. was to strengthen the economies of the recipients. Basil Davidson pointed out in 1952 that:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{300} The \textit{New York Times}, March 7, 1952, page 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{301} Schlesinger, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 586.
  \item \textsuperscript{302} Vatter, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 269.
\end{itemize}
though large sums are being spent through the Mutual Security Administration and other agencies to promote certain kinds of industry in colonial territories, such spending is being presented to the world as a contribution to the development of backward areas; in reality it is merely imperialism in a new form.303

Harold G. Vatter makes the point that after the foreign aid organization had been converted from the Economic Cooperation Agency to the Mutual Security Agency, foreign aid became more concerned with military aid than before. Through 1952 military aid amounted to some $6 billion, while 1953-60 saw the amount rise to some $24 billion. The total aid amounts remained rather stable.304

Assistance was notably small for underdeveloped areas of the world; most of the aid given by the United States still went to Europe.305

American interest in Africa centered around the fact that vital raw materials were obtained from Central Africa and strategic metals from mines in East Africa.306


304Vatter, op. cit., p. 271

305Ibid., p. 269.

Because Africa was a politically sensitive area, and demanding recognition, the United States felt it could extend certain forms of aid and encouragement. In so doing, the vulnerable new countries might be saved from Communism, and the vital materials and territory saved for the West. 307

In a message to Congress in 1956 President Eisenhower indicated that it was especially important to encourage forces friendly to the United States, and for that reason he asked Congress to extend aid for certain programs in Africa. 308

Toward the end of the 1950's the geographical distribution of non-military aid shifted from the European area to less developed areas. It then began to center on the areas which were strategic militarily, but were woefully underdeveloped, and whose costs of development were rising precipitously. 309

The value of economic assistance was recognized by those who were coming to power in East Africa. M'boya, writing in Atlantic in 1959, sanctioned American aid and


309 Vatter, op. cit., p. 271.
admitted that the capital and technical skills for development of the African economies had to come from abroad. 310

While some American aid was being sent to the newly independent states, most of the money was going to those countries which had been self-governing for a long time, or which had peculiar interest for the United States. 311

Reflecting the reluctance of the United States to enter the new nations with massive aid, the Eisenhower Administration called upon Europeans to continue supporting the countries of Africa that had once been their colonial territories. 312 However, as 1960 ushered in a great number of new states, the United States offered to assist them. President Kennedy promised that Tanganyika would receive $10 million as a loan, as well as assistance in a three-year development plan. 313 The actual figure amounted to $6.2 million. 314


312 Vatter, op. cit., p. 18.


The Kennedy years saw an increased interest in Africa, but, the continent continued to receive scant attention as compared with the rest of the world.\footnote{Richard P. Stebbins (ed.), \textit{The United States in World Affairs, 1965} (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 192.} And, the United States was warned that it must not expect the recipients of aid to accept it with no qualifications in the terms of agreement.\footnote{Helen Kitchen, "Africa and the Kennedy Era," \textit{New Republic}, 143:17-19, December 12, 1966.}

Mboya, too, sounded a warning note to the United States in regard to what it might expect to gain from the money it expended in East Africa:

I believe that in the past the Americans gave aid in expectation of friendship and even of political support. But increasingly they are becoming aware that such a process brings them in return resentment, rather than friendship. The change in American attitudes over aid has come because the number of independent states has grown and the voice of the colonial powers, finding an echo in the United States, has become weaker. Like everyone else, the Americans have now had to come to grips with the real Africa, meeting and negotiating with African leaders, rather than doing business through the British and French.\footnote{Mboya, \textit{Freedom and After}, p. 241.}

The expectation of many is that the future is where American economic interest lies. As Africa develops it
will require American goods in ever increasing volume, and the demand for African raw materials will correspondingly increase.318

Clearly, then, American economic policy was centered in aiding the economies of the underdeveloped countries of the world, in the hope that such aid would block their drift toward a communistic society and that it would create new demands for Western goods and services, which would enhance the Western economy.

II. AID TO EAST AFRICA

The strategic importance of East Africa in the event of another world conflict has already been alluded to in Chapters I and III, and that importance is readily seen when the communications facilities of East and Central Africa are traced on a map.

The region contains the major portions of the strategic and precious metals being produced by the continent, and it affords the principle facilities for shipping those metals to ports accessible to the West without passing through Suez and the Mediterranean Sea.

One is not surprised to learn of the May, 1953, establishment of a military command in East Africa under Sir George Erskine, just at the time of Egypt's revolution and the establishment of the Nationalist regime.319

The New York Times commented:

The presumption here is that the eastern half of Africa, together with Turkey is going to be called on to replace the center of strength that was Egypt and the Levant when Britain was in control there.320

Also worthy of note is the fact that these events paralleled the establishment of the Central African Federation, composed of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.321

Regarding the United States' grant of aid to the East African countries, it is of interest to note the operation of the Mutual Security Administration in the early 1950's. Basil Davidson gives an account of the establishment of Tanganyika Concessions, an international organization formed to exploit the mineral wealth of East and Central Africa.

320Ibid., p. 10, col. 4.
321Ibid., p. 10, col. 6.
Tanganyika Concessions issued 3,831,412 ordinary shares in April, 1950. The British government sold 1,677,961 shares to an Anglo-Belgian group. In November, 1950:

... 600,000 of these shares had been resold to an American group headed by Ladenburg Thalmann and Company and Lazard Freres of New York, in association with the International Basic Economy Corporation and David Rockefeller—that is, to the Rockefeller interests.322

The extent of the involvement of Tanganyika Concessions in the economy of East and Central Africa may be estimated from the following: the company owns a minority interest in the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga; it operates the uranium mines from which the United States gets ninety per cent of its uranium; it owns ninety per cent of the Benguela Railway which hauls ore to Lobita Bay in Angola; it has a controlling interest in Kentan Gold Areas (Kenya) and Uruwira Minerals in Tanganyika, and it is closely connected with the British South Africa Company, and the Anglo-American Corporation.323

322Davidson, "Cashing in on Old Imperialisms," p. 209.

323Ibid.
From this resume one readily perceives that the organization of the economy of East Africa, especially strategic metals, is complex indeed. But, more complexity is involved, for in 1952 the Mutual Security Administration lent $1,640,000 to Uruwira Minerals, which contracted to repay the loan with lead and copper.\(^{324}\)

John Gunther commented that, "By and large FOA and Point Four are much less conspicuous in colonial territories than in the independent states, like Libya and Liberia."\(^{325}\) He went on to say that American technical help had been promised for East Africa.

The Mutual Security Administration was intended to aid small businesses rather than agriculture. Accordingly, Kenya was denied a request for $2.8 million for agricultural aid, while Uganda and Tanganyika were granted assistance to stimulate small industry.\(^{326}\)

The limitation of grants to small industry leaves a discrepancy to be accounted for when one remembers that the M. S. A. granted the rather large loan to Uruwira Minerals,
which was in the business of mining a strategic metal for airplane construction.\textsuperscript{327}

The importance of East Africa in the estimation of the United States, and the direction of its aid policies, may be seen in the fact that in 1953 and 1954, $1,680,000 were granted to Tanganyika for the rebuilding of a road from Iringa to Morogoro.\textsuperscript{328} This road connects the Great North Road with the port city of Dar es Salaam. The improvement of the road to Dar es Salaam assured the Uruwira Minerals of better communications with shipping in the Indian Ocean, as well as facilitating the movement of other necessities in the event of war.

In addition, £2,390,000 were granted to the East African Railways and Harbors to facilitate the export of sisal and other commodities, and $300,000 was granted to each of the three territories for aid to small industries, in return for various raw materials.\textsuperscript{329}

The New York Times reported in June, 1955, that the United States had granted $4,161,800 to the East African

\textsuperscript{327}United Nations Review, 1:26, May, 1956.


\textsuperscript{329}Ibid.
countries on a matching fund basis. In that amount was
$3,887,300 for development in Kenya.\textsuperscript{330} Tanganyika had
the most value so far as strategic metals and communications were concerned, but Kenya received the funds.

Kenya had a large investment from Britain in the
settler farming community and small valuable mineral
deposits. Also, her communications were already developed,
in the railway which reached all the way from the port of
Mombasa to Kampala in Uganda.

Uganda received more attention than Kenya, but less
than Tanganyika, because of her production of cotton, coffee,
and copper. Her gross domestic product amounted to $66 per
head of population.\textsuperscript{331}

Coffee exports were restricted by the East African
countries in the 1959 International Coffee Agreement, which
was advocated by the United States.\textsuperscript{332} Cotton and coffee

\begin{footnotes}
\item[331] Adamantioris Pepelasis and others, \textit{Economic
\item[332] Richard P. Stebbins (ed.), \textit{The United States in
pp. 367-68.
\end{footnotes}
exports represented an estimated eighty per cent of Uganda's total foreign sales.\textsuperscript{333}

When United States aid to India, in the form of surplus cotton, threatened to erode the Uganda cotton market in the same country, a protest was made by a representative of another form of American aid to East Africa. Henry Thomas, a graduate student at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who was working with the Uganda Development Corporation, protested to the United States government.\textsuperscript{334}

Through the Uganda Development Corporation, the United States was involved in promoting the economy of Uganda by giving information about investment opportunities in that country, and as operator of some businesses.\textsuperscript{335}

Another M. I. T. fellow was Project Development Officer in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of Tanganyika. He developed the agreement with an Italian firm to build a refinery in that country. Later he advised the government when it acquired an interest in the Tanganyika Meerschaum Company, which was about to cease operations.\textsuperscript{336}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{334} \textit{The New Yorker}, 42:124, March 5, 1966
\item \textsuperscript{335} \textit{Pepelasis, op. cit.}, p. 247.
\item \textsuperscript{336} \textit{The New Yorker}, 42:116, March 5, 1966.
\end{enumerate}
Kenya also had its M. I. T. fellow in the person of Michael Roemer, who helped negotiate a loan from the World Bank. He was Planning Officer in the Treasury in Nairobi.\textsuperscript{337}

Another incident involving a M. I. T. fellow occurred when Michael Christian, who was the Legal Secretary of the East African Common Services Organization, was introduced to a gold smuggler as an American missionary from Tanganyika. He contracted to buy $75,000 worth of gold from the smuggler and his guise of missionary was accepted at face value. It did not seem incongruous to the smuggler.\textsuperscript{338}

The M. I. T. students represented a genuine contribution to the economies and governments of the new East African states. Although they may have seemed to work against the interests of the United States, in reality they served that interest. At the time the concern of the United States was with the establishment of stable and viable governments in the area.

American contributions to East Africa were not all self-serving. Lionel Cliffe wrote in 1964:

\ldots On Independence Day, almost half a million people in the barren Central Region,

\textsuperscript{337}Ibid., p. 128.

\textsuperscript{338}Ibid., p. 134.
where famine is endemic, were being kept alive on free issues of United States surplus corn.339

Similarly, A. J. Meyers wrote regarding Kenya in 1965 that imports of American corn amounted to some $5 million worth. And, "... most U. S. aid to Kenya--amounting to 11.7 million dollars this year--goes into education and agriculture training."340

United States aid to Africa remains small when compared with other areas of the world. David Bell estimated, in May, 1964, that United States aid in Africa amounted to little more than one dollar per capita.341

Arnold Rivkin summed up American attitudes toward Africa in an article in 1965 by saying:

As the continent receiving the smallest segment of our aid (less than 10%), Africa deserves more if we are to give credence to our policy of support for African development.342


III. MULTI-LATERAL AID

Africa, the last continent to experience nationalism, furnished the largest number of states to the United Nations organization. 344

Many leaders of the African states have advocated the use of the United Nations as a channel through which aid would flow from the developed countries to the undeveloped ones. 344

The result was the formation, in 1958, of the Economic Commission for Africa, which divided Africa into five regions. Some reservations were expressed, in fear that the regions might become economic and political entities, making later unity of the whole of Africa more difficult. 345

Meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1961, the Commission adopted a program of development which had been worked out by twenty-four African states. The plan had the tacit approval of the United States. 346


345 Ibid., p. 224.

Tom Mboya has expressed reticence about the effectiveness of the plan with the following comment:

The multi-lateral arrangements through international agencies could help greatly. The only snag here is that Africa is moving on to the international scene at a time when most of the international agencies have been established, and no attempt is being made to reorganize them to take account of the emergence of Africa. So that for some time to come, they will presumably continue to function on the basis of what their original sponsors wanted them to achieve, without considering what is in the best interests of the newer nations. 347

The above situation forced the new states into the position of making bi-lateral agreements for aid. 348 And, they have attempted to safeguard their sovereignty by making such agreements with both East and West. 349

Arnold Rivkin has summed up the Western approach to the multi-lateral aid question by saying that the effort would be basically Western and American, although others would be invited to join. 350 These efforts continue to be the substance of American policy. Regional development

347 Mboya, Freedom and After, p. 181.
348 Ibid., p. 180.
349 Ibid., p. 323.
offers attractive possibilities in the matters of control of funds and future political unification of the continent.

IV. INVESTMENT AND TRADE

An estimate of the market needed to maintain full employment in the United States, after World War II, placed exports near the $10 billion mark.  

By January, 1952, the value of foreign trade of the United States had reached the new high of $25 billion. Such trade was necessitated by the raw material needs of the defense program and the Korean War.

The vital nature of African minerals caused a massive infusion of American capital for the purpose of developing and protecting them.

Basil Davidson called on the United States to use investments for the needs of the African population, as well as exploitation for profit.

A common fear of investors was that their capital would be consumed by the fires of nationalism which were

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evident by the early 1950's. The J. P. Morgan Company was concerned about investment opportunities in Kenya, and the possible results of the Mau Mau rebellion then in progress in that country. The company was assured that Britain would not leave Kenya. 354

At the end of 1952, the direct investment of the United States in Africa was placed at $458 million. That figure compared with $312 million at the end of 1950. Some 52 per cent was invested in petroleum, mainly marketing and distribution, 20 per cent was invested in mining, and 15 per cent was given to manufacturing. 355

John Gunther estimated that the extent of American interest in East Africa was represented in the fact that:

... an American oil company had development licenses for a petroleum survey in northern Kenya, ... and an American automobile assembly plant is to be built at Mombasa. 356

He also mentioned that the Coca Cola Company was engaged in business in Kenya.


American investment in the continent increased 42 per cent between 1953 and 1957, amounting to $573 million in 1957.357 One estimate placed the increase of American investment in Africa since 1945 at 2,500 per cent.358

By 1960, the amount of trade with Africa had reached a total of about $1.2 billion annually, and the investment was placed at more than $600 million.359

When the African states became independent, their leaders insisted that foreign investment and aid be used to serve the needs of their countries, as they defined those needs.360

Private investment in East Africa, by 1960, amounted to some $46 million. One million dollars were invested in mining, $42 millions were invested in petroleum, and $4 millions were invested in trade.361

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360 Bretton, op. cit., p. 456.

361 Karmarck, op. cit., p. 172.
Trade with East Africa in 1961 amounted to $52 million in imports and $19 million in exports. The difference between the two was smoothed out by the infusion of public funds in the forms of grants and loans.

Total trade figures for Africa amounted to 3.2 per cent of United States exports and 3.4 per cent of United States imports. Such figures do not seem large, but they are enough to induce a significant change in the overall demand on the production of the industrial complex of the United States.

The policy of the United States was to encourage the export of capital to other areas of the world, and it underwrote the investments going to high risk places. Tied to the policy of guaranteeing investments by the private sector was the requirement of protective guarantees by the countries to which the investments were going. Such assurances were available in Kenya and Tanganyika by July, 1964.

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362 Ibid., pp. 170-71.


365 Vatter, op. cit., p. 268.
For each of these countries guarantees were available with respect to convertibility, expropriation, and war risk, including guarantees against loss due to revolution and insurrection; also extended risk.³⁶⁶

The East African countries are desirous of foreign capital. President Nyerere stated in 1966, "We want capital investment here so that the amount of wealth which can be produced in Tanzania is increased, and our people will therefore become better off in the future."³⁶⁷

However, Mr. Nyerere goes on to say that his government wants investment for a purpose, and it will be welcome only if it fulfills that purpose.³⁶⁸

Tanzania's intention is that investments will benefit the people as a whole, and not just the investor.³⁶⁹

The article in which Mr. Nyerere made the above assertions was written to defend his policy and its effect upon the development of his country.

It seems reasonable to assume that the infusion of American capital into Africa will continue, especially in


³⁶⁸Ibid.

³⁶⁹Ibid., p. 67.
the areas of strategic metals and petroleum. The future development of the continent holds much promise for the United States as a market for industrial goods, as well as a profitable investment of funds in the exploitation of natural resources.

An affinity exists between the modern African and his American Negro brother. Such a feeling should not seem strange, for the Pan-African movement began in the United States, and the Africans feel a certain amount of gratitude because of that fact. Too Mboya has said:

'It should be understood that we feel a special bond with American Negroes, and that we feel our struggle is closely related. Negation rests on United States of the moral standing and power if one is to give effective leadership to the free world.'

Efforts to establish the principle of equality of the races in the United States were viewed with sympathy and understanding. Those who were victims of discrimination welcomed compensation for the government, as well as an alliance with those who would assist her efforts.'


CHAPTER VI

OTHER UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENTS IN EAST AFRICA

I. RACE AND RACE RELATIONS

An affinity exists between the modern African and his American Negro brother. Such a feeling should not seem strange, for the Pan-African movement began in the United States, and the Africans feel a certain amount of gratitude because of that fact. Tom Mboya has said:

It should be understood that we feel a special kinship with American Negroes, and that we see our struggles as closely related. Segregation robs the United States of the moral standing she needs if she is to give effective leadership to the free world. 370

Efforts to establish the principle of equality of the races in the United States were viewed with sympathy and understanding. Those who were victims of discrimination expressed commendation for the government, as well as an impatience with those who would obstruct its efforts. 371


The American Negro does not identify with the African to the extent that the African identifies with the Negro.\textsuperscript{372} Probably because he has been cut off from his homeland for so long and that he has been fully oriented to Western life, the Negro has thought of himself as an American first of all.

East African leaders judge the United States by its accomplishments in regard to the Negroes among its citizens. They believe that the freedom struggle in which they have become engaged is the struggle of all men of color.\textsuperscript{373}

Perhaps the performance of the United States in regard to Africans upon the continent has affected relationships more than the domestic problem, for the Americans have an equivocal record so far as Africans in South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, and Southwest Africa are concerned.\textsuperscript{374} The temporizing attitude of the United States is represented by a statement made by Undersecretary Satterthwaite:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{373}Ibid., p. 242.
\end{itemize}
"Our official policy is clear and unmistakably opposed to racial discrimination. Nevertheless, in view of our own domestic problems in the field of racial relations, the United States should in good conscience avoid attempting to suggest to any African territory specific solutions to these problems."

African students in the United States have complained that Negroes often exhibit an unfriendly and superior attitude toward them.

East Africa has its own racial problems. The settlers in Kenya, the Indians in all the territories, the Arabs along the coast and on the island of Zanzibar, all contribute to a racial problem which rivals any other difficulty. An influx of Indians into East Africa in 1952 raised some serious problems for all governments in the area.

Tribalism also represents a formidable problem for the East African states. Indeed, some observers have


suggested that the new countries will founder on the
difficult problem of tribalism. 379

Negroes in the United States have been able to assert
themselves to an extent approached by no other Western state.
Africans are aware of this fact and their estimation of
United States' racial policy is that it is proceeding in
the desired direction. When the Kenya Africans made a
pilgrimage to London in 1960 to write a constitution,
their counsel was Thurgood Marshall. 380 The very recent
elevation of Marshall to the Supreme Court of the United
States probably will favorably affect relations with East
Africa.

II. ASSISTANCE TO LABOR

East African nationalism has been closely connected
with the labor movement. Tom Mboya, who is deeply involved
in the labor organizations of Kenya, as well as the politics
of the country, says that the real beginning of unionism in
Kenya was during the Mau Mau emergency. 381

Saturday Review, 47:27, December 5, 1964; Elspeth Huxley,
"Africa's First Loyalty," The New York Times Magazine,

380 Donald Weidner, A History of Africa South of the

381 Mboya, Freedom and After, p. 195.
In 1953 there were seven unions in Kenya, and by 1963 there were twenty-eight. These unions have combined to form the Kenya Federation of Labor.\(^3\)\(^8\)\(^2\) The unions of Kenya were aided by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, in the persons of David Newman and Jim Bury.\(^3\)\(^8\)\(^3\) These men helped Africans to organize and to specify their aims as labor organizations.

The American Federation of Labor also aided the Africans of Kenya by giving them access to their publications, as well as other aid.\(^3\)\(^8\)\(^4\)

From Kenya, the development began in Tanganyika, when Mboya visited Dar es Salaam in 1955. In the capital of Tanganyika, he talked with Rashidi Kawawa, who was Secretary of the Civil Servants Association.\(^3\)\(^8\)\(^5\) At the suggestion of Mboya, the leaders of the various union organizations agreed to form the Tanganyika Federation of Labor, and the movement in that territory became national in scope.\(^3\)\(^8\)\(^6\)

\(^3\)\(^8\)\(^2\) Ibid., p. 196.  
\(^3\)\(^8\)\(^3\) Ibid., p. 36.  
\(^3\)\(^8\)\(^4\) Ibid.  
\(^3\)\(^8\)\(^5\) Ibid., p. 197.  
\(^3\)\(^8\)\(^6\) Ibid.
Mboya also visited Uganda in 1955 for the same purpose as his trip to Tanganyika. He found that the laborers in that country were much harder to organize than in Kenya or Tanganyika, and their progress was noticeably slower. The Uganda laborers only began to take an interest when the organization showed some tangible results.\(^{387}\)

John Scott gave an American appraisal of the labor movement's importance in Africa by asserting in 1959 that "... the labor unions constitute one of the most important barriers to Communist infiltration into the continent."\(^{388}\)

The response of American labor officials was appropriate, attested by the following analysis by the Council on Foreign Relations in 1959:

Requests for assistance have been made directly to American labor leaders who have visited Africa and by African leaders who have visited here. In response, aid is being given directly and through the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and other free labor organizations with which American unions are affiliated.\(^{389}\)

\(^{387}\)Ibid., p. 199.

\(^{388}\)John Scott, "Last Chance in Africa," *Atlantic*, 203:93, April, 1959.

East African unions have followed the forms of American unionism. Mboya remarked that "... we also became convinced we would have to move to the American and Canadian system of a 'check-off' payment of dues, ..., ." The system was placed upon the statute books of Tanganyika, and was accepted by many employers in Kenya and Uganda on a voluntary basis.

While more extensive resources would no doubt reveal a deeper involvement of American Labor with the East Africans, the above citations attest to the fact that this country was significantly engaged in efforts to organize the workers of East Africa into effective unions.

III. EDUCATION

The United States has played an important role in the education of Africans since World War I. A few students made their way to this country and studied in various fields. They were generally poor, lonely, and discriminated against, and they all came to the conviction that Africa was not destined to be the dependency of Europe, but that they, too, had distinctive contributions to make to the world.

390 Mboya, Freedom and After, p. 190.
391 Ibid., p. 191.
Prior to World War II, few Africans ever left their homeland. But, some did leave, travelled broadly, and usually found their way to America. The United States provided much of the stimulus for the movement toward nationalism.\footnote{Hans Kohn and Wallace Sokolsky, \textit{African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century} (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1965), p. 22.}

Perhaps the small number of Africans studying in the United States helps explain the success of their venture. Because, had the number been very large, the colonial authorities probably would have tried to thwart their efforts, as they did in the case of Gatheru.

The number of Africans in American schools always remained small. A report in July, 1952, gave the total number of foreign students in the United States as 30,462. Significantly, there was no estimate of the number of African students.\footnote{J. W. Gardner, "Foreign Students in America," \textit{Foreign Affairs}, 30:637-50, July, 1952.}

Although small groups were aiding Africans in education in the United States, perhaps the first significant organization was the African-American Institute, founded in 1953, which began to expedite the movement of
Africans to the United States. The organization set up an office in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika to process applications for scholarships and other matters related to the students' preparations for college.  

Tom Mboya came to the United States in 1956 and found that scholarships had been offered to East African students, but they were unable to pay for their transportation. The problem was presented to the American Committee on Africa and means were found to transport a number of students to the United States.  

In 1959, the African-American Students Foundation was begun with the purpose of raising money to charter aircraft to transport East African students to the United States. That year saw eighty-one students transported by the airlift, one of whom later became the wife of Mr. Mboya.  

The founding of the African-American Students Foundation, and its subsequent activities, provided impetus for

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394 Mboya, Freedom and After, p. 145.
395 Ibid., p. 59.
396 Ibid., p. 138.
397 Ibid.
further action by official groups, as Mboya notes in his account of the events.

The African-American Students Foundation spurred on the Ivy League colleges to set up ASPAU, and it also stirred the Institute of International Education, which is a private agency handling educational exchange for the U. S. Government on a contract basis, to expand its then small programme. 398

The small size of the budget for African education may be seen in the comment of Time in 1960 when it said, "The State Department spends less on African education ($2,000,000 this year) than it does in any other area." 399

The year 1960 provided an interesting incident involving African students. When the students could not meet the expense of travel to the United States, they asked the Eisenhower Administration to finance the project. The government refused to grant their request, but John F. Kennedy arranged for the necessary funds through the Kennedy Foundation. 400

The presidential campaign was in progress and the response of Kennedy provided abundant publicity for him.

398 Ibid., p. 145.
The government later offered the money needed, but the Kennedy Foundation funds had already been accepted.\textsuperscript{401} The Department of State made $100,000 available in 1961 for the purpose of transporting East African students to the United States.\textsuperscript{402}

The students who came to American schools were at the heart of East African life, since they were in positions to contribute to the progress of the people. They were clerks, teachers, secretaries, draughtsmen, laboratory assistants, surveyors, postal clerks, salesmen and health inspectors.\textsuperscript{403} The contribution of American educational enterprises will never be ascertained with finality, but it must be considered important.

The public school system made an indelible impression on many of the students. A representative comment is the following, taken from The New York Times Magazine: "One of the really great things about America that I have been discovering since my arrival is your public school system."\textsuperscript{404}

\textsuperscript{401}Mboya, Freedom and After, p. 146.
\textsuperscript{402}Ibid., p. 139. \textsuperscript{403}Ibid., p. 148.
The number of students continued to increase as the countries of East Africa progressed toward, and acquired, independence. 405

Not only have Americans contributed to education on the advanced levels, but they have been deeply committed to education within the East African countries. An example is the Jeanes School at Kiambu, Kenya. This school was named for Anna T. Jeanes of Philadelphia, who contributed to its support. Primarily, the school is for adult education, which is an impressive need of East Africa. 406 Later, the Agency for International Development contributed money for the conversion of the Jeanes School into the Kenya Institute of Administration. 407

Literacy among adults has been of much concern to the governments of East Africa. Consequently, many groups have designed programs to attack the problem of adult education. 408


408 Ibid., p. 152; Unpublished minutes of The Baptist Mission of East Africa, August 23, 1956, on file with The Foreign Mission Board of The Southern Baptist Convention, Richmond, Virginia.
When independence came to the East African countries, there was a critical shortage of secondary school teachers. A response to this need was made by the United States when the Agency for International Development asked Columbia University to send 157 teachers to the area. They received training at Columbia, with additional orientation at Makerere College in Uganda. They served in all the East African countries. In three years the program sent more than 370 secondary teachers to East Africa to relieve one of the most pressing needs faced by the countries.

An example of multi-lateral aid to education in all of Africa is the UNESCO Special Fund, which was inaugurated in 1964. The fund was given a total of $85 million which was to be spent in forty-two countries, twenty-six of which were in Africa. The United States will contribute heavily to the program, as it does to all United Nations projects.

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IV. THE PEACE CORPS

Perhaps nothing excited the idealism of young Americans more than the Peace Corps. Created by President Kennedy, the Corps was designed to mobilize the idealism of America's youth, and, in the process, to make a contribution to the welfare of developing nations.\(^{412}\)

The energetic young Americans were not received without questionings however, and it was necessary for the director to allay the fears of the fledgling governments about the purpose of the organization.\(^{413}\)

A report of the work of the Peace Corps in East Africa in 1966 gave the total number of volunteers as 649. Of that total, 457 were engaged in teaching, either in elementary or secondary education.\(^{414}\)

An indication of the contribution being made by the teachers in the Peace Corps is seen in the following comment:

The Peace Corps had become a vital force in African education, particularly secondary education. It had encouraged an expansion of African school systems, challenged the habit of rote learning, and, to a lesser extent, dampened

\(^{412}\)Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 606.

\(^{413}\)Ibid., p. 607.

elitism in the schools. It is trying to help African leaders prevent their schools from becoming factories for the production of facts without thought—of "skeletons without organs."415

Without the teachers provided by the Peace Corps, much of the advancement made by the school systems in East Africa would not exist.416 The Corps has been a primary source of teachers for Tanzania (Tanganyika and Zanzibar).417

While the primary task of the Peace Corps in East Africa has been to aid in education, there have been people with other skills working there too. They have been engaged in most of the phases of public life in the area.

V. MISSION UNDERTAKINGS

American missionary efforts in East Africa began in the nineteenth century and have contributed much to the area in many fields.

Groups that have work in East Africa include the African Inland Mission, American Friends, the Church of God, Seventh Day Adventists, Southern Baptists, Assemblies of God,

Salvation Army, Eastern Mennonite Board of Missions, Christian Missions in Many Lands, Gospel Furthering Fellowship and the Churches of Christ. 418

The work of these organizations is spread over the whole of the three countries of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, Zanzibar receiving scant attention. 419

Their work is extensive, taking in most of the fields of humanitarianism as well as religious activities.

A typical example is given in the excerpt below:

American Friends have been in Kenya since 1902. It is the largest of their five mission fields, and Kaimosi near Lake Victoria is their largest station. Here 39 missionaries are carrying on an ambitious program of medical, educational, industrial, agricultural, and evangelistic work. Particular projects include the Bible Institute, Girl's Boarding School, Boy's Boarding School, Junior Missionary School, Industrial Department, Agricultural Department, Men's Teacher Training Center, Women's Teacher Training Center, Press, Work Camp and Hospital. Besides all this there is an extensive school program on the primary and intermediate levels, which provides education for almost 40,000 children. Bible teaching is given in all schools. The work at Kamusinga, opened in 1957, centers around a secondary school. 420

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420 Glover, op. cit., p. 326.
While other mission groups do not conform precisely to the foregoing example, it indicates the scope of work of mission groups in all the East African countries. Some have concentrated their efforts on a few types of work, but all have engaged in a broad ministry. Southern Baptists entered East Africa in 1956, establishing a specialized hospital at Mbeya, Tanganyika, and a goodwill center, with adult literacy work, at Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika.\footnote{i}{H. C. Goerner, Thus It Is Written (Nashville, Tennessee: The Convention Press, 1944), p. 34.}

That mission endeavors are extensive, and their accomplishments impressive are undeniable. However, many question the motivations for a voluntary engagement in such work.

H. C. Goerner, Secretary for Africa for the Foreign Mission Board of The Southern Baptist Convention has stated the motivation in terms of the eternal purpose of God to bring salvation to all of mankind. The incentive for the individual is to help in carrying out that purpose.\footnote{i}{Ibid., p. 335.}

Harold Lindsell includes more in the following analysis of the motivation for mission work:

When any Christian notes the spiritual, physical, and moral morass of the pagan world,
all of which he knows to be the consequences of sin and when he realizes that he himself has been delivered from this bondage and corruption without works and by grace, constraint, of necessity, is laid upon him to bring to others the same opportunity for deliverance which has been his. 423

Such an estimate includes more than an interest in the future salvation; it becomes cultural and implies that the technical and economic aspects of the American, or Western, society is the result of the Christian Gospel.

Robert Hall Glover is more explicit when he enumerates the motivations for mission enterprises. He first talks about the physical condition of the mission fields and associates them with the absence of Christianity. Next he gives the moral circumstance of the pagan, speaking of the various cultural practices such as caste, polygamy, and others. This, too, is a central motivation of mission work. His last element is the spiritual condition of the heathen. 424

Sometimes it is intimated that the concern with the physical and cultural elements is prompted by a desire to


424 Glover, op. cit., p. 4.
find ways of ministering to the spiritual needs of the people.\textsuperscript{425} Such an analysis would explain many of the enterprises into which missionaries go, such as hospitals and schools. But, it does not explain the extent, universality and permanence of such commitments.

Lindsell indicates that the mission concern is also humanitarian and cultural.

Christianity can and does do something about physical conditions. One of its most important by-products is that humanitarian concern which corrects these tragic anomalies through education, example, and Christian zeal.\textsuperscript{426}

Henry P. Van Dusen, writing in 1964, indicated a strong concern over the fact that the missions of Africa have remained fragmented in the traditional Protestant divisions. It is his thought that such division has left African missions unable to cope with the problems of the emerging denominations in these countries.\textsuperscript{427}

Another writer's opinion is that in order to minister to Africa, the Church must disengage itself from the various


\textsuperscript{426}Lindsell, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 47-48.

forms of secular enterprises and turn to direct evangelism, somehow finding unity in the process. 428

Most observers will agree that the present attitude of African church leaders is ecumenical and they advocate more involvement in the political life of the countries. The All-Africa Conference of Churches, held in Kampala, Uganda in 1963, gave a picture of Africans who want a Pan-African church movement similar to that of the political sphere. It also indicated that the old system of missionary supervision was doomed. 429

A certain ambivalence is practiced by many of the American denominations working in East Africa. Southern Baptists are an example. The mission organization is a member of all of the Christian Councils of the countries involved. The minutes of the second meeting of the Baptist Mission of East Africa contain the following motion:

Motion passed that we seek to affiliate ourselves with the Christian Councils of Tanganyika and Kenya and that we cooperate


with them so long as it does not involve compromising our Baptist principles.430

Membership in, and cooperation with, the Christian Councils has continued to the present time.

The Councils fill an evident need in coordinating the cooperative activities of the various missions, such as that of the Kenyans in 1954, when they asked for help in rehabilitating the many thousands of former Mau Mau followers.431 Such a task would have been impossible for any of the missions alone, as indeed it was beyond the means of the Christian Council of Kenya, for it had to ask for emergency help from sympathetic Christians in other countries.

The Christian Council of Tanganyika has had a refugee project since the influx of Africans fleeing from Rwanda, as well as other cooperative efforts.432

The practical value of the Christian Councils is not only in the area of expediting cooperative ventures, but also in the fact that the governments prefer to deal with

430 Unpublished minutes of The Baptist Mission of East Africa, December 6, 1950, on file with The Foreign Mission Board of The Southern Baptist Convention, Richmond, Virginia.


only one organization rather than many. The future indicates even closer organization of the religious groups in East Africa; the Africans are demanding it.\textsuperscript{433}

Sir Philip Mitchell, former Governor of Kenya, has remarked, when asked about the causes of the twentieth century revolution in Africa:

Well, I believe that, fundamentally, it was the Bible, the Bible and the brave, determined, merciful men and women who carried it and its message of hope—hope of the end of the slave trade, of prevention of epidemics and relief of famine, of protection from the savage whims of tyrants or the obscene orgies of sorcerers— to a people who were living in a brutish lethargy induced by continuous danger, horrors, and sufferings.\textsuperscript{434}

Sir Philip was voicing the conviction of the colonialists, who thought that their task was to bring Western civilization to the continent. He equated the work of missions with the civilizing work of the British government.

That the same attitude was held by some missionaries is apparent from the comments of various critics of mission policy. J. H. Robinson wrote in 1953, "Unfortunately, the communists, the nationalists, and the


secularists often equate the missionary movement with the colonial exploitation, sometimes with justification. Although another writer states that, "... it is not the old-line mission denominations from Europe and America which championed the cause of revolution in Africa." The writer further remarked that the political leaders of Africa had found the churches to be reactionary and opposed to the changes taking place. This seemed strange to them, because they respected the role played by the missions in the early progress of the Africans.

The failure of the missions to comprehend the drift of the new spirit caused wholesale defections among some of the tribes of Africa. The Kikuyu particularly deserted the churches during the Mau Mau uprising. But, it must be emphasized that the defection was incipient long before the publicized rebellion.

Elijah Masinde was one of the many native religious leaders of Africa to form entirely indigenous churches.


He formed a movement based on eclectic doctrines which were vaguely Christian. He also demanded that the European be expelled from Kenya. Such separatist movements have arisen in many areas of East Africa as well as other countries on the continent.

The natural proclivity of mission groups to give aid and comfort to colonialism was recognized and efforts have been made to change the attitudes of the missionaries toward their African proteges, taking them into full partnership with the missionaries in the posts of management and policy-making. In this way it is hoped that the separatist movements will be stifled and the ministry of the churches to Africa may be preserved.

It is hoped also that mission bodies will be able to exert a stabilizing influence on the African states as they consolidate their rule and evolve indigenous institutions throughout their national life.

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439 Robinson, op. cit., p. 72.

440 Ibid., p. 66.

The failure of American missionaries to distinguish between their culture and the essential Christian Gospel has been the greatest single mistake in Africa. The comment of an African in the *American Journal of Sociology* makes the point clearly.

The establishment of Christian missions in Africa has been an act of spiritual aggression; they operated on the principle that everything African and indigenous is contrary, while everything European and foreign is acceptable to the will of God. The glaring contradiction between religious theory and the economic and political practices of Christians has made Africans distrust the Christian Church, and it is losing ground through its own fault. 442

The seriousness of the effect on sociological matters is made also in the same publication, when an author commented:

Missionaries represent a subculture within Western culture. They stress theology and the moral taboos more than do their fellow-countrymen. According to the prejudices of their sects, Missions combat nakedness, manners, and the mores concerning marriage, health, property, and what they accomplish is characteristically a compromise between Western and indigenous ways. In some cases easily assimilable, the new traits may weaken the family and the prestige of the chief, destroy social classes and create new ones, and usurp the native arts. 443


L. K. Painter, commenting on the disruption of customs in Kenya by the missionaries, says:

Too frequently the first action of these well-meaning newcomers is figuratively to sweep clean the African hut of all primitive practices regardless of their worth to people living under long established cultures.\footnote{L. K. Painter, "To Sit Where Kenyans Sit," 
Christian Century, 76:1337, November 18, 1959.}

A typical call for changing cultures is seen in a book written by Martha L. Moennich. She speaks of the elements of the culture of Africa without asking whether those practices have value to the Africans, or whether they really do contradict the Christian Gospel.\footnote{Moennich, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 139.}

A typical excerpt is given below:

When young boys and girls are initiated into adolescence, the vile rites performed (in many tribes) are physically harmful and morally degrading and beyond description, when the children are taken to fetish groves and made to sin. Is there not an urgent call for the Gospel to set men free from this terrible life? How beautiful are the feet of those missionaries who have gone in the past, who are there now and who are on their way out there.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 142.}

An apt rejoinder is that of L. K. Painter, writing in \textit{Christian Century}, when he commented regarding the

\footnote{L. K. Painter, "To Sit Where Kenyans Sit," 
Christian Century, 76:1337, November 18, 1959.}

\footnote{Moennich, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 139.}

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 142.}
missionaries of Kenya and the Kikuyu, "Actually, they have little direct contact with local village life."  

In the same article, Painter accused many missionaries of spending several years in Kenya without learning the native language, either the local vernacular or the trade language, Kiswahili. He charged that, "... they have little real knowledge of the people whom they seek to convert and are not seriously concerned about their social, economic and political problems.

Harold Lindsell stated:

Missionaries are bound by the cultures in which they have been raised, and all other cultures are foreign to them. The temptation for mortal men is to regard their particular culture as sacrosanct and to think of all other cultures as "queer." More than that, many people think of their culture as being "right" and suppose that those who do things some other way are "wrong." Since the missionary is human, the chances are that he, too, will tend to think and to evaluate other cultures against his background and with the unspoken assumption that whatever is not in agreement with his culture is somehow suspect.

American missionaries have educated the Africans in their schools, taught them the precepts of the Bible,

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447 Painter, op. cit., p. 1337.
448 Ibid.
449 Ibid.
450 Lindsell, op. cit., p. 278.
and then have been highly surprised and indignant when
their pupils have asked them to practice the simple gospel.
They, too, recognize the veneer of culture over American
mission enterprises. 451

There is no question but that missions have contrib-
uted to the modern situation in Africa. They have made
contributions in all the fields of endeavor, and they have
raised the African's view of himself, allowing him to walk
with pride in the world. 452 The tragedy is that they
failed to recognize what was essential Christianity and
what was merely cultural.

The result has been to create a generation of Africans
who are caught between two worlds, belonging somehow to both,
but really to neither. 453 The consequence is that the
modern African is intent upon taking that which is obviously
valuable in the gospel and harmonizing it with the evident
values inherent in the culture that spawned him. Painter
gives a reasonable solution to the problem of future
missions in East Africa:

451Painter, op. cit., p. 1336.

452Robert Ezra Park, "Missions and the Modern World,"
American Journal of Sociology, 50:177-78, November, 1944.

453Branislaw Malinowski, "Pan-African Problem of
Culture Contact," American Journal of Sociology, 48:649,
May, 1943.
Kingdom building in Kenya calls for prophets and Christian statesmen. The leadership of the emerging church must be African and not Western. The Churches of the West can help train leaders who will not be hampered by denominational prejudices and practices. A living Church in Kenya must be set in the natural social landscape of indigenous African culture.
African nationalism received much of its impetus and inspiration from Negro leaders in the United States. The first organized efforts to project the African goals were made by American Negroes. Led by Negro agitators, who insisted that their race retain its distinctive culture and community feeling, the movement gained momentum slowly, culminating in the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester, England. Basil Davidson asserts:

In this respect the sixth congress, held at Manchester in 1945, was crucial. Here for the first time the Old Guard from over the ocean was flanked by new men from the continent itself; obscure young men, for the most part, whom few in England (or anywhere else) had ever heard of—among them Kenyatta from Kenya, Nkrumah from the Gold Coast, Akintola from Nigeria, Johnson from Sierra Leone.455

Official attitudes in the United States respected the jurisdiction of the European nations and shrank from any direct involvement with African aspirations. Such policies continued until it became evident that the newly independent nations were capable of exerting sufficient

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pressure to preserve their sovereignty, and were capable of competing in the technical world of the twentieth century.

The official change of attitude was signaled by the creation, in 1957, of the African Bureau in the Department of State. The action was commented upon by the Council on Foreign Relations in the following manner:

The establishment within the State Department during the year of a special Bureau of African Affairs, headed by an Assistant Secretary of State, testified to the realization of Congress and the executive that African matters could no longer be handled, as in the past, as an adjunct of European or Near Eastern policy.456

United States interest in Africa has been to maintain the availability of the raw materials of the continent for Western productive capacity, while keeping the African nations stable and viable as political and economic units.457

This interest has been both selfish and philanthropic. It has sought to gain markets for productive capacity, maintain the flow of raw materials, and keep


the Africans amenable to the United States' foreign policy. Yet, it has also been deeply interested in the well-being of the African states. Public opinion has been especially sensitive to the latter.

Problems have always existed in the relations between the African states and the United States. East Africa has been especially sensitive to the ebb and flow of American policy, aware of the existence of power and the relationship between power and the independence of states. Mainly, differences that have arisen between the East African states and the United States have been the result of varying patterns of thought and basic philosophies. However, some tense relations have developed out of the selfish motives of both parties.

The United States has had a large economic interest in Africa for many years. But, the advent of the atomic age gave them an even greater interest in the stability and friendliness of the new African states. Even where the investment remained small, in relation to the total wealth of the United States, the relative size of the investment within the countries has given them a control of the economic affairs of the states.

Government aid has also tended to transfer control of the economies to the United States, by way of giving
security for loans and investments. While the United States may not exercise direct governmental control, effective control of some countries is maintained through economic manipulations.

East Africans are biased toward the West because of their long association with the British. They find it difficult to exchange connections, that have been made for nearly a century, for others that are tenuous and to be made with strange people.458

Those connections are more extensive than the governmental and economic connections which have characterized their modern history. They extend to fields such as education, religion, and other causal forces. These cannot be shed easily, since they condition all that the new countries are, or wish to become.

The West has contributed to the nature of modern East Africa. It has provided the institutions which characterize their modern governments. It has provided the impetus for their growth of national feeling, represented by the history of the United States. It has

contributed the form and substance of modern education in East Africa, as well as the reasons for giving and acquiring an education. It has given to Africa the leavening effect of the Christian Church. Although the motives and results may not always have met the high standards of Christian ethics, all that modern East Africa is has been influenced by the Christian Church.

To summarize, it may be said that the policies of the United States have been dually prompted. The government has been motivated by pragmatic considerations, taking into account relations with all the rest of the world. Privately, and this has affected to some extent the official policy, the United States citizen has been motivated by idealism in his relations with the African states. The result has been, at times, an equivocal position. Yet, it seems that the two have been able to so modify each other that neither has entirely prevailed. So the United States has been able to maintain the Western influence in Africa and at the same time it has been able to effectively use the basic idealism inherent in this country.

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THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICAN NATIONALISM

IN BRITISH EAST AFRICA

SINCE 1945

World War II brought about a realignment of the
power structure among the nations of the world. The primary
conflict of interest developed between native and the occu-
pied nations, with the United States predominant among them.
Through the leverage and influence wielded by the United
States, African nations were pressured to take steps to
self-govern in preparation for independence.

An Abstract of a Thesis
Presented to the
School of Graduate Studies
Ouachita Baptist University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Clarence A. Allison
August 1967
World War II brought about a realignment of the power structure among the nations of the world. The primary conflict of interest developed between Russia and the Western nations, with the United States predominant among them. Through the leverage afforded by the East-West conflict, African nations were able to exert enough force to dislodge the colonial powers which had ruled them for nearly a century.

Early efforts to unite the African people were carried out in the United States and other Western nations, with American Negroes leading the drive. Among these men were W. E. B. DuBois and Marcus Garvey.

The United States conducted its foreign policy, with regard to Africa, through the European capitol which controlled the African areas of interest. This policy continued until 1957, when it became evident that the African states would indeed achieve independence. In that year, the African Bureau was created in the Department of State.

Economic policy was central in all the policy considerations in the post-war period. Europe had to be rebuilt and made strong, in order to resist the push of
Russia in the East. But, in giving aid to Europe, the United States stood to gain a large export trade in every segment of the economy. The rising capabilities of the rest of the world created markets for the production of goods in the United States.

Raw materials were of vital importance. In Africa the United States sought to protect the precious store of fissionable material, which included the major portion of the American supply.

East Africa was important because of its supplies of industrial diamonds, exotic metals, and its strategic communications potential if war should come with Russia.

The United States contributed to African progress toward independence in many ways, including the revolutionary tradition of the country, the expressed idealism of its citizenry, educational work, and religious enterprises.

The revolutionary tradition of the United States gave incentive to the Africans, who felt that there was a kinship between them because of the common revolt against Britain. American leaders tended to encourage such an identification through their numerous idealistic statements advocating self-determination and other aspirations.
Educational contributions were made through the American universities which gave scholarships to Africans who could qualify and raise money for travel and through the efforts of many sacrificing people who worked within the East African countries. These latter were chiefly missionaries, although there were others, who were supported by agencies in the United States.

Missions aided the progress of East Africa by preaching the essential idealism of the Christian Gospel. The Africans could not be satisfied with their status of subjugation after they had heard the tenets of the Christian Church.

United States policies and involvements have been dually motivated. On the one hand, they have been moved by a genuine idealism, which is inherent in the American system. On the other hand, the foreign policy has been directed toward the preservation of the status quo in world politics and economy since that status gives the United States an advantage in international politics and trade.